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SOME .ASPECTS OF THE CONCEPT OF UNCONSCIOUS 
PURPOSE IN MODERN PHIIDSOPHY 
* * * * * 
* 
Chapter I 
INTRODUCTORY 
la. The problem of the dissertation. • • • • • • • • • • • • • 8 
lb. The initial stating of the problem. 
2b. The problem and the average man. 
3b. The problem and the modern mood. 
4b. The relation of unconscious purpose to the 
general teleological issue. 
5b. The reason for undertaking the study at the 
present time. 
6b. Delimitation of the subject. 
The problem is conceived as being primarily onto-
logical and metaphysical rather than psychological. 
I.e. its purpose is not to inquire whether ideas 
exist apart from our consciousness of them, but 
whether the final cause is better conceived as 
conscious or as unconscious. 
2a. Summary of the work already done in this field. • • • • • 18 
lb. Literature bearing directly on the concept. 
2b. Literature contributing to the study. (The problem 
borders on four prominent fields of philosophical 
interest, although these overlap and are not always 
kept distinct from one another.} 
lc. Teleology. 
2c. Pessimism. 
3c. The German IrrationalitRtsphilosophie. 
4c. Psychology, or the mind-body problem. 
3b. Dissertation studies in the field. 
3a. The method of the dissertation. • • • • • • • • • • • • • 25 
lb. The dissertation will first present an historical 
sketch tracing the rise and development of the 
problem, particularly in modern thought. 
2b. It will then offset the historical study with a 
critical study of terms and the chief interpreta-
tions of the concept. 
3b. The problem will then be adapted and criticized in 
relation to some of the basic metaphysical problems. 
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'IHE RISE AND DEVELOPMENT. OF THE CONCEPT OF 
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The idea of Nisus. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 28 
lb. The concept among the Greeks. 
2b. The use of the term in modern thought. 
The formulation of the concept Of unconscious purpose. • 33 
lb. Traces of the unconscious in early philosophy. • • 33 
lc. Plat o. 
2c. Aristotle. 
3c. Augustine, and others. 
2b. Initial suggestions of unconscious mental processes 
in modern thought. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 39 
lc. Leibniz. 
2c. Hume. 
3c. Kant. 
4c. Locke. 
3b. The speculative pxoblem in German idealism ••••• 45 
lc. Fichte. 
2c. Schelling. 
3c. B8hme. * 
4c. Hegel. 
4b. The influence of Oriental Thought. • • • • • • • • 56 
5b. The temper of pessimism: Arthur Schopenhauer • • • 59 
6b. The "philosophy of the Unconscious": Eduard von 
7b. 
8b. 
9b. 
Hartmann• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
The effect of evolutionary thought • 
lc. Spencer. 
2c. Fiske. 
3c. Bergson. 
4c. Lloyd Morgan, and others. 
. . . . . . . 
The effect of the psychologies of the unconscious. 
lc. Her bart. 
2c. Freud, and others. 
3c. Anti-intellectualism. 
The present status of unconscious purpose. • • • • 
Chapter III 
AN EXAMINATION AND DEFINITION OF TERMS 
65 
80 
88 
93 
A criticism of Moore's and Gurnee's division between 
psychology and philosophy ••• • -• ••••••• 
The meaning of the term "the unconscious." •••• 
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lc. The unconscious as a "psychical" continuum. 
2c. The unconscious as a physiological 
functioning. 
3c. The unconscious as the fore-conscious. 
4c. The unconscious as the non-introspectible. 
5c. The unconscious as the co-conscious. 
102 
3b. A" resume and reconstruction •••••••••••• 119 
The meaning of "purpose.". • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 130 
lb. Etymology and uses of the term. 
2b. Purpose as end, or Zweck. 
3b. The relation of purpose and consciousness. 
The chief fonns of unconscious purpose. • • • • • • • • 137 
lb. The voluntarism of Schopenhauer. 
2b. The Unconscious of Hartmann. 
3b. The blind, creative impulse of creative and 
emergent evolution. 
4b. The purposive being of DIAMAT. 
5b. Principles which we only know of as attributes, 
and are left in abstraction. 
Sununary. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . . . . . . . . 
Chapter IV 
THE .ARGUMENT FOR UNC011SCIOUS PURPOSE :FROM THE 
NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
• 152 
The 
The 
The 
The 
The 
significance of consciousness. • • • • • • • • • •• 157 
intermittent nature of consciousness •••••••• 159 
idea of the Absolute • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 163 
argument that the Absolute cannot be a Self ••••• 165 
argument that the Absolute cannot be a Person. • • • 167 
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UNCONSCIOUS PURPOSE AND '!HE PROB:LIDJ! OF EVIL 
The contribution of unconscious purpose to philosophy •• 171 
lb. The realization of purposive behavior by organisms 
as seen by Schopenhauer, Hartmann, and others. 
2b. The realization of the purposive adaptation in 
organisms as viewed by Kant, Henderson, and others 
in the new teleology. 
3b. The realization of purposive effort on the part of 
the evolutionary series. 
4b. The scientific appreciation of interaction and 
orderliness. 
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2a. The contrasting fact of evil. • • • • • • • • • • • • • 174 
3a. Theistic solutions to the problem of evil. • • • • • 176 
lb. The view that evil is not really evil. 
lc~ Partial evil as universal good. 
2c. Evil as necessary to distinguish the good. 
3c. Evil as necessary for the moral development 
of men. 
2b. Dean A. c. Knudson's 'moral agnosticism.' 
3b. The theory of a finite God. 
lc. Exemplary exponents. 
2c. Professor Brightman's systematic presentation. 
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lc. Purpose implies purpose, but consciousness 
does not imply consciousness. 
2c. The problem of the origin of consciousness. 
2b. The emergence of consciousness. 
lc. The explanation of E. von Hartmann. 
2c. The explanation of G. Geley. 
3c. The general difficulty in "gradualism." 
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lb. The instrumental values of order, continuity, 
and change. 
2b. The appreciation and realization of the intrinsic 
values. 
lc. The aesthetic experience. 
2c. The moral experience. 
3c. The religious experience. 
4c. The intellectual experience. 
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Philosophy may not neglect the 
multifariousness of the world --
the fairies dance, and Christ is 
nailed to the cross. 
Whitehead, P.R, 513 
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Chapter I 
INTRODUCTION 
**** 
* 
The Problem of the Dissertation 
It would be a commonplace from modern psychology to assert 
that much human behavior issues from unconscious motives. To maintain, 
however, as many have done, that the ultimate being which acts in, and 
lies beyond the world process is itself purposive, yet unconscious; 
intelligent, yet 'unaware'• is a different matter. It at once involves 
us in a philosophical problem where proof and disproof are alike diffi-
cult, and where metaphysical issues prove hydra-headed to the unwary 
seeker after truth. It is this problem which we propose to examine in 
the following study. 
The Problem and the Average Man. 
When the proposition is first advanced that the World-Ground 
is purposive, yet unconscious, the 'average man' is apt to consider it 
a contradiction in ter.ms, or dismiss it as a preposterous point of view. 
If he stops to reflect, however, he will probably find himself more 
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sympathetic to the notion. It is native to our present climate of thought I 
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and it is the very natural conc:l.usion that is to be drawn from two strong I 
tendencies in contemporary thinking. The concept actually phrases aptly, I 
~=~t very precisely,_::~-dew which a great many people bave of tba -~ --
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real. It is, thus, a popular position in metaphysics, although it is 
held vaguely rather than sharply. 
The Problem and the Modern Mood. 
Despite its protean forms, if not because of them, unconscious 
purpose is much more successfUl than mechanism as a contemporary opponent 
of theism. While the long conflict between the philosophies of intellec-
tualism and anti-intellectualism in the nineteenth century2 served to 
deepen the teleological problem without conclusive proofs, it tended to 
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strengthen rather than weaken man's conviction of the orderliness of world 1 
process. The gradual acceptance of the evolutionary view, the scientific II 
study of microcosm and macrocosm, the impressive appraisal of organic 
I' factors in the 'new teleology', 3 and the deep appreciation of the delicate II 
range of chemical balance within which life is possible together with the d 
II suggestion that nature is adapted to lite4 have established a climate 
1
1 
·i 
of thought which is no longer satisfied with the view that such orderlinessli 
could arise from chance or fortuitous concatenation. Materialism is not 
disproved, but the modern mind is impressed with its insufficiency. As 
General Smuts has summarized the situation, "Materialism has gone by the 
1 Thus, Sorley states, "This may be taken as the view of unconscious 
purpose ••• as the determining force of the world's progress, which 
has now in many quarters almost attained the rank of a popular 
creed." MOral Values and the Idea of God (MVIG), 41~. 
I 2 See House, "Psychologies of the Unconscious." Psychoanalytical 
'i 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Review, 15(1928), 1-25. jl 3 See Hocking, Types of Philosophy ( TP), chapter 7. Cf. BaldWin, 
1
'1 Journal of Philosophy, 33(1936), 115. . 
I 
4 Henderson develops this argument in his Order of Nature (ON), and his 
Fitness of the Environment {FOE), but refrains from accepting~y 
theistic implications. See Baldwin, E.E.• cit., ll7f • 
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board; matter, lite, and mind translate roughly into organization, 
organism, and organizer."1 It is no longer news that "The greatest 
scientists (such as Sir James J.eans} are inclining more and more to the 
., 
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view that the universe behaves like a great mind or a great mathematician !1 
II 
. 2 
rather than like a great machine." In short, the teleological factors 
have come to outweigh the dysteleological in contemporary thought. The 
average modern would accept the statement that "the goods are evidences 
tor God which the evils do not cancel,"3 perhaps deleting the words 
II 
I 
I' 
,I 
I 
"for God." The trend is to accept the major proposition of Bossuet: 11 
"All order, that is, all proportion between means and ends, supposes an 
4 intelligent cause." 
But the modern mood goes thus tar and no further. Does order-
liness imply purpose? And does purpose imply a conscious agency? Does 
intelligent activity discernible in function imply a consciousness as 
its origin?5 And if the implication be granted, is it equivalent to 
proof? In one of his early essays, William James distinguished "between 
. . 6 
real teleology" and "hypothetical teleology": 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
We can describe the latter in teleological terms, hypo-
thetically, or else by the addition of a supposed 
contemplating mind which measures what it sees going on 
by its private teleological standard, and judges it 
intelligent. But consciousness itself is not merely 
Quoted "as reported by the press" by Brightman, Is God a Person? 
(IGP), 32. 
Ibid. 
Brightman, The Future of Christianity (FC), 104. 
Ct. Janet, Final Causes (FC), 314. 
As Janet puts it, " ••• The order of nature ••• supposes a specific, 
appropriate principle may be allowed; but is that principle neces-
sarily an intention, .a will, a free reflection, capable of choice?" 
FC, 314. 
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intelligent in this sense. It is intelligent 
intelli@Bnce. It seems to supply both the means and 
the standard by which they are measured. It not only 
serves a final purpose, but brings a final purpose -
posits, declares it.l 
Science is unable to prove; it is only able to present us with an 
hypothesis. .And the hypothesis of such an additional "contemplating 
mind" is rejected by the three philosophers who are probably the most 
influential in the English speaking world today: Earl Russell, 
Professor John Dewey, and Professor George Santayana. 2 
The same factors which have been so effective in establishing 
a degree of teleology in the modern mood have been equally effective 
in denying the importance of consciousness. They have thereby seriously 
undermined the meaning and value of the traditional teleological 
argument. 
Although in a sense "the bone of contention in all philosophy 
is the importance of consciousness,"3 it is a particularly important 
issue at present. Frequently, it is still taken for granted. Thus, 
Dr. D. M. Allan, in his doctoral dissertation at Harvard in 1926, partly 
defined purpose as "effective conscious anticipation of an end,"4 and 
Dr. L. J. Jones, in a paper in the British Journal of Psycholosz, 
admits a general correlation "of intelligence with consciousness."5 
For the most part, however, the present climate of thought has been 
1 FTom William James' article on "Spencer's Definition of Mind as 
Correspondence," in Journal of Speculative Philosophy, 18?8. 
2 Brightman, IGP, ?. · 
3 Brightman, Journal of Philosophical Studies, 4 {1929), 497. 
4 As given in the abstracts of Harvard Dissertations, 1926, p. 203. 
5 Article entitled, WWhy is the Unconscious Unconscious?" Cited by 
Northri.dge, Modern Theories of the Unconscious (MTU), 163. 
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impressed with the unimportance of consciousness, and is highly 
critical of any arguments that use it as a f\~crum. 
Evolution and modern psychology have been most influential 
in developing this attitude. Evolution has stressed "blind forces," 
ii 
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shown the complex functioning of nature . be:f'ore the development apparently 1
1 
!I 
o:f' conscious phenomena, dwelt on the late emergence of man and o:f' the 
human mind as we know it, and emphasized the purely instrumental char-
acter o:f' consciousness :f'rom the point of view of its survival value.1 
Psychology, in a similar way, has pictured consciousness as flanked on 
the one side by instinct, automatic acts, and reflexes, and on the other 
side by habit. It has further circumscribed the conscious li:f'e by 
theories of unconscious activity, and behaviorism has denied the con-
scious altogether. 
Thus, the "flight from consciousness is in full swing."2 
"Not alone realism and pragmatism, but also idealism, in some of 1 ts 
for.ms, deprecates consciousness."3 Many thinkers today are as much in 
rebellion against the notion of the conscious origin of knowledge as 
I 
II I. ~I 
I 
tl 
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they once opposed the notion of the divine origin of man. 
,I 
II 
The conviction I 
is deeply grounded that consciousness is secondary and inconsequential 
as an intermittent and a broken dream; that there is something beyond 
consciousness more substantial and profound. Thus, Bergson, for whom 
consciousness is the very nature of the elan vital, "shares in the 
opinion ••• that unconscious purpose is superior to conscious purpose, 
II 
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'I I. 
,, 
l1 
l 
1 C:f'. Brightman, Journal o:f' Philosophical Studies, 4 ( 1929), 498. 1 
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,I 2 .Brightman, Personality and Religion, (PR), 29. . j' 
d 3 Brightman, Journal o:f' Philosophical Studies, 4 (1929), 500_· ----·---===--=-
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and he therefore opposes the philosophy of finalism."1 As Sir H. 
" Cunynghame mively seeks to orient the thought across the centuries: 
It is curious how almost all our great philosophical 
thinkers have hankered· after some such explanation. 
The 'demon' of Socrates ••• ; the realities of Plato 
••• ; . the ecstasy of the Neoplatonists; the scientia 
intuitiva of Spinoza; the practical reason of Kant; 
the 'morai sense' of the English Ethical Schools; the 
Will .of Schopenhauer; all indicate a belief that 
somewhere there is Super-reason which lies above and 
commands the reason of consciousness.2 
We may say, consequently, that a respect for cosmic efficiency 
and an impatience w1 th consciousness have combined in the modern mood !J 
to produce "a common tendency at present in several schools to adopt 
a middle theory between the Epicurean theory of fortuitous combination 
and the Leibnitzean of intelligent choice."3 This middle theory is 
the concept of unconscious purpose. This is the idea, it is thought, 
which can probe the face of existence, and reveal what Santayana sees 
as "surely more than hmnan, less than moral, other than dialectical."4 
The Relation of Unconscious ?urpose to the General Teleological Issue. 
In his article on teleology in the Encyclopedia of Religion 
and Ethics, Mr. William Fulton states: 
(The) ancient opposition between the mechanical and 
teleological standpoints, as represented by Democritus 
and Aristotle respectively, sets a problem which runs 
through the whole hi story of philosophy. The funda-
mental question at issue is, are rational processes 
subordinate to conscious rational p~oses, or is the 
1 Brightman, Journal of Philosophical Studies, 4 (1929}, 500. 
2 Cunynghame, "Short Talks upon Philosophy (STP), 237. 
3 Janet, FC, 379. 
4 Santayam, The Realm of Matter, (BM), 204. 
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world to be explained and interpreted by mechanical 
puxposes alone?! 
This position leaves no middle ground between teleology and mechanism, 
but the concept of unconscious purpose is a mediating theory, and 
attempts to establish one. 
Like many mediating theories, it is unstable and beset by 
the difficulties of both the views between which it occupies its 
uncertain position. 
Like the mechanical theory it has to face the most 
awkward of all problems, the · trans! tion from the 
' unconscious to the conscious; and it shares with the 
opposed view the assumption of an internal factor of 
whose operation there is no direct evidence in the 
early periods of cosmic history.2 
The theory is unstable in two ways: (1} in its mediate 
capacity, and {2) in its relation to two different meanings of the term 
'teleology.' In its mediate capacity, unconscious purpose tends to lean 
toward either mechanism or teleology. Insofar as unconsciousness is 
made essential to the teleological position, the theory moves toward _ 
mechanism. Thus, Professor E. s. Brightman can see little difference 
between unconscious purpose and mechanism.3 On the contrary, insofar 
as intelligent orderliness is made the chief essential of purpose, the 
theory moves toward teleology. Thus, Professor La~nce Handerson 
"re:fuses to make the inference from 'preparation' to a Being who 
~~~~ 1 ERE, XII:216a. 
2 Sorley, MVIG, 422. 
1 3 See Brightman, Introduction to Philosophy, {ITP}, 308, "••• Like 
I mechanism, it explains purpose in terms of no purpose.~ <!·~· no 
'purposer' ). "The only advantage of unconscious purpose is that 
!I 
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11 it calls attention to nwnerous facts t hat point toward a teleo- 1.1 
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1 logical explanation. tt ITP, 308. JL! 
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prepares,"1 and argues not tor a cosmic intelligence, but simply for 
tele.ology. By teleology he claims to mean nothing more than "that the L 
properties 'unaccountably preceded that to which they are unquestionably il 
2 1!1 related.'" 
In relation to the meaning of the tenn 'teleology', unconscious 
purpose may refer equally to an external or to an internal end. 3 The 
word teleology apparently was devised by Christian Wolff in 1728 who 
used the term to designate "ends or final causes as distinguished from 
efficient causes."4 Historically, then, it implies an external end. 
It refers to a purposive order involving items related 
to each other as 'ends' and 'means'• Taken in this 
sense it is applicable only to a series in which con-
scious purposes are fulfilled, and is essentially 
identical with accomplishment, pertectibility.5 
But etymologically it refers to the organic whole, and teaches that 
"the whole is ideally prior to the parts and constitutes the explanation 
ot their mechanical actions and reactions."6 In this sense all ends 
are internal and the teleological situation is a "nexus of relations ••• 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Baldwin, ~our.nal ot Philosophy, 33 {1936), ll7. Ct. Henderson's own 
treatment in ON. 
Ibid. In criticism, Baldwin states, "Henderson's appeal to prepara-
~on, coupled with his denial of design, manifests a half-hearted 
attempt to explain w1 thout accepting the one way open. And, as 
the value-character of lite 1s impressed upon him, he gives clear 
indication of a more than halt~hearted willingness to move in the 
direction of theism." .Journal of Philosophy, 33 (1936), 118. 
The article in the Encyclopedia Britannica seems to make .an 
indefinite use of the law of sufficient re~son. It defines teleo-
logy as "that branch ot study which considers 'final causes' as 
real principles of explanation, i.e. which explains things as 
existing solely as prerequisites-of the results which they 
produce." 
Fulton, in :ERE, XII:215b. 
Cunningham, The Idealistic Argument in Philosophz ( IARP}, 144. 
Fulton, ERE, XII:216a. 
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delicately conjoined. n1 The theory of unconscious purpose may be used 
1
1 in relation to either or both of these meanings . It depends upon the 
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form which the theory takes, and the one who states it •2 In either case, 
t he concept of unconscious purpose claims that the metaphysical ground 
i s unconscious of the ends for which it strives. . 
The Reason for Undertaking the Study at the Present Ttme. 
Twenty-nine years ago, M • .Arreat expressed the hope that 
"perhaps the day is near when the intellect will be exalted anew with 
t he same zeal with which it has been depreciated.~ Today, however, 
the temper of anti-intellectualism continues unabated, and has been 
augmented by. a new practical stress upon ·action in the so-called new 
social ph1losophies.4 .An inquiry, then, into the thesis of unconscious 
purpose is timely, and in view of its relation to the modern mood, 
already sketched, it might have a practical value as well. The present 
tendency toward increased respect for orderliness together with lessened 
regard for consciousness is apt to preserve the for.m of our present 
social order without its values. 
More pressing than the timely, however, is the timeless. Is 
it possible to establish a satisfactory middle ground between mechanism 
and conscious purpose? An examination of this attempt makes it necessary 
1 Cunningham, URP, 144. 
2 E • .s_., Schopel;l.ha.uer's Panthelism, Hartmann's Panpneumatism, and 
Aristotle's Unmoved Mover. 
3 M. Lucien Ar~at, Monist, 21 (1911), 277. 
4 Fascism can give no better argument for its reactionary character 
than i ts assertion of the priority of action over theory. If new 
patterns are not provided first, actions involving group agreements 
must employ the patterns of recent yesterdays. 
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to undertake a new criticism of the arguments of reason and irration-
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alism. While incontestable proof is impossible in metaphysics, the 
theory most adequate to explain, most competent to offer a coherent 
grasp of experience must be sought as meriting the victory for any 
rational person.1 
Delimitation of the Subject. 
The following study centers around the inquiry whether the 
final cause of' teleological processes is better conceived as conscious 
or unconscious. It is interested in the psychology of' the unconscious 
only insofar as it contributes to, or suggests hypotheses tor, a 
knowledge of' ultimate being. 
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Consequently, the study must retrain from going any further !I 
I, 
into abnonna.l psychology and the intriguing field of' psycho-analysis than jl 
is necessary to give a general criticism of the terms involved and 
establish an adequate empirical background. If empirical selves or 
persons are alone real, and a society of' selves is ultimate, as in 
:r. M. E. McTaggart's thought, the psychological aspects are more impor-
tant. But even here the present study is more interested in the 
coordinating one without which the "interacting many cannot exist."2 
The study also does not expect to establish the teleological 
position, but would accept the proofs advanced by the teleolog1st as 
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1 MUller states it thus: "Denn dass man vom Gegenspieler immer sehr I' 
viel lernen kann, dattir ist die vorstehend geschilderte geistige II 
1? 
Entwicklung ein schlagendes Beispiel. Und darum scheint mir die 
Diskussion tiber di e Lehre vom Unbewussten in der klassischen Periode !l 
der deutschen P., noch heute wertvoll und wichtig zu sein." LUDP, 36~J 
2 Bowne, Metap~ysics, 126. . _ _ ~-------
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evidence to be criticized and examined for its implications regarding 
the central problem. 
** ** ** ** 
Summary of Work 
Already Done in this Field 
Although the theory of an unconsci ous drive behind, or 
transcending, the phenomenal order reaches back into the dawn of 
philosophy, and although many works imply and contribute to the theory 
of unconscious purpose , few works have been directly devoted to it as 
this dissertation confronts it. This will be demonstrated more fully 
in an historical study and we do not wish to anticipate the argument 
here. The following, rather, is a brief citation of the most valuable 
sources we have found for a study of the problem. 
Literature bearing directly on the Concept. 
The first tentative statement of a philosophy of the uncon-
I 
I, 
I 
II 
scious is to be found in Friedrich Schelling's earlier work, his T.ranscen-
1 
dental Philosophy.1 This was followed by Arthur Schopenhauer•s more 
complete philosophy of a blind will as developed in his major work, ~ 
Welt als 1Ville und Vorstellung.2 In turn, Schopenhauer' s work was 
I 
I 
l. Hegel anticipated and reacted to the tendency in Schelling's thought l1 
and called it "the night in which al.l cows are black." I 
2 In 191.9, Dr. Gustave Geley attempted to extend Schopenhauer' s work in 
his De l'inconscient au conscient, readjusting it to later develop- 1 
1 ments in such a way as to derive an optimistic rather than a I 
18 
II pessimistic conclusion. How Dr. Geley can achieve such a purpose Uj 
__ j _____ ~~~- say, "Vle have made no essential. change (see next pag=e=)=· =d±=-=:j-:J===== 
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surpassed in the directness and influence with which it stated our 
problem by Eduard von Hartmann in his Philosophie des Unbewussten. 
Hartmann' s work captivated the German publi c1 and inspired a host of 
criticisms2 and a few independent expositions. A collection of these 
has been gathered by Hermann Haacke, and was privately published in 1904 
under the title, Stimmen der Kri tik ~ber Eduard von Hartmanns Werke. 3 
More recently Wilhelm Windelband presented a study of the problem in a 
Festrede to the Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften in 1914, 
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In 1930 a comprehonsi ve survey I' 
of the development of the concept in German thought was made by Dr. 
entitled, Die Hypothese des Unbewussten. 
Otfried Mllller in her work, Die Lehre vom Unbewussten in der deutschen I 
Philosophie, and the study was reprinted later in volume thirty-eight of 
the Sammlung diagnostisch-therapeutischen Abhandlungen tar den prak-
il 
,I 
I, 
tischen Arzt. I 
After these more or less systematic treatments by German 
' 
I' 
·I 
authors, the work of Henri Bergson should be noted. I, Bergson's philosophy II 
does riot bear so directly on the problem as do the foregoing German II 
li studies; yet, it has played a most important role in developing the 
1 
2 
3 
in his (.Scbopenhauer'sLphilosophy, and we bring to it only the 
I 
I 
I 
sketch of a scientific demonstration of its truth," is a manifest I 
contradiction. The importance of the problem with which Dr. Geley•s l 
book grapples, commends it to our attention, but the book contri- _ 
butes l ittle that is of value. 
H8ffding points out that Hartmann's work went through ten editions in 
twenty years, and between 1870-1875 "fifty-eight works dealing with I 
his philosophy were written." History of Modern Phil. (HMP}, II:533. 
E.g., see Weber, Wille zum Leben, oder Wille zum Guten? 1882. . 1 
In addition, an account of the struggle which arose around the idea, I 
together with a comprehensive bibliography on the same, has been \ 
given by Olga Plllmacher in Dar Kampf urn's Unbewusste, nebst einem I 
chronologischen Verzeichniss der Hartmann-Literatur von 1868-1890. ' 
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concept of unconscious purpose in French and English thought. Bergson 
was greatly interested in consciousness from the beginning of his 
11 tera.ry efforts, and devoted the first two of his three most important 
works to its study.1 His criticisms of the intellect in his Introduction 
'I 
il 
I 
I 
a la Metaphysique, 2 however, showed him to be a sharp critic of rational- ~~ 
I· 
I! ,, 
ism and the usual conception of consciousness, and in 1907 when his 
L'Evolution creatrice appeared, he developed his own view of evolution, 
"in contrast with the two rival theories of mechanism and finalism, tt3 
and he was destined to become, willingly or unwillingly, a leader in 
"the doctrine of unconscious teleology."4 
Next in order the studi es of G. A. Feingold, w. L. Northridge, 
and s. D. House may be listed. These give a brief historical survey 
similar to Hartmann's account at the beginning of his Philosophie des 
Unbewussten. They are excellent studies of the problem of the uncon-
II 
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scious. However, they approach the problem primarily from the psycholog- :1 
ical side, and do not examine the philosophical implications of the 
problem. Hence, their usefulness is limited. 
The most direct examinations and criticism of the concept of 
unconscious purpose have been made by Professors Paul Janet, James Sully, 
Je.mes Ward, W. R. Sorley, and E. s. Brightman. Professor Janet's 
particular approach to his examination of teleology led him inescapably 
into the problem of unconscious purpose, and he subjects it to a splendid 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Essai sur les Donnees immediates de la Conscience, 1889; Matiere 
et Memoire: essai sur la relation du corps avec l'esprit, 1896. 
In Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale, 1903. 
Pringle-Pattison, The Idea of God in the Light of Recent Philosophy, 
( IOG), 370. 
_Ibid_.._, 3?1. 
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criticism of some length in his Les causes finales. Professor Ward's 
I in the problem of I! IJ own sympathy for theism gave him a special interest 
11 unconscious purpose, and he subjected t he theory to a running critici sm 
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both directly and indirectly in his work, The Realm of Ends. In tum, 
Professor Sully makes a thorough examination of the concept in his 
volume, Pessimism: a History and Criticism. His work centers chiefly 
around the philosophi es of Sehopenhauer and Hartmann. It is not always 
fair and sometimes falls into instances of special pleading. Never-
theless it presents many difficulties in a new and helpful form, and is 
a source one cannot afford to neglect . Dr. Sorley's most direct 
consideration of unconscious purpose is found in his discussion of 
"purposeff in the Gifford Lectures for 1914-1915.1 There he shows 
concisely and well the mediating nature of the concept and the special. 
difficulties it confronts . Professor Brightman devotes only two pages 
to the problem in his Introduction to Philosophz, but his statement is 
exceedingly clear and pointed. Elsewhere throughout his writings, his 
vigorous defense of the importance of consciousness leads him into 
I 
,I 
I 
continuous attacks upon the vagueness and abstractions of most theories of l 
the unconscious. His work, thus, constitutes a most valuable source of I 
II 
I criticism. The author of the present dissertation has found his work, 
together vnth the work of Professors ~anet and Ward to be of great value, I ,, 
and the present study is heavily indebted to it. 
1 MVIG, chapter :x:vr. 
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Literature Contributing to the Study. 
In contrast to the comparatively limited literature which 
directly deals with the theme of a world ground which is unconscious, 
yet ostensibly distinct from mechanism and materialism, there is an 
I 
I 
II 
inexhaustible literature which contributes to the study for the concept 
of unconscious purpose invades four prominent fields of philosophical 
interest. These are teleology, pessimism, the philosophy of irrationality I 
and psychology. These admittedly overlap and are not always kept , 
distinct from one another, but we have had to examine each. It is this 
examination which has unfortunately expanded the bibliography until it 
may appear undesirably pretentious. 
(a) Teleology 
Studies in teleology have an especially pertinent relation to 
our problem as has already been noted. In addition to Janet's most 
scholarly and critical study of Final Causes, Mr. William Fulton's 
article in the Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics should be commended, 
I 
!I 
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II 
along with Rudolf Eisler's historical source survey in his Wgrterbuch der lj 
II Philosophischen Begriffe. Other than these we call attention, especially 
" to PTofessor Wolfgang KOhler's Place of Values in a World of Fact, I 
Professor L. J. Henderson's two volumes, The Order of Nature, and. ~ 
Fitness of the Environment, and Dr. W. B. Cannon's Wisdom of the Body. 
(b) Pessimism 
As Schopenhauer•s work won favorable attention in the middle of 
the Nineteenth Century, it gave a powerful impetus to pessimism which 
developed into a special study of that theme. Pessimism had a special 
affinity for the concept of unconscious purpose and was linked with it 
22 
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in both the thought of Schopenhauer and Hartmann. In much of the work 
dealing with pessimism special treatment is given to the unconscious. 
Thus, in Mr. E. E. Saltus' The Philosophy of Disenchantment, chapter 
five is on Hartmann's work, and in Dr. K. o. Petraschek's Die Rechts-
philosophie des Pessimismus, frequent references are made to ·Hartmann•s ! 
theory of the unconscious. Mr. J. W. Barlow's The Ultimatum of PessiD1ism: l1 
An Ethical Study has a more indirect bearing. Professor R. A. Tsanoff' s 
The Nature of Evil, chapter twelve, has an excellent discussion of 
Hartmann's phi+osophy of the Unconscious. Professor Sully's work has I 
already been noted.1 
(c) Irrationalit!tsphilosophie 
The work of Schopenhauer and Hartmann also intensified an 
attack started earlier by Hume and Kant upon the supremacy of reason in 
the knowing process. This developed into movements variously known as 
anti-intellectualism and irrationalism and intuitionism; all expressively 
grouped by German thinkers under the term Irrationalit~tsphilosophie. 
These stressed feeling and volition rather than thought, and persist in 
pragmatism, intuitionism, and much arm-chair romanticism2 of today. This 
group is far too extensive to be dealt with here. Yet it contributed in 
a most significant way to provide a maieutic for views of unconscious 
purpose. 
(d) Psychology - or t he mind-body problem 
By far the most important data bordering on the subject are to 
1 See p. 21 of this dissertation. 
2 So-called to distinguish it from the romantic movement in Germany in 
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. 
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be found in the studies of the Psyche and the psychophysical problem 
contributed by psychology. In the study of the nature of the self and 
consciousness special reference should be made to the work of Miss M. w. 
Calkins, particularly in her First Book of Psychology, and in the 
Persistent Problems of Philosophz; the numerous articles by Professor 
Brightman; Professor W. E. Hocking's The Self: Its Body and Its Freedom, 
8.nd the appendix to his Meaning of God i n Human Experience;- Professor 
J"ohn Laird's Problems of the Self; Professor C. A. Strong's Why the 
Mind has a Body; Professor J". B. Pratt's Matter and Spirit; Mr. F. H. 
Bradley's analysis of the self in his Aupearanoe and Reality; section C 
of Professor c. D. Broad's The Mind and its Place in Nature; the study by 
Professors J". s. Moore and H. Gurnee, Foundations of Psychology; 
Professor Hans Driesch's The Crisis in Psychology; and Mr. J"ames Drever's 
article on the wNature of Consciousness from the Psychological Point of 
View," in volume twenty-five of the Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society. 
The psychological study of the unconscious has developed a 
whole field of literature of its own. The pioneer work in this field 
has been done by Morton Prince, Sigmund Freud, Carl J"ung, Boris Sidis, 
w. H. R. Rivers, and others. Attention will be given to these in the 
text of the dissertation. 
Dissertation Studies in the F1eld. 
The present writer has been unable to find any studies bearing 
directly on this particular problem. The ones which were most nearly 
related to the theme were collected. However, they will be omitted from 
24 
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the bibliography as a special division as was first planned. The only 
ones mentioned in the following work are those of Dr. D. M. Allan, 
"Purpose and Causality: A Study in the Problem of Body and Mind," 
Harvard University, 1926; Dr. Rowland Gray-Smith, "God in the Philosophy 
of Schelltng," University of Pennsylvania, 1933; and Dr. F. R. Iredell, 
"'Ihe Problem of the Self: an Epistemological Study of the Reality and 
Natur:m of the Self-Conscious Experience," Harvard University, 1937. 
* *** * 
Method of the Dissertation 
The dissertation will first present an historical sketch 
tracing the factors which have favored the rise of the concept of 
unconscious purpose. This study will then be offset by a criticism of 
the various terms involved, showing at length the various co~ceptions 
of the unconscious which have developed in modern psychology and 
philosophy, and discussing similarly the uses made of the problem of 
purpose. The chief forms of unconscious purpose will then be presented 
in a more critical manner than was attempted in the historical survey. 
At the close of this study an attempt will be made to appraise the value 
of the concept of unconscious purpose as a metaphysical principle. 
The concept of unconscious purpose will then be examined and 
criticized in relation to some of the most basic metaphysical problems. 
The concept of the Absolute as unconditioned, unknowable, or unlimited, 
will be examined; the comparative problems created by the teleological 
and the dysteleological evidence will be examined; and the value of 
I 
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consciousness in the conservation of value will be criticized. This 
will be closed in the last chapter with a summary of the dissertation's 
findings. 
In documentation, the full titl e of a book will ordinarily 
be given the first time it appears in the footnotes. 'Thereafter, it 
will be referred to by the author's name, and the standard abbreviation 
given in the bibliography. If a book is cited only once in the footnotes; 
and is not used throughout the study, full bibliographical data will be 
given at the time of the initial reference. In this event, it may be 
omitted from the f1nal bibliography. 
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r He cannot be sculptured in 
stone. He cannot be seen. 
Service cannot be rendered to 
Him. Gifts cannot be presented 
to Him. He is not to be 
approached in the sanctuaries. 
Where He is is not known. He 
is not to be found in inscribed 
shrined. No habitation can 
contain Him. 
From Hymn to Hopi, 
Egyptian, 18th Dynasty. 
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Chapter II 
TBE RISE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF 
UNCONSCIOUS PURPOSE IN ffiiLOSOPHY 
**** 
* 
The Idea of Nisus 
Nearly all great literature is penetrated With the belief 
in a mysterious and vague power which rules and overrules the human 
organism and consciousness. In the faith of the Hebrew it appears as 
the great "I am." Elsewhere it is posited with equal force as the 
great "It is." This is the essence of the idea of nisus which connotes 
an irresistible impersonal force moving toward the achievement of vague 
yet definite gpals. 
The ancient Greeks, caught in the turmoil of stern, impersonal, 
relentless nature, early transformed an unfriendly world into a compan-
ionable place by the imposition of friendly but fickle and wilful gods. 
These were derived from a mythology fabricated through the law of 
sufficient reason, and constructed from an insufficient and romantic 
view of natural phenomena. But these gods adorned and did not ultimately 
control the cosmic order. Behind them the three fates continued to spin, 
to measure, and to cut; and even Zeus could not say them nay. 2 The 
1 
2 
I.e. the Moirai: Klotho, Lachesis, and Atropos. 1 The Greeks occasionally ascribe him this power, and the Romans ascribe I 
it to jupiter more frequently, but neither people did so dominantly 
or consistently. 
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burning brand of Meleager' s life might be plucked from the burning for 
a time, but ultimately it must be surrendered to the fire and be consumed 
CEdi pus might struggle valiantly with an evil fate, but his best intent 
must finally be thwarted by blind passion and unknown circumstance. 
Nisus could nobly defend his city, but the beleaguered Megara must fall 
when a treacherous daughter out the fateful, purple look of hair from 
Nisus's head.1 
Dean Earl Marlatt has aptly characterized the Greek Spirit as 
"aspiration within limitations." As the Hellenic peoples swept into the 
Aegean lands, they overthrew the earlier Mediterranean peoples, but fell 
themselves under the powerful influence of the Minoan civilization.2 
The great traditions and dominant commercial power of Cnossus, the 
capital. of Crete, and of Mycenae on the mainland provided the back-
ground for many legends and myths, led to the commercial events that 
culminated at Ilium in the Homeric 'Epics, and placed the Golden Age of 
Greece in the past. The sight of the inner breakdown of this brilliant, 
yet decaying culture must have deepened the impression that all effort, 
whether divine or human, however high and noble, ultimately was bounded 
by inscrutable destiny. And the final economic and political failure 
of the versatile Greek himself helped to crystallize the impression into 
1 Strange to say, Nisus does not appear in the Greek as it is now used. 
According to Scott and Lydell, Greek Lexicon, Nisus appears in the 
Greek only as a proper name. From this it appears that the tem 
received its force from the fatal destiny of the men who bore the 
name, and thus came to be synonymous with inexorable fate. 
2 "••• The native races, endowed with a creative genius in religion 
as in art, contributed far more than the incoming Northerners to 
Hellenic belief and ritual." Botsford, Hellenic History, (N. Y.: 
Macmillan, 1922), P• 41. 
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the Stoic doctrine of necessity. 
In this form the doctrine came to the Romans whose word for 
struggle was the noun nisus derived from the verb nitor.1 The Latin term 
has a dual meaning. It may mean, "to make one's way with an effort," or, 
"to press forward," without the particular goal being specifically known 
by the agent. On the other hand, it may mean "to mount, climb, or fly" 
with respect to the goal, !·~· germinal capacities of the individual.2 
In either case it connotes an impersonal, or at least a non-subjective 
drive. The word merged with a world-view, and came to connote an imper-
sonal power within the object, or beyond, yet dominating the object, which 
drives on toward certain pre-established goals. 
The concept has kept this connotation, and has been commonly 
used by those who wish ·to refer to effort and struggle without reference 
to values personally and consciously sought. Thus, Munro in his Anatomy 
of the Nerves3 (ed. 3) 34 refers to "this Nisus of the mind to free the 
body;" Hume stated, "No animal can put external bodies in motion without 
the sentiment of a nisus or endeavor;"4 and Sir F. Palgrave, eight years 
before the publication of Darwin's famous work, wrote, "Species and their 
varieties seem to have been produced by an inward nisus."5 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Harper's Latin Dictionary. Cf. Baldwin, DPP, II:l?Sb. 
Called in biology, nisus formativus. "Leibnitz uses it as a quasi-
technical term. He denies the existence of mere capacity or 
potency, holding that reality always issues in act. This remains as 
nisus or active tendency when hindered from expressing itself." 
Baldwin, DPP,- II: l?Sb. 
See Murray, NED, 62,2, p. 16la. 
Ess. and Treat., II:4?6. See Murray, NED, loc. cit. 
Norm. and Eng· !:39. See Murray, NED, loc. cit.Cf. Century Diet. 
and Encyc. II:3999a. 
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In his study of mechanism versus teleology in the Kritik der 
Urteilskraft, 1790, Kant refers to man as one who 
Ala das einzige Wesen auf Erden, welches Verstand, 
mithin ein Verm8gen hat, sich selbst willkllrlich Zwecke 
zu setzen, ist er zwar betitelter Herr der Natur, und 
wenn man diese ala ein teleologisches System ansiehti 
seiner Bestimmung nach der letzte Zweok der Natur ••• 
Yet, man must recognize that 
Andrerseits ist so weit gefehlt, dass die Natur ihn zu 
ihrem besondern Liebling aufgenommen und vor allen 
Tieren mit Wohltun begilnstigt habe, dass sie ihn viel-
mehr in ihren verderblichen Wirkungen, in Pest, Hunger, 
wassergefahr, Frost, Anfall von andern grossen und 
kleinen Tieren u. d. gl. ebenso wenig verschont, wie 
jedes andere Tier; noch mehr aber, dass das Widersinnische 
der Naturanlagen in ihm ihn noch in selbstersonnene 
Plagen und noch andere von seiner eigenen Gattung, durch 
den Druck der Herrschaft, die Barbarei der Kriege u. s . 
w. in solehe Not versetzt, und er selbst, soviel an ihm 
ist, an der Zerst3rung seiner eigenen Gattung arbetiet, 
aass selbst bei der wohltKtigsten Natur ausser uns der 
Zweck derselben, wenn er auf die Glfickseligkeit unserer 
Spezies gestellet w!re, in einem System derselben auf 
Erden nicht erreicht werden wUrde, weil die Natur in uns 
derselben nicht empfinglich 1st. Er ist also immer nur 
Glied in der Kette der Naturzwecke, zwar Prinzip in 
Ansehung manches Zwecks, wozu die Natur ihn in ihrer 
~lage bestimmt zu haben soheint, indem er sich selbst 
dazu macht, aber doch auch Mittel zur Erhaltung der 
ZweckmKssigkeit im Mechanism der Ubrigen Glieder.2 
In this study of judgment, Kant, in harmony With his critical philosophy, II 
was prone to view teleology as subjective and as being only relatively 
valid so far as it applied to the objective world. However, he also 
I 
developed the theo~f of internal finality which had the greatest influence I 
on the further development of Ger.man philosophy, 3 and also the problem 
1 
2 
3 
Kant, 
Cf. 
Ibid. 
Ibid., 
Kritik der Urteilskraft, II, par. 83; Cassirer edition, V:510. 
this dissertation, p. 
par. 6lff. Cf. Janet, FC, 320-340; esp. 332. 
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of evolution. 
When evolution, especially emergent evolution developed, the 
idea of progress, the concept of nisus came into special use by those 
who wished to refer to an element making for the fulfilment of certain 
far-reaching goals, yet without commitment to any personal or theistic 
views and without the slightest suggestion of any anthropomorphic 
element.1 In this sense, Bosanquet referred to organic forms as stages 
in which the nisus comes alive; 2 Alexander asserts a nisus in space-
time; 3 and Buckham in an article on "Process and Purpose" writes: 
As the nisus toward spirit pushes on to higher levels, 
the drama grows more self-revealing, intelligence 
clearer, the type of freedom higher, until in man, it 
issues in that majestic and measureless potency free-
will, purchased at the cost of much wreckage and--su:t'fering, 
but unattainable otherwise and more than worth the cost.4 
In short, nisus is a classical term used to indicate purpose without at 
the same time implying consciousness. 
1 
2 
3 
** ** ** ** 
Thus Webster's 2nd. ed. unabridged ('1938) of the New International 
Dictionary now states the meaning for philosophy as "The tendency 
or principle in reality which is exhibited in the emergence of 
higher levels of existence and the movement toward the quality of 
Deity," { p. 1654b. ) 
See Cunningham, IruRP, 132. " ••• And consciousness or mind is only 
further manifestation ot the same spirit of the whole." 
Alexander, STD, II:346. "There is a nisus in Space-time which, as 
I 4 
=r-
it has borne its creatures forward through matter and life to mind, 
will bear them forward to some higher level of existence." 
Hibbert Journal 32 1933-1934} 211. 
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I 
The Formulation of the Concept 
of Unconscious Purpose 
From the idea of nisus it is seen that the notion that "men 
live by im:pulses"1 rather than by "conscious reasons"; that the belief 
that actions emanate from "the efforts of a vital energy which moves 
darkly ••• through the generations of men"2 reaches far back into the 
history of human thought. Prot~ssor Brightman cites four factors which 
have led to the theory of unconscious purpose: 3 (1) Habitual, instinc-
tive, and reflex acts by the individual, unconsciously done. (2) Purpose 
in subhuman forms of life. (3} .Adaptations between life and inorganic 
environment. (4) Influence of suppressed desires, ~cetera. The 
definite formulation of the concept of unconscious purpose is primari ly 
a development in modern philosophy; yet, the factors Professor Brightman 
cites did not escape earlier attention. Not only has "the hypothesis 
1 of the unconscious in one fo:nn or another ••• never been absent from 
modern philosophy,"4 but suggestions of it have appeared recurrently 
throughout the history of thought. 
Traces of the Unconscious in early philosophy. 
Early suggestions .of the Unconscious arise from three sources: 
{1) Plato's observation of non-conscious behavior; (2) Plato's theory of 
I 
I
. 1 House, Psychoanalytical Review, 15 (1928), 5. 
2 Ibid. 
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3 ITP.·, 308. 
Sabine, Philosophical Review, 24 (1915), 334. Cf. Eisler, w3rterbuch 
der Philoso~hischen Begriffe, who begins his citations of the uncon-/ 
scious With escart s I 
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our knowledge of objective and eternal ideas; and (3) desire to provide 
a continuity for the self. 
Plato was one of the most acute observers of human nature. 
His dialogues, particuiarly the Phaedrus,1 the Phaedo, 2 the Symposium, 3 
and the Republic contain references to activity which are strongly 
suggestive of the psycho-analytic studies of today. One of the clearest 
of these is the oft-quoted passage from the Republic: 
Some of the unnecessary pleasures and appetites are, if 
I mistake not, lawful; and these would appear to fonn 
an original part of every man ••• I refer to those 
appetites which bestir themselves in sleep; when, during 
the slumbers of that other part of the soul, which is 
rational and tamed and master of the former, the wild 
animal part, sated with meat and drink, becomes rampant, 
and pushing sleep away, endeavors to set out after the 
gratification of its own proper character. You know 
that in such moments there is nothing that it dare not 
do, released and delivered as it is from any sense of 
shame and reflection. 4 
Anticipating in a way, the problem in our third source, but 
facing particularly the problem of knowledge, Plato came to his famous 
theory of forms or ideas, and herein he laid the basis for the argument 
in modern philosophy over innate knowledge. In the ~' Plato puts the 
question rhetorically: 
I know, Meno, what you mean; but just see what a tire-
some dispute you are introducing. You argue that a 
man cannot inquire either about that which he knows, 
or about that which he does not know; for if he knows, 
he has no need to inquire; and if not, he cannot; for 
he does not know the very subject about which he is to 
1 Par. 254f. Random House edition, J"owett translation, I:257f. 
2 Par. 94. Edition cited, I:478-479. 
3 Par. 220, 221. Edition cited, I:342f. 
4 Plato, Republic, bk. 9, par. 571, 572. Edition cited, I:829. 
Of. Northridge in Psychoanalytical Review, 15 (1928}, 7-8. 
II 
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inquire.1 
Ii:t the same . discussion, he has Socrates make the answer: 
••• The soul, then, as being immortal, and having been 
born again many times, and having seen all things 
that exist, whether in this world or in the world 
below, has knowledge of them all; and it is no wonder 
• that she should be able to call to remembrance all 
that she ever knew about virtue, and about every-
thing; for as all nature is akin, and the soul has 
learned all things, there is no difficulty in her 
eliciting or as men say learning, out of a single 
recollection all the rest, if a man is strenuous and 
does not faint; for all inquiry and all learning is 
but recol1ection.2 
Plato• s views were shared by .Aristotle. Dr. w. L. Northridge 
summarizes this phase of Plato's and Aristotle's thought: 
The storing up of images, Aristotle says, is the 
condition of memory. These ret'ained images existing 
potentially may be revived by association of ideas 
presented in consciousness ••• Plato discusses men 
as the subject of impressions from without. Some of 
these never reach consciousness though the organism 
reacts to them; some enter consciousness and are soon 
forgot ten, such impressions ceasing to have any further 
existence; others reach consciousness and pass away, 
but are again capable of recall. These in the inter-
val during temporary forgetfulness have existed in 
potential form, having been retained as impressions on 
the soul. • •• Here in Plato and Aristotle we get an 
approach to the unconscious states of the type 
described in modern orthodox psychology.3 
Ordinarily Hebrew and Christian thought has been unique for 
the way in which it focused both the religious and the ethical life in 
consciousness and 1~ conscious decision.4 However, A~gustine, who has 
1 Par. 80. Edition cited, !:360. 
2 Par. 81. Edition cited, !:360. 
3 Northridge, MTU, 1-2. The same is given by House, Psychoanalytical 
Review, 15 ( 1928} , s. 
4 Thus, original sin must be traced back to the conscious transgression 
of Adam, and ~esus is referred to as sinless, not because he was 
· not tem ted in all oints like as we but because see next 
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influenced Christian doctrine so greatly, often implies a non-conscious 
ground. He was led to this by our third source, and the twofold need 
of providing a basis for the organic continuity of (original} sin and . 
grace , and for personal immortality. In Herr Alois Dempf's view: 
Augustinus spUrt die Sondergesetzliohkeit der unter-
bewussten Seelenvorginge, sein Memoria-Begriff mit 
dem geheimnisvollen Spiel der von selbst aufsteigenden 
It 
und halb auch bewusst hervorzuholenden Gedachtnis-
bilder bedeutet nichts anderes als was wir haute 
Unterbewusstsein nennen.l 
Dr. Friedrich Seifert also writes: 
Der Begriff des Unbewussten (id quod in memoria 
manet, etiam cum aliunde cogitamus) hat systematische 
Bedeutung rl1r ihn gewarnen; er 1st ihm zum unent-
behrlichen methodischen Mittel geworden~ die KOntinui-
t~t seelischen Gesehehens zu begreifen. 
Augustine's thought was followed by many other Christian 
writers. However, the neo-Platonist, Plotinus, was led to a similar 
postulate by his theory of emanations: 
Dass Plotin mit der Tatsache bnbewusst-seelischen 
Geschehens wohl vertraut ist, bezeugt eine Reihe von 
lusserungen (1. Enn. IV, 1-10; 4. Enn. IV, 4, 8; 
VIII, 8}; nur ist ihm die metaphysische Deutung 
wichtige als die psychologische Analyse. Unbewusst 
empfinden und handeln heisst ihm ungebrochener, un-
mittelbarer, naturhafter, - aber ebendamit auch in 
gr8sserem Abstand vom Geiste leben; wenn jemand 
unbewusst etwas besitzt, so kann es in h8herem Grade 
sein Besitz sein, als wenn er ein Bewusstsein davon 
h!tte.#3 
These factors recur frequently in later philosophy. However, 
he did not consciously acquiesce. (This, or course , is a belief, 
not a verifiable fact.) 
1 Handbuch der deutschen Philosophie, III:C:46:3-7. 
2 Ibid., III:E:42:22-28. 
3 ~Friedrich Seifert, in the Handbuch der deutschen Philosophie, 
III:E:22:3-10. 
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they were not molded into a theory of the unconscious in ancient times.1 I 
They refer primarily to the knowing process and the general being of I 
man; not to the unconscious nature of objective reality. 2 Plato 
suggests at least that God may be conscious when he says in the 
Republic: 
God is not the author of all things, but of good only.3 
••• Few are the goods of human life, and many are the 
evils, and the good is to be attributed to God alone; 
of the evils, the causes are to be sought elsewhere, 
and not in him. 4 
In an equally striking passage in a later work, the f!!!!, Plato says, 
"From one who is polluted, neither a good man nor God can without 
impropriety receive Gifts."5 
1 Hartmann states, " ••• The primitive man as natural existence felt his 
body and soul to be one •••• Nowhere in all Greek philosophy do 
we find this opposition clearly expressed, still less its signifi-
cance recognized, but least of all in the classical period. If 
this holds good of the opposition of the Real to the Ideal, ought 
we to be surprised that the contrast of the unconscious and the 
conscious should still less occur to the primitive understanding, 
and therefore should arise much later in the history of philoso-
phy?" PU, !:16. 
2 Thus Rudolf otto says, "FOr the non-rational and supra-rational 
strain in Plato the reader is referred to the von-Wilamowith-
M8llendorff, Plato, i, 418: and especi.ally to the splendid 
passage from Plato's 7th letter: 34lc: •concerning these things 
(sc. ultimate truth) there is not, nor will there be, any treatise 
written by men. For they do not at all admit of being expounded 
in writing, as do objects of (scientific} studies •••• Only after 
long, arduous eonversance with the matter itself ••• a light 
suddenly breaks upon the soul as from a kindled flame, and once 
born keeps alive of 1 tself • • • Only to a few men is the expositi on 
of these things of any profit, and they only need a slight indica-
tion of them for their discovery.'" Otto, IOH, 98, note 1. 
3 Republic, bk. II, par. 380. Random House edition, I:644. 
4 Ibid., par. 379; •• !:643. 
5 LaWS, bk. IV, par. 716; •• II:488. (But, does the Laws represent 
--:?lato at his best?) 
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It would seem also that Cleanthes' God is conscious since he 
sings that "even that which is evil is overruled by thee for good, and 
is made to harmonize with the plan of the world."1 And the Stoics 
argued that "since the world contains parts endowed with self-conscious-
ness, the world as a whole, which must be more perfect than any of its 
parts, cannot be unconscious; the consciousness which belongs to the 
universe is Deity."2 Cicero cites Zeno as affirming, 
Nullius sensu carentis pars aliqua potest esse 
sentiens. Mundi autem partes sentientes aunt. Non 
igitur caret sensu mundus. 3 
It is possible then for Didymus to say, "God cares for man; He is kind, 
beneficent, and loves men."4 
The nearest approach5 to the unconscious cause of Hartmann 
in early philosophy is found in the "Unmoved Mover" of Aristotle, which 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Cleanthes' "Hymn to Zeus" (as preserved in Stob. Eel., I, 30). 
Ueberweg, History of Philosophy, I: 194. - -
De Natura Deorum, 11, 8, 22. cr. Zeller, "The world would not 
be most perfect and complete unless Reason were inherent in it; 
nor could it contain any beings possessed of consciousness, 
unless it were conscious itself." Stoics, !picureans, and Skep-
tics, translated by o. Reichel, London: Longmans, Green, and 
Co., 1870. P. l38f. 
In Eus. Pr. Ev. xv, 15, 2. See Zeller, ~· cit., 143, footnote. 
Cf. Chrysippus' view: "Viewed as the whole of the world, He is 
called Zeus; viewed as the inner power in the world, Providence 
or Destiny; and to prove this identity Chrysippus maintained that 
at the close of every period, Zeus reunited Providence to Himself." 
Zeller, ~· ~., 146. Cf. Janet, FC, 337 
I 
li 
I 
I 
The God of the Stoics was "the soul of the world. For a contemporary I 
criticism of this view, see H. Wildon Carr's article, "Is there a 
World-Soul?" Hibbert journal, 29 (1930-1931), 411-420. 
A possible other exception would be Anaxagoras's "Nous." However, I 5 
we know little about Anaxagoras's view except for Socrates's \ 
complaint at the false hope that Anaxagoras inspired in him with 1 
concept. See Plato's Phaedo, par. 97; Random House ed. I:481-482. 
Cf. Aristotle's Metaphysica, 985a; translated into English under 
the editorship of w. D. Ross, OXford: Clarendon Press, 1928. 
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acts on "nature unconsciously, and by a sort of insensible attraction."! 
It thus "produces motion as being loved," while "all other things move 
2 by being moved." 
In the merging of Greek and Hebrew thought under the aegis 
of the Christian movement, the Trinitarian formula of three persons in 
one substance favored a conscious World Ground. The conception of an 
unconscious purpose was temporarily eclipsed until it reappeared in 
modern thought. 3 
Initial Suggestions of Unconscious Mental Processes in Modern Thought. 
The entrance of the idea of unconscious purpose in modern 
thought may be said to begin with the theory of unconscious mental 
processes developed by Leibniz , Hume, and Kant. 
1 
2 
3 
It was Descartes who first cal led attention to the problem 
Janet, FC, 370 . However, does Aristotle's Unmoved Mover need be 
unconscious? Aristotle's proof of the Unmoved Mover would not 
need to rule out consciousness. The answer depends upon whether 
the Aristotelian view of passion and consciousness would identify 
the two. 
Aristotle, Metaphysica, 1072b, 3-4. Aristotle also says, "But since 
there is something which moves while itself unmoved, existing 
actually, this can in no way be otherwise than as it is." ••• 
1073a, 3-13, "It is clear then from what has been said that there 
is a substance which is eternal and immovable and separate from 
sensible things. It has been sho\qn also that this substance cannot 
have any magnitude, but is without parts and i ndivisible ••• But 
it has also been shown. that it is impassive and unalterable for all 
the other changes are posterior to change of place." 
As Dean Knudson points out, however, the Christian vi~v generally 
held to personality in God rather than the personality of God. 
The Doctrine of God (DG), 287. In philosophy, God was Often the 
passionless absolute. Thomas Aquinas modeled his God on the Aristo-
telian "Prime Mover." See the Summa theologiae, I, 2, 1. Cf. 
Jourdain, La Philosophie de Saint Thomas D'A~uin, Paris: Librairie 
de L. Hatchette, 1858, vol. I:l85f. 
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of consciousness with his dictum that consciousness is self-evident 
and is implicated and assumed in the very process of doubt and denial.l 
But despite his positive emphasis on consciousness and his assertion 
that the soul always thinks, there was nothing unconscious or hidden in 
the colorful brigntness of his thought.2 Consequently, it was Leibniz 
who began the modern theory with his petites perceptions. 
"Leibniz reaffirmed the general doctrine that the soul always 
thinks and that innate ideas exist, but introduced a significant modifi-
cation of the Cartesian view by maintaining that innate ideas exist not 
actually, but in latent or potential form as natural inclinations, dis-
positions and habits, and not as activities, although these powers are 
always accompanied by some activities often imperceptible."3 Being not 
only a philosopher but also a mathematician and the discoverer of the 
differential calculus, 4 he had a great respect for the infinitesimal. 
In the Monadology5 he distinguishes between apperception (conscious 
ideation} and perception (ideation). Ideation begins with small per-
ceptions6 which remain in the unconscious, fragmentary and indistinct, 
1 House, Psychoanalytical Review, 15 {1928), s. See Descartes, 
Respons.ad object, IV. 
2 Of. Seifert, Handbuch der deutschen Philosophie, III:E:75:18-19, "In 
farblossen Helligkeit der cartesianischen cogitat1s sive con-
scientia gibt es niohts Unbewusstes, Verborgenes, UnentrKtseltes. 
3 House, ~· cit., p. 9. Of. Northridge, MTU, 5. 
4 Or, co-discoverer with Sir Isaac Newton. 
5 Sec. 14. 
6 Leibniz applied his mathematical reasoning to consciousness. As 
Windelband well states, "Von dem Zustand des klaren und deutlichen 
Bewusstseins bis hinab zu der absoluten Verworrenheit und Dunkel-
heit der rein sinnlichen Passivitgt lKsst mit nach Analogie der 
Infinitesimalrechnung durch alle m8glichen Grade hindurch eine 
allmHhliche, bis zum unendlich Kleinen absteigende Abschw!chung der 
Bewusstseinsenergie annehmen, ohne dass man diesem (see next page) 
I' ! 
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and arise in conscious representation through their summation or inte-
gration. 1 These small, unconscious ideas2 Leibniz declares "to be the 
bond 'which unites every being with all the rest of the universe,' and 
explains by their means the pre-established harmony of the monads, in 
that every monad as microcosm unconsciously represents the macrocosm 
and its position therein."3 Leibniz expresses his view of the nature 
of "unconscious" perceptions as follows: 
D'ailleurs il y a mille marques qui font juger qu'il 
y a a tout moment une infinite de perceptions en nous, 
mais sans aperception et sans reflexion, c'est-a-dire 
des changements dans l'ame m~me dont nous ne nous 
apercevons pas, parae que las impressions sont ou 
trop petites et en trop grand nombre, ou trop unies, 
en sort qu'elles n'ont rien d'assez distinguant a 
part, mais, jointes a d'autres, elles ne laissent pas 
de faire leur effet et de se faire sentir, au moins 
confusement, dans l'assemblage.4 
Again, Leibniz says: 
Ces petites perceptions sont done de plus grande 
efficace par leurs suites qu'on ne pense. Ce sont 
elles qui formant ••• cette liaison que chaque etre 
die RealitRt abzusprechen gen8tigt ist. In diesem Sinne bezeichnet 
Leibniz die Unbewussten Vorstellungen als petites perceptions." 
HP, quoted by Mftller, LUDP, 4. 
1 Cf. Kuntze, in Handbuch der Philosophie, I:B:62:47-51. 
2 "There are infinite degrees of perception, and perception is not 
necessarily sensation." Lettre aM. des Maizeaux, quoted by Weber, 
HP, 280. 
3 Hartmann, PO, I: 18. Hartmann goes on to say, "I cheerfully confess 
it was the study of Leibniz which first incited me to the present 
investigation." Ibid., 18. 
It is difficult to see-how Hartmann could interpret Leibniz here so 
as to get greater universality from the unconscious than the con-
scious. Leibniz held that the individual monad could only perceive 
what was within itself. The greater the monad and the more clear 
and distinct its ideas, the better does it represent the universe. 
Of. the Monadology; also Weber, HP, 250. 
4 Leibniz, Nouveaux Essais sur L'Entendement Humain; Paris: Librairie 
Hachette (1765) 1886, p. 104. Of. Levine, The Unconscious, 14. 
(Of. Hartmann, PU, !:19; also, Prince, (see next page) 
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II a avec tout le reste de l'univers.1 
Ces perceptions insensibles marquant encore et 
constituent le meme individu qui est caracterise par 
les traces ou expressions qu'elles conservent des 
etats precedents de cet individu, en faisant la con-
nexion avec son etat present.2 
En un mot, les perceptions insensibles sont d'un 
aussi grand usage dans la Pneumatique que les cor-
puscles insensibles le sont dans la Physique, et il 
est egalement deraisonnable de rejeter les uns 
et les autres sous ~retexte qu'ils sont hors de la 
portee de nos sens. 
Leibniz's hypothesis of unconscious perception was restated 
by Christian Wolff in his own way. As MUller states it: 
Die Auswirkung einer rein rationalistischen Geistes- . 
richtung die mit Christian Wolff •• einsetzte, 
brachte bald einen Rllckschlag. Wolff baute die 
genialen Essais von Leibniz nach seiner Art zu einem 
starren System aus. Aber in diesem System sprachen 
die petites perceptions, die eben manchmal unsere 
grandes perception sind, nicht mehr mit. Der klare, 
rein logisch zergliedernde Verstand war alles, worauf 
es ankam. Demge:mllss gab es hier auch keine .Lehre 
vom Unbewussten mehr, sondern nur nach ein, "oberes 
Erkenntnisver.m8gen," das die Wissenschaften ~priori 
(Vernunftswissenschaften) und ein "unteres Erkennt-
nisverm8gen," das die Wissenschaften ~posteriori 
(Erfahrungswissenschaften) umfasste. Bezeichnender-
weise fiel der Kausalsatz in der erste, und der 
Finansatz in das zweite Gebiet.4 
Locke rejected the theory of unconscious ideas quite emphat-
ically, and criticized that "it is not more necessary for the soul always 
The Unconscious, pp. 250-251, footnote; also House, 2£· cit., 9. 
1 Leibniz, .2£• ill·, 106. 
2 ~., 107. Cited also by Levine, .2£• ~., 15. Of. Ward, Realm 
of Ends (ROE), 62-63. 
3 Ibid., 109-110. Ct. ·Dewey, Leibniz' New Essays Concerning Human 
----uii'derstanding, 85. "Leibniz asserts that 'unconscious ideas' are 
II 
I 
of as great importance in psychology as molecules in physics. They 1 
are the link between unconscious nature ani the conscious soul." 1· 
4 LUDP, 8. 1! 
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to think than for the body always to move."1 Hume's own position dis-
posed him to be more friendly to the idea, and makes it possible for 
Hartmann to look upon Hume as a predecessor. Hume, however, admitted 
only the priority of external impressions and the manifestation uncon-
sciously to ourselves of an instinctive power far removed from our 
discoursive thinking. 
Consequently, it was Kant who continued Leibniz' notion of 
unconscious perception, chiefly in his Anthropologie: 
Vorstellungen zu haben und sich ihrer doch nicht 
bevrusst zu sein, darin scheint ein Widerspruch zu 
liegen; denn wie k8nnen wir wissen, dass Wir sie haben, 
wenn wir uns ihrer nicht bewusst sind? • • Allein 
wir k8nnen uns doch mittelbar bewusst sein eine Vor-
stellung zu haben, ob wir gleich unmittelbar uns 
ihrer nicht bewusst sind ••••• Dass das Feld unserer 
Sinnenanschauungen und Empfindungen, deren wir uns 
nicht bewusst sind, ob wir gleich unbezweifelt 
schliessen k8nnen, dass wir sie haben, d. i. dunkeler 
Vorstellungen, im Menschen (und so auch ·in Tieren) 
unermesslich sei, die klaren dagegen nur unendlich 
wenige Punkte derselben enthalten, die dem Bewusstsein 
offen liegen; dass gleichsam auf der grossen Karte 
unseres Gemnts nur wenig Stellen illuminiert sind, 
kann uns Bewunderung nber unser eigenes Wesen ein-
fl8ssen:2 
Kant did not, however, develop the concept far. Apart from the 
fact that he placed the synthetic judgment a priori at the peak of his 
I 
systematic teaching, 3 he does not make much use of the unconscious. As 
I 
1 I Locke, Essay concern. hum. understand., Bk. II, chap. i , par. 10. j 
(Philadelphia: James Kay, and Brother, Amer. ed., P• 77). Cf. 
Northridge, MTU, 4; cf. also, J. Prasad, Indian Journal Psychology, I 
4 (1929), 72. 
2 
3 
Kant, Anthropologie, I, par. 5. Cassirer ed., vol. 8:19f. Quoted 
also in Hartmann, PU, I (Introductory), p. 15. Cf. Eisler, ~.... ,. 
buch der philosophischen Begriffe , 791. 
"In dieser Rtlcksicht nlln. ste1lt Kant an die Spitze seine systema.- I 
tischen Lehrvortrages der kritischen Untersuchungen das Ideal der 1 
___ synthetisehen Urteile a priori,_~ h. ursp~~ehe:__! see _"ext pag4 -----
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Muller stat es: 
Angesichts solcher, selbst den Wahrheiten Si gmund 
Freud' s gerecht werdender Erkenntnisse mag es zunKchst 
Wunder nehmen, dass in der kritischen Philosophie, dem 
eigentlichen Lebenswerk Kents, spgter vom Unbewussten 
nicht mehr die Rede ist.l 
Thus, while these thinkers introduced the idea of the uncon-
scious, they did not develop the thought very far. Although Hartmann 
quotes the opinions of Kant and Leibniz , these two authors speak tt rather 
of obscure, indistinct perceptions, of an extremely feeble consciousness, 
than of absolutely unconscious perceptions in strict terms."2 Lewes 
accor dingly comments: 
When Leibniz referred to the fact of 'obscure ideas', 
and modern writers expressed this fact as 'unconscious 
cerebration,' the one phrase did not imply a process that 
was other than mental, the other phrase did not imply a 
process that was other than physiological; both indi-
cated a mode of the process known as consci ousness under 
other modes. 3 
Professor Friedrich Seifert explains the difference in a 
compact way: 
Dar Begriff des Unbewussten bezeichnet nur einen 
graduellen Unterschied der Erkenntnisweisen. Die 
'unbewussten Vorstellungen' (Leibnizens petites per-
ceptiones) sind als cognitio confusa nur eine Vorstufe, 
e ine niedrigere Form der 'klaren' und 'deutlichen' 
Vorstellungen und der Vernunftseinsichten. Far das 
das 19. Jahrhundert dagegen wi rd das Unbewusste zum 
Hinweis auf eine anthropologische Grundtatsache: dass 
die menschlich-individuelle Existenz genRhrt wie bedrKngt 
ist vori dunkel triebhaften MKchten des Elementarlebens. 
Hier wird das Unbewusste nicht mehr als niedrige und 
nicht logisch begrllndeter Begriffsverknftpfungen von allgemeiner 
und notwendiger Geltung." MUller, LUDP, 9. 
1 LUDP, 9. However, Mdlle~ seems to overlook the fact that the Anthro-
pologie from whi ch she quotes is much later than all the Kritik(s). 
2 Janet, FC, 352. 
3 Mind, 2 (1877}, 161. 
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lebensunwichtige Vorstufe im Vorstellungs und I 
Erkenntnisprozess, sondern als der Mutterboden von / 
triebenden Krafte~ unserer GefUhle, Gedanken, und Jl 
Taten betrachtet. 
The Speculative Problem in German Idealism. 
Many historians of the unconscious pass quickly from Leibniz 
and Kant to Schopenhauer and Hartmann. 2 It was among the German ideal-
ists, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, however , that the theory of uncon-
scious purpose received some of its strongest impulses. The German 
idealists wrestled primarily with the problem of consistency rather than 
the problem of continuity. It was this quest for consistency that led 
Schelling, particularly, to the postulate that an unconscious purpose 
is the basis of all things. 
Fichte's epistemological method of developing the Absolute 
Ego tended to bring everything into the sweep of consciousness.3 The 
necessity for the ego to posit the non-ego, to limit itself in order to 
know itself, made nature the result of consciousness. 4 As Fichte was 
lj 
li I 
1 
intexested primarily in the moral rather than the natural, he never 
!1 faced the brunt of the empirical contradictions,5 !· e. the dysteleo-
1 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Seifert, in Handbueh der deutschen Philosophie, III:E:46:3-13. 
This tendency arises in part from Schopenhauer who had an antipathy 
for Schelling. 
" • • • we cannot transcend consciousness by our theoretical reason." 
Thi lly' H:P', 440. 
True, Fichte refers to the non-ego as the unconscious product of the 
ego, but as Schell ing points out , the unconscious ego is not 
really t he ego. Cf. Weber, HP, 398. Fichte called the "uncon-
scious self-limitation of t he I," the "productive imagination." 
Cf. Windelband, HP, 594. 
As Ward points out, "••• The Absolute Ego of Fichte can only be got 
under way with the help of an unintelligible Anstoss (or impact} 
determining it to posit its non-Ego." ROE, 3?. {See next page) 
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logical factors.l 
Schelling was a follower of Fichte, but felt, in Dr. H. L. 
Martensen ' ~ words, that "••• A Theism without Naturalism, the doctrine 
of a natureless God, is a sapless, powerless, marrowless Theism ••• "2 
Accordingly, he attempted to add a philosophy of nature to Fichte's 
general position. 3 But to condition the Absolute Ego with data 
derived from the world, was to face the very problem with which Hume 
wrestled in his Dialogues on Natural Religion, 4 and Kant in his Religion 
innerhalb den Grenzen der reinen Vernunft. These had left Hume a 
skeptic, Kant wi th the problem of reconciling duty and inclination, and 
produced a pre-Barthian appeal to a t ranscendent God that left the 
divine to approach man adequately only through the imraediacy of feeling. 5 
Schelling, leaning more on the~ priori, and Hegel, leaning more on the 
a posteriori, alike struggled with the problem. Their conclusions were 
It is in this sense that Hartmann states, "··• All the elements 
of the Unconscious are to be found in Fichte , but they appear only 
casually, as vague hints scattered here and there." PU, I:24. 
1 Cf. Haeckel, WeltrHtsel, Kap. 14. 
2 Martensen, JB, 44. 
3 "To the Transcendental philosophy Nature is nothing but the organ 
of self-consciousness , and everything in Nature is only 
necessary because only through such a N~ture can self-conscious-
ness be achieved. " Schelling, Werke, i~· 3, p. 273. Cf. Hartmann, 
PU, III: l21. 
4 Hume's character, Phi lo, shows that a priori reasoning can escape 
the necessity of making Deity responsible for all the inconsis-
tencies in nature, but a posteriori reasoning cannot, and finally 
(, 
I 
I 
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concludes, "a person seasoned with a just sense of the imperfec- 1
1
. 
tions of natural reason, will fly to revealed truth with the 
greatest avidity." See Hume, Treatise of Human Nature. ••• and 
Dialogues concer~ing Natural Religion. Longmans, Green, ed., 
1890, PP• 412, 467. 
4 Expressed in Friedrich Schleiermacher , and in the · Wesleyan Revival; 
both of the eighteenth century. 
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quite different, but both came to f eel as Hegel later taught, that 11 
philosophy and theology have much the same task. 1/ 
Schelling first followed a lead from Fichte and Fichte's 
epistemological method. He posited the Absolute as unconscious in order 
to leave it unconditioned by the opposition of ego and non-ego, subject, 
and object, essential to the being of consciousness.l Being committed
1 
however, to the development of a philosophy of nature he was unable 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
,I 
II II to stop here. His system required tba. t he proceed from the Absolute i 
to an account of nature, even as Hegel's system demanded that the converse \ 
1 Schelling thus fell in line with the age-long controversy over the 
unconditioned which was to break out anew in the Nineteenth 
Century among Sir William Hamilton, John Stuart Mill, Victor 
Cousin, Dean Mansel, and others. Schelling ' s famous passages 
states it thus: 
"\Venn das Objektive immer da.s Bestimmte ist , wodurch 
i st es denn nun gerade so bestimmt , dass es zu der Freiheit, 
welche nur in der Will~r sich Kussert, objektiv hinzubringt, 
was in ihr selbst nicht liegen kann, namlich das GesetzmAssige? 
Eine solche pr&stabilirte Harmonie des Objektiven (~esetzmgssigen) 
und des Bestimmenden (Freien} ist allein denkbar durch etwas 
frei, sondern gemeinschaftliche Quelle des Intelligenten zu-
gleich und des Freien ist. 
"Wenn nun jenes H3here nichts anderes ist als der Grund 
der Identit&t zwischen dem absolut Subjektiven und dem absolut 
Objektiven, dem Bewussten und dem Bawusstlosen, welche eben zum 
Behnt der Erscheinung im freien Handeln sich t rennen, so kann 
Jene.s. H8here selbst weder Subject noch Object, auch nicht beides 
zugleich, sondern nur die absolute IdentinKt seyn, in welcher 
gar keine Dup~icitRt ist, und welche eben desswegen, wail die 
Bedingung alles Bewusstseins DuplicitRt ist, nie zum Bewusstseyn 
gelangen 1cann. Dieses ewig Unbewusste, was, gleichsam die ewige 
Sonne 1m Reich der Geister, durch sein eignes ungetrttbtes Li cht 
ver birgt, und obgleich es nei Objekt \drd, doch allen freien 
Handlungen seine IdentitHt aufdrrrckt , ist zugleich dasselbe frrr 
alle Intelligenzen, die unsichtbare Wul""Liel, woven alle Illtelligen-
zen nur die Potenzen sind, und das ewig Vermittelnde des sich 
selbst bestimmenden Subjektiven in uns und des Objektiven oder 
Anschauenden, zugleich der Grund der Gesetzm!ssigkeit in der Frei-
heit und der Freiheit in der GesetzmKssigkeit des Objektiven. " 
Schelling, Werke , 1, 3, 600. 
I 
I 
II 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
II 
1/ 
II 48 
II 
------ ---= --==-----==- _-_-_-_ ---~---- ------- --------
be done . In this common problem, he and Hegel alike identified logic 
with ontology or metaphysics, 1 and were greatl y influenced i n their 
speculation by ~akob B8hme, 2 the ' Philosophus Teutonicus . ' 
B8hme , the ' powertul ' mind ' as Hegel called him, had early 
coped with the problem of theosophy. Through his mysticism, E81une knew 
God as the " supreme, fundamental , universal, self-existent, eternal 
cause; absolute and unimaginable in glory, perfection, goodness, beauty , 
magnificence, and splendour.n3 But what most afflicted his soul, as he 
contemplated the world, was "the pervading conflict of everything with 
i 
II 
II ,, 
' 
all else, one thing struggling with, buffeting, biting, pushing, crushing ~~ 
aoother. Evil, not only in the human spirit, but in the whole world, 
evil in its cosmical sense, " was "the burden that so heavily weighed upon 
his mind."4 He was incessantly struggling with this ' dark point. ' His 
chief aim was to "explain the origin of things, especially the existence 
of evil,"5 and this he did in a system that was nominally monistic and 
practically dualistic . 
B8hme oscillates between a dualistically constituted Absolute , 6 
God , and a God who is the 'Deity' aspect of the "all . "7 He starts with 
1 Cf. Thilly, HP, 463. 
2 Often called Behmen in English. B. lived from 1574-1624, and was 
known as the shoe-maker of G8rlitz. 
3 Franz Hartmann, Life and Doctrines of .Jakob Boehme, London: Kegan, 
Paul, Trench, Trnbner and Co., 1891. 
4 Martensen, ro, 47 . 
5 Chambers Encyclopedia, article "Boehme." I 
6 Such as Alexander's Deit y ; sees. Alexander, Space, Time, and Deity, .\ 
Volume II. I 
7 "As soon as the devils want out of the light and attempted to rule by 11 
the power of the fire over the beatitudes in the heart of God, in 
the same moment they were outside of God and in the four lower 
qualities of eternal nature. " Threefold Life, 2: 50 (see next page) 
'I 
the principle that all revelation calls for "opposition."! The 
Urgrund , or God, is the primordial infinite asleep -- at rest . Yet, 
it does not really exist, and God cannot be without being. 2 He conceives 
within Himself a will, 3 and this will is love. The will is light; it 
desires to create and when it does so, the "matrix with its fiery, dark, 
acid, and bitter qualities became manifest."4 This shows that in "God 
there are (really} two states, eternally and without end; namely, the 
eternal light and the eternal darkness."5 One of these is the "sub-
11 
' stratum of real nature; the other that of divine personality."6 The 
11 
I 
substratum (matter) is never transformed into Spirit, but is illumined 
and glorified by the latter. 7 Upon it the Spirit works and through it 
I 
the spirit is enabled to become manifest. 8 The external world then is il 
"produced by the motion, and outbreaking of divine power and divine will . I 
I It had been outbreathed from the holy and the dark world. It is both 
9 
evil and good." The good comes from God's free will; the "evil from the 
involuntary ground of God's nature."10 
quoted by Franz Hartmann, .2E.• cit., pp. 114-115. Cf. here, 
Brightman, The Problem of God, 137, "~akob Boehme speaks of a 'fire 
of anger within God'VV 
1 Boutroux, Historical Studies in Philosophy, London: Macmillan, 
1812, p. 183. 
2 F. Hartmann , ~· ~., 65. Cf. B8hme's Threefold Life . 11:75. 
3 Yet, contrast Martensen, ~. 57. 
4 F. Hartmann, .2E.• cit., 150; quoti ng the Aurora, V:24. Cf. Martensen, 
~B, 135-136. 
5 Ibid., quoting Three Principles, IX:30. 
6 H~ffding, HMP, I:l75; quoting B8hme' s Morgenr8te, xiv:72. Cf. 
Martensen, ~, 67, "We have, accordingly, two centra in God, the 
Nature-will and the Spirit-will." 
7 Boutroux, £E.• ill_., 192. 11 
9 F. Hartmann, .2£• cit., 165, quo ting Mysterium, iii:lO. ; 
8 F. Hartmann, .2E.· ·cit., 73. ~ 
10 Ibid. :&\bm.e defe'ii'dS himself by quoting a passage from (see next page I 
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Thus, B8hme's revelation found its solution to the problem of 
evil in a struggle within God's nature. 1 The battle in the microcosm 
of man has its counterpart in the macrocosmic battle within God.2 
B8hme limited God's will by God's nature, 3 and therein limited both 
God's knowledge4 and God's power, but he maintained the goodness of God's 
willand the beauty of God's love. Evil is , t herefore, in the world 
because God cannot help it. God's nature is "like a revolving wheel."5 
But man does not need ever to fear this evil. It can never lead to 
cosmic catastrophe, because God's good-will i s the only active element.6 
II 
I 
.\ 
Amos, "Shall there be evil (trouble) in a city, and I the Lord 
haVe not done it?" Martensen comments, "Nor do we forget that the 
words, ' I form the light and create darkness!' may perhaps contain [ 
a protest against that Persi an dualism which taught two fundamental II 
principles -- Good and Evil. The words inform us that everything, 
even evil, must be deduced from unity, from the one God; and this 
is exactly what B8hme means." JB , 138. 
1 This is difficult to harmonize ~~th H8ffding's statement, "This 
idea, t oo, underlies ~acob B8hme's motto: He to whom time is as 1 
eternity, and eternity as time is freed from all struggle." I 
H8ff'ding, HMP, I:225. This is psychologically true, but a departure '! 
from B8hme's cosmic process . I 
2 F. Hartmann, ££• cit., 78. 
3 "We notice in passing that we get here the root of B8hme's psychology • . 
According to B8hme , the Will is the inmost thing in man, the 
principle of our personality; and, - fancy the form-fashioning and 
i mage shaping energy, not excluding but presupposing reason and 
wisdom, - is the necessary complement of the Will. It is impossible 
to Will, or to hate, or to love the purely abstract , but only that 
which presents i tself in an image and shape. No act of the Will 
is possible without imagination. A Will must have an object; but 
an object that is posited by the Will lies in the f uture, must be 
pictured in the imagination, and must hover before it. A Will 
must detennine itself according to motives, love or hatred, hope 11 
or fear , good or evil, and all of these things are imaginations." 
Martensen, JB, 64. ~~~ 
4 Thus, "God does not will evil; neither did he foreknow all things 
" would happen as they have happened." Hoffding, HMP, I:75. 
~brgenr8te, xiv:72. 
5 F. Hartmann, .2E.• ill•, 78; quoting Menschwerdung, ii : 4. 
6 Every beginning goeth forth out of the Eternal One." (See next page.) 
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BBhme ' s theosophy with its sharp statement or a hostile 
contrast 1 in the World-Ground made a deep impress upon Ger.man thought at 
the close or the Eighteenth Century and the opening of the Nineteenth.2 
It made it particularly difficult to give a coherent account of Being 
as dominated by conscious reason without abandoning, or at least quali-
tying, one ' s realism on the one hand, or the goodness or God on the 
other. It was this perhaps that helped to cause the Romanticists to 
look with such favor upon Friedrich Schleier.macher ' s Reden in 1799, and 
encouraged the faith-philosophers such as F. H. ~acobi. It laid a 
particularly heavy burden upon the systems or Schelling and Hegel which 
so closely combined logic and ontology. 
Schelling, as Professor Frank Thilly says , sought to resolve 
the difficulty by broadening the concept of reason • 
• • • • Reason is not necessarily consc-ious intelligence; 
with the Romanticists and faith-philosophers, Schelling 
broadens the conception or spirit, mind, or reason, 
so as to include the unconscious, instinctive, purposive 
rorce that manifests itself in inorganic and organic 
nature as well as in the highest self-consciousness or 
the philosophers into which it evolves . That which is 
connnon to unconscious nature and self -conscious mind is 
pure activity, self-determining energy; reality is, 
through and through, action, life, will. 3 
It was in 1809 after a careful study of B8hme ' s work that Schelling 
wrote his Untersuchungen Uber das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit: 
The indifference of opposites, he now teaches, is not 
as yet God's actual being, but only its primal source 
(or Urgrund, to use BBhme ' s term). This unity ditferen-
ff Bohme, A Treatise on Christ ' s Testaments, bk. i, ch~ 1. 
1 Martensen, ~, 132. 
2 Even the Catho.lic, Franz Baader, called B5hme, "his real teacher. " 
3 Thilly, HP, 451. 
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tiates God himself into the antitheses of nature and 
intelligence, which only when combined constitute the 
actual life of God. Moreover, nature in God, as in us, 
precedes intelligence as its Basis, and without it 
personality is as little conceivable in God as in us; 
for personality depends upon the combination of a 
self-contained principle with an independent Basis. 
This nature in God is as such simply a blind , unreason-
ing instinct . By it we can explain the residue of 
reality never resolvable into reason, the irregularities 
underlying all order in the world, as a chaos never 
wholly subdued. The desire for reconciliation on the 
part of this dark Basis produces reason, which, when 
united with the instinct of nature, becomes free, 
creative, almighty will, and reduces to order the forces 
of chaos. But since the blind will of this dark Basis 
produces reason, which, when united with the instinct 
of nature, becomes free, creative, almighty will, and 
reduces to order the forces of chaos. But since the 
blind will of this Basis continually reacts, and only 
gradually gives way to reason, the conversion of nature 
into spirit can only proceed by degrees in the various 
grades of the natural world. All beings, as springing 
.from the dark Basis in God, have an individual \nll of 
their own; but, as also originating in God's reason, a 
universal will.l 
Schelling, thus fell back upon his unconscious Unconditioned, thereby 
making it unnecessary to place in sharp opposition good and evil, the 
teleological and the dysteleological. 
It is the ' eternally unconscious'2 which is the root 
of all intelligences and the basis of all law and 
order in their freedom, but which, being absolutely 
simple, can never be the object of knowledge, but only 
of faith.3 
Schelling later abandoned reason for revelation. His ultimate being 
is not to be deduced by the dialectic use or the reason. It can only 
be experienced.4 Although he considered this to be empirical in that 
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1 Bfleiderer, DTK, 66. 
2 Cf. Eisler, HPB, 683. 
3 Pfleiderer, DTK, 63. 
4 W'indelband, HP', 619. 
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the 'more' depended upon an extraordinary intuition, it must remain 
a priori for the average mane It not only was more than the natural 
world, but was not to be judged by the natura.l. 1 Hence, it became the 
mystical unconditioned of Demea which Hume had earlier condemned.2 
Hegel, on the other hand, was not so willing to abstract from 
the empirical; he had no patience with the "dead-head" of Schelling's 
fancy. The influence of B8hme, together with a discretion conditioned 
by history, gave him a wholesome respect for the "guile of reason" which 
the "OWl of Minerva" can later understand but never anticipate. But 
while the course of natural events does not exhaust the meaning of the 
Absolute, it does reveal i n part the essential nature of Reality. If 
there is contradiction in nature t there must be contradiction in 'God.' 
Hegel, like B8hme, made the Absolute a "man of war," as Royce says . 
To make such an Absolute wholly conscious, however, was to 
1 Weber states, "Fichte's absolute is one of the terms of the opposi-
tion , that of Schelling is the transcendent, mysterious, impene-
trable source of the same •••• Schelling's absolute is a trans-
cendent entity, which does not explain anything, since we do not 
know either how or why to deduce from it the oppositions consti-
tuting the real world. The absolute indifference, from being the 
highest and most concrete reality, is, at bottom, nothing but an 
abstraction." HP, 406. 
ji 
I 
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2 Schelling ' s "unconditioned" thus became what Hegel called, "the night 1 
in which all cows are black. " It did not satisfy Schelling himself. I 
It left the contradiction between duty and inclination, freedom and j 
necessity, unsolved, and Schelling moved from the transcendental 
to the aesthetic, and from the aesthetic to revealation to solve I 
the problem. He was unsuccessful. As Pfleiderer says, "The notion 
of the divine Intelligence issuing from a dark Basis of nature and 
blind instinct grates upon religious feeling as a reminiscence of 
heathen theogonies, by which the spiritual and ethical purity of 
the Christian idea of God would be marred. This defect, remains 
substantially uncorrected in the final form of Schelling ' s philoso-
phy, though on that point the philosopher designedly adheres very 
closely to the terminology of •• dogmatics. tr Pfleiderer, DTK, 67. 
53 
assign him the contrary emotions of the Christian God and the Persian 
Devil. As a result, although Hegel does not turn the Absolute uncon-
scious,1 he never explicit~y identifies the Absolute as conscious, or as 
personal, and this point remains one of the most contested issues among 
Hegel's interpreters. 
Hegel's most characteristic position makes consciousness 
a step in the dialectical self-development of the Idea. 2 It represents 
consciousness as an emergent quality, not as an abiding attribute. 3 In 
his work on logic, Hegel states that "one ought not to conceive the end 
under the for.m it assumes in consciousness, - that is to say, under the 
form of a representation, n4 and J"anet comments: 
According to this principle, the end is not an 
effect realized according to a preconceived idea; 
it is the eternal conformity of things to their 
idea or essence. Finality i~ thus not merely 
immanent, it is unconscious. 
Professor Ward is dubious whether mind out of itself can be called mind 
at all, and is not surprised 
that thinkers largely in sympathy with Hegel, 
as for example, von Hartmann, and still more, 
Volkelt - regarded his system as really a philos-
ophy of the unconscious; or, that others trained 
in the Hegelian school like Strauss and Feuerbach 
1 11 In Hegel, just as in Schelling's later works, the Jiotion of the Un-
conscious does not clearly appear ••• " Hartmann, PU, I:27. 
2 Thus Eisler, "Nach Hegel ist es ein Moment in der dialektischen 
Selbstentwicklung der 'Idee.'" HPB, 101. 
3 Cf. "The world's history begins only potentially (i.~. as Nature) 
with its general end, the full realization of the notion of spirit. 
That end is its inner, nay its inmost unconscious impulse, and the 
entire business of the world-history is the labour of bringing it 
to consciousness." Ward, ROE, 148. 
4 Wissenschaft der Logik, par. 104. 
5 J"anet, FC, 346. 
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resolved it into a refined naturalism.l 
~~ny, indeed, believe that Hegel never conceived the Absolute itself as 
becoming conscious at all, but as becoming conscious only in the limited 
individuals.2 
This is by no means the only interpretation of Hegel, nor 
the most satisfactory one. After all, Hegel's thought was not so much 
a static idea as a productive process.. And if it be agreed that within 
the process there is an absolute reason 'sifting traditions,' 'piecing 
together particular facts,' establishing a fundamental continuity of 
events and the spiritual principles that control it, 3 it is not so 
obvious that the "persistance of a transcendent consciousness in the 
Absolute" is a "false premiss."4 In fact, it is difficult to see how 
Hegel's "guile of reason" can be anything but a coincidence if that be 
the case. Unfortunately, Hegel did not express himself definitely on 
the subject, and his failure to treat the ontological ground of the 
dialectical process as itself conscious leaves his thought particularly 
akin to the pantheism he once criticized. 
Although the German idealists attacked the speculative problem 
posed by B8hme, they did not carry it far toward a staisfactory conclu-
sion. Fichte, emphasizing chiefly the moral problem, escaped the direct 
issue. Schelling faced it frankly in his philosophy of nature, but took 
1 Ward, ROE, 154. 
2 See Hartmann, PU, II:250, footnote 2. Cf. J"anet and Seailles, II: 
337, "But in Hegel's philosophy this absolute consciousness of 
God appears to exist only in the human mind." 
3 Cf. Zeller, Geschichte der deutschen Philosophie, 824; Ward, ROE, 16. 
4 Hartmann, PU, II:250, footnote 2. Cf. German edition, II:lSO, note 
1, "falschen Voraussetzung. " 
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refuge in a higher indifference. Hegel rej acted Schelling' s example, ~~ 
but tended to deny the real existence of evil; his realism suffered, and 
his philosophy of nature remained the weakest link in his remarkable 
system. The notion of development emphasized by the dialectical method 
strengthened a growing conviction in the reality of a cosmic purpose 
and an evolving order while it left the apparent corollary of conscious 
direction in inner turmoil. 
The Influence of Oriental Thought. 
The speculative problem of theosophy was kept vigorously 
and its influence greatly extended by a growing interest in Oriental 
thought. In the Nineteenth Century extensive research was carried on 
in the Sacred Literature of the East. This research finally touched 
fields as widely disparate as the philolog.ical studies of Nietzsche and 
the sociological theories of Max Weber.1 
Even by ''Hegel's time Hinduism was arousing deep interest 
in Europe, and was being widely studied. Many of its sacred books had 
been translated."2 By Hartmann's time, Buddhism likewise was coming 
to the fore, and the development of oriental study called forth the 
enthusiastic challenge: 
1 
2 
One task remains for German philosophy to fulfill: 
namely, to blend the religious ideas of (central) 
Asia, which have been grasped in fragments by Hegel, 
Schopenhauer, Fichte, Schelling, Herbart, and others 
--- to blend them, I say, with the elements of 
Talcott Parsons at Harvard points 
so far as to learn the Sanskrit 
ments among the Indian people. 
in unpublished, and unfinished, 
out that Weber (1864-1920) went 
language to study social develop-
His untimely death left his work 
manuscript fonn. 
Stace, PH, par. ?34. 
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Christianity which are worth preserving, and with 
the series of ideas developed by Modern Civiliza-
tion (and finding for the most part already their 
expression in Hegel), so as to produce a thoroughly 
compact system.l 
The general effect of the enthusiasm which arose recurrently from 
Hinduism and other branches of oriental thought was to emphasize the 
mystical approach to reality, continue the theosophical issue, and 
further the flight from consciousness for impersonalism. The Hindu 
Trimurti with its Creator-God, Brahma, "its Preserver-God, Vishnu, and 
its Destroyer-God, Shiva, 2 was no advance over the Christian Trinity in 
its most crude form. Vishnu and Shiva were too obviously simply personi-
fications of natural forces to exalt the idea of conscious divinity, and 
the impassive Brahma was too indifferent toward the world-process to 
be considered as other than its vague creator - the source of a stran~ly 
contradictory process. 
Hindu thought was particularly concerned with the epistemo-
logical problem of consciousness for the Absolute. In the old Indian 
book of the Vedanta philosophy, the Pan6adasaprakarana, no distinction 
is made between the knower, knowledge, and the knowable in the Absolute. 
1 
2 
3 
Hartmann, RF, 109. II 
One of the earliest suggestions of the Trimurti which appears in the 1\ 
Vedic prayer, "May Surya protect us from the sky, Vata from the air, l' 
Agni from the earthly regions" reflects a natlll'alistic origin. It 
thus appears as a product of natural philosophy. 
A. B. Keith {ERE, 12:457b) points out that the conception of the 
Trimurti is only a later development in Hindu thought, and is 
the outcome in the Upanishads "of the adoption of the principle 
of the absolute." The three offices donnot remain constant; the 
various names have been used at different times and among the 
different peoples. Brahma sometimes is Vach or Sarasvati; Vishnu. 
is sometimes Sri, Lakshmi, or Radha; Shiva is sometimes Uma, Durga, 
or Kali. 
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The Absolute is characterized by Sat (being), C'it (knowledge), and 
Amanda (intellectual rapture), but consciousness is only an unfortunate 
moment in the phenomenal order of things.1 
The theory, however, sprang from an underlying realism. In 
the Orient where the practi.cal fulfilment of the Malthusian principle 
across the centuries, so often laid the forces of life upon the Procrus-
tean bed of nature's limited resources, moral evil seemed completely 
dwarfed by the enormous issue of natural ev.il. The tide of life beat in 
vain against the limits imposed by material needs; when it rose too 
high, flood and famine, war and pestilence set in to bring it low. It 
is little wonder that in such a world, life was an evil thing, and love 
of life a sin. The rise of separate conscious existence was a misfor- I 
I 
tune, not an achievement. The way of escape was the denial of conscious- I 
ness, the denial of separate existence, the abrogation of one's monadic 
isolation for the merging of individual life in the Universal Absolute 
from which it sprang. The general result of Hinduism, and also of 
Buddhism, was to emphasize the irrational, introduce a more fundamental 
pessimism, and exalt the Inscrutable Absolute at the expense of person-
ality. 
1 "To sum up, the entire system of the (Kapila) Sankhya rests on the 
idea of the final cause. But in place of conceiving a supreme 
cause that acts with intelligence for an end, it is this intelli-
gent and unconscious nature that tends toward an end. Thus, the 
Sankhya approaches the philosophy of Aristotle, but while in 
Aristotle nature has as its object God, or the pure act, in the 
Sankb.ya it has as its object Soul and the soul of man." J'anet, 
FC, appendix IX, p. 508. 
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-The Temper of Pes simi sm. 
The special merit of Arthur Schopenhauer lies in the fact that 
he went beyond the petites perceptions of Leibniz and Kant, rejected the 
higher indifference of Schell1ng,1 refused to accept only the rational 
as the real, and asserted that ultimate reality itself is voluntaristic 
and unconscious. 2 He thus broke company with "Descartes, Spinoza, 
Leibniz, Hegel, and all the rationalists who made thought the essential 
3 thing," and contributed the voluntarist position from which the philos-
ophy of irrationalism, the philosophy of pessimism, and the concept of 
unconscious purpose alike derived much of their inspiration.4 
The world-weary theme of Buddhism found a responsive chord 
I 
I 
I 
I 
in the life and work of Schopenhauer whose disposition and environment II 
alike combined to convince him that he lived in the "worst of all possible 
worlds. 115 Schopenhauer was singularly disposed to see the world at its 
worst, and has the merit of forcing the grim facts of misery and anguish 
"upon the attention of idealistic philosophers."6 
1 Schopenhauer, however, owed more to Schelling than he realized. As 
H8ffding remarks, "Schopenhauer' s natural philosophy reminds us of 
Schellings." (HMP, II: 230. Of. Calkins, PPP, 351.) Hartmann 
observes, "His (Schopenhauer's) odious prejudice against Schelling 
alone hindered him from finding in that writer the very thing he 
wanted, ••• " (PU, I:31.) 
2 Cunnyngham goes a little too far when he states, 11The first thinker 
who raised the theory of the inconscient to an important position 
was Schopenhauer." STP, 230. 
3 Of. Weber, HP, 448. Weber does not mean that Schopenhauer broke 
with these thinkers altogether. Hence, it were better to say, 
"insofar as they made thought ••• " 
4 In voluntarism, "conation, not cognition, is regarded as fundamental 
to life." Ward, ROE, 198. 
5 The World as Will and Idea, Book IV, par. 56, end. 
I 
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6 The singular beauty and clarity of Schopenhauer's style make his 1 
indictments especially sharp. The following citations (see next pag ) 
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Taking his cue from Kant's first Critique and the example 
1 
of Fichte, he placed his emphasis upon the practical will. He also I 
accepted the results of Berkeley's idealism,1 and admired Kant's critical I 
I method. However, he rejected Kant's denial that we could 'know' the 
Tiing-an-sich, and felt the critical method should be used for limitation 
and not for skepticism. He preferred to add the principle of sufficient 
reason to criticism. 
Schopenhauer argued that in one's innermost consciousness, 
one is aware of himself most basically, not as knowing, but as willing. 2 
1 
2 
are illustrations: 
"The life of most men is weary yearning and torture, a dreamy totter-
ing through the four ages toward death, accompanied by a successian 
of trivial thoughts. It is like a clock-work that is wound up and 
goes without knowing why; and every time a man is conceived and 
born, the clock of human life is wound up anew, in order to grind 
out the same old hackneyed tune which it has played so many count-
less times before, measure for measure, beat for beat, with insigni-
ficant variations." Quoted by Thilly, HP, 489. 
"Everywhere in nature we see combat, struggle, and varying fortune 
of war ••••• The universal struggle is most readily seen in the 
animal world which lives on the vegetable world, and in which every I 
animal becomes the prey of another •••• Thus, the will to live 
forever devours itself." The World as Will and Idea, par. 29. II 
Trans., vol. I, p. 214. 
"Thus Schopenhauer wrote, 'The life of most men is but a continuous 
struggle for existence, -- a struggle which they are bound to lose 
at last. Every breath we draw is a protest against the death which 
is constantly threatening us, and against wnich we are battling 
every second. But Death must conquer after all, for we are his by 
birth, and he simply plays with his prey a little while longer 
before devouring it. We, however, take great pains to prolong our 
lives as far as we can, just as we blow soap-bubbles as long and 
as large as we can, though we know with absolute certainty that 
they must break at last.'" Calkins, PPP, 35?. 
"One knows no sun and no earth, but always only an eye which sees a 
sun, a hand which feels the earth." Schopenhauer, Fourfold Root, 
par. 41. Miss Calkins observes, "In other words, 'every object is 
object only in relation to the subject': so-called external things 
are, after all, facts of consciousness." PPP, 345. 
ltiss Calkins criticizes Schopenhauer's introspection (see next page) 
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Will controls nperception, memory, imagination, judgment, and reason-
ing; we perceive, remember, imagine that we will to perceive, remember, 
and imagine;" "and our arguments are always pleas of the will. 111 Thus, 
the essential and fundamental thing in us is the Will, "whereas thought 
is but a derived or secondary phenomenon, an accident of will. 112 
This idea Schopenhauer makes the key to the solution to the 
whole question of metaphysics. 3 He interprets all things in analogy 
with his conception of the human being: t he world is will and idea; idea 
to the intellect, but in reality will. 
1 
2 
3 
We find this voluntaristic world-view corroborated 
by the facts. When I look inward, I come face to 
face with will; when I look outward, I perceive this 
wi ll of mine as body. My will objectified itself 
as body, expresses itself as a living organism. We 
are, therefore, justified in inferring by analogy 
that other bodies are, like mine, the outward mani-
festations of will. In the stone, will manifests 
itself as blind force; in man, it becomes conscious 
of itself. The magnetic needles always point to the 
north; bodies always f all in a vertical line; sub-
stances form crystals when acted on by other sub-
stances; and all such occurrences give evidence of 
the operation of forces in nature which are akin to 
the will in us. In the vegetable kingdom, too, we 
here: "That self whom we intimately know is indeed will, but is 
moxe than will ••• One is conscious of oneself, also, as thinking 
and perceiving." PPP, 358. Is this universally. true, or does it 
depend upon the individual? 
Thilly, HP, 487. Cf. Ward, ROE, 28. 
Weber , HP, 448. 
Schopenhauer uses an indirect argument to show that the ~dll in us 
is only the manifestation of the Ding-an-sich. He argues that the 
invariable coincidence of volition and bodily movement must indi-
cate that my body is a manifestation of will. The body, however, 
is closely interrelated with other objects -- in fact with every 
physical body. These bodies must be expressions of will, and of 
a single will since they all are interrelated. Yet, they are not 
expressions of my individual will. Hence, there must be an 
absolute will, manifesting itself in all being. See World as Will 
and Idea, par. 20. Cf. Calkins, PP.P, 348-349. 
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discover traces of unconscious striving or 
impulse. The tree desires light and strives up-
ward; it also wants moisture and pushes its roots 
into the soil. Will or impulse guides the growth of 
the animal and directs all its activities. The 
wild beast desiring to devour prey develops teeth 
and claws and muscles; the will creates for itself 
an organism suitable to its needs; function precedes 
organization: the desire to butt is the cause of 
the appearance of the horns. The will to live is 
the basal principle of life. 1 
Schopenhauer develops this treatment at length, arguing that back of all 
being is the fundamental will which 
as a magic lantern shows many and manifold pictures, 
but there is only one and the same flame which makes 
them all visible; so, in all the manifold phenomena 
which, side by side, fill the world, or, one after 
another, as events, crowd each other off the stage, 
the one will is that which manifests itself. 2 
This will, however, must be judged by the way it expresses itself. 3 
Since it does so many contradictory things, functions in the lapses of 
consciousness, and functions even before consciousness arises, 4 it must 
itself be a blind, unconscious force. 5 Panthelism6 replaces pantheism. 
The will is a perpetual desire to be; the endless source of all life, 
1 As summarized by Professor Frank Thilly, HP, 486-48?. 
2 World as Will and Idea, par. 28. 
3 But only in regard to what'? -- not why'? " . 
4 "Nach Schopenhauer geht das Bewusstsein aus dem ursprunglich un-
bewussten Willens hervor." Eisler, HPB, 101. 
5 What similarity there is between the voluntarism of Schopenhauer, 
and the materialism of Santayana - when materialism is so facile, 
and idealism is so unintelli@Bnt! The one falls back upon the 
Platonic idea; the other falls back upon th.e trope or essences. 
"Yet the intrinsic essence of matter being unknown, it may be 
figured almost indifferently by any image of sense or thought, as 
by 'the gods' or 'the devil,' provided that expectation and action 
are not misled by that symbol." Santayana, RM, vi. Cf. Randall, 
Journal of Philosophy, 28, (1931), 649. 
6 Webster, New International Unabridged Dictionary, 2nd ed., p. 1?66a. 
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and hence also the origin of all evil. 
Schopenhauer thus confronted the problem posed by B8hme 
and sought to escape the theistic ~ priorism of Schelling by basing 
his metaphysical reality on all the evidence, good and evil alike. But 
insofar as an unconscious Will was his sole metaphysical principlel he 
left the universe accounted for but unexplained.2 Although, as 
Professor ~ames Sully points out, he nowhere defines what he means by 
will, 3 he pictures it chiefly as simply desire, to the instinctive 
urges of phenomenal organisms. 4 Since he asserts that it is not enter-
tained~ but is itself final, he escapes the charge of supplanting God 
with his Satanic Majesty. 6 To attribute mere desire to ultimate 
1 Hartmann, PU, I:29. 
2 "... Schopenhauer' s explanation o.f, say, a man's traits by reference 
to Will cannot quite give satisfaction to our desire to understand 
why that man has those traits." Sheldon, . Strife of Systems and 
Productive Duality, 411. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 191 
3 Sully, PES, 85. 
4 Similar, but not identical. Schopenhauer's 'desire' is not dependent 
on the organism, but prior to it. Hence, phenomenal, not meta-
physical value is to be given ~anet's statement, "But the school 
that has most decidedly adopted and defended the doctrine of in-
stinctive finality is that of Schopenhauer. This school has in-
sisted much on the principle of finality; but, like the Hegelian 
school, it asserts an unconscious finality, and finds in instinct 
the type of it." ~anet, FC, 34?. 
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5 Miss Calkins criticizes that Schopenhauer misconceives the nature of 
the will which he considers mere wish or desire, not active, self-
assertive will. PPP, 355. This is to claim that to will is an act 
of the whole mind; not a separable function. (Gestalt vs. function . 
alism.) 
6 Urquhart, (PVL, 579) quotes Professor Wenley's statement (Aspects of 
Pessimism), "Schopenhauer and Hartmann solace themselves with the 
brilliant thought of returning to the bosom of an impersonal devil. 
To Schopenhauer, at least, the charge is as unfair as the notion 
of an impersonal devil is contradictory. Surely to "Bahnsen, as 
to Schopenhauer, (the idea that) the world is a ceaseless self-
tormenting of the absolute , " (Sully, PES, 10? :) has no place in the 
traditional view of devil psychology. 
reality, however, is simply to make reality abstractly dynamic, and 
not to be distinguished from force. 1 Yet, Schopenhauer says, "force 
is to be rejected as covering a mystery.n2 It would seem that his 
own idea fares no better. 
With Schopenhauer the world-principle is some-
thing never distinctly conceived as to its nature, 
and stands in no discoverable relation to the 
universe.3 Consequently, further, from his point 
of view, the origin of the world of consciousness 
is an insoluble problem.4 
As Paul ~anet and Gabriel Seailles state: 
The transition from the absolute to the relative, 
from the infinite to the finite, is not any 
clearer on their theories than on those of their 
predecessors. With Hegel the Idea externalized 
itself; with Schopenhauer Will objectivizes itself.5 
The difference is merely verbal, and it is not 
1 Schopenhauer, however, was careful to subsume the notion force under 
that of will. cr. Sully, PES, 84. 
2 S~lly, PES, 174. 
3 "Everywhere the intellect strikes against insoluble problems, as 
against the walls of a prison-house. The essence of things not 
only transcends our knowledge, but, most probably, knowledge in 
general; it is both unintelligible and unintelligent, and intelli-
gence is but a form, an addition, an accident. With the Eleatics, 
Scotus Erigena, Bruno, Spinoza, and Schelling, I accept the one 
and the all, the doctrine of the unitary essence of all beings; 
only I am careful not to add: all is god, and so I differ essen-
tially from the pantheists. The god of the pantheists is an x, 
an unknown quantity by means of which they aim to explain the 
known; my "will," on the other hand, is a fact of experience; I 
proceed, as all true science must proceed, from the known to the 
unknown. My method is empirical, analytic, inductive; that of the 
synonymous with optimism; in my system, however, the evil in the 
world is frankly conceded and its significance fully recognized. 
In this respect, my system differs from most ancient and modern 
philosophies, especially from Spinoza, Leibniz, and Hegel. It is to 
Spinoza what the New Testament i s to the old." Weber, HP, 456. 
4 Sully, PES, 1?2. 
5 "In fact we seem then driven to assume a really inconceivable frac-
t i onation of the one unconscious will into many, in order that the 
consciousness may arise." Vlard, ROE, 198 • 
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here that the originality of Schopenhauer and 
Hartmann lies, but principally in their substi-
tution of pessimism for optimism.1 
The Ehilosophy of the Unconscious: Eduard von Hartmann.2 
Schopenhauer would have rejected the question of Paul ~anet 
and Gabriel Seailles, "Why does the Will objectivize itself?" as mean-
ingless.3 It is · in the nature of will to act. But to the question, 
"Why does it produce the illusion we call world'?" he would have given 
no final answer. Some of Schopenhauer' s followers, like Bahnsen, 
carried out some of Schopenhauer's principles with greater rigor than 
their author, and by denying consistently the cooperation of reason in 
the world, rejected the only kind of pure delight retained by Schopen-
hauer, that of intellectual contemplation.4 
Hoernle would have Schopenhauer go the other way: 
If Schopenhauer had made his Will throughout a 
conscious Will, enacting a cosmic spectacle for 
its own contemplation and entertainment, his 
theory would have been more consistent. But when 
he insists on the blindness and unconsciousness 
of his Will; when he regards consciousness as a 
subordinate efflorescence, and the inorganic 
world and plants as typical objectifications of 
unconscious Will, he follows a track of thought 
which is p5ainly inconsistent with his Berkeleyan 
idealism." 
1 janet and Seailles, PP, II:338. 
2 Eduard von Hartmann, 1842-1906, Philosophie des Unbewussten, 1869. 
3 janet and Seailles, PP, II:338. 
4 "Since, according to Bahnsen, intelligent order and harmony of 
design are wholly absent from the universe, the scientific obser-
vation of the world and the representation of it in the creations 
of art, so far from being a source of quiet joy, can only bring 
anguish to the logical and philosophic mind." Sully, PES, 10?. 
5 R. F. A. Hoernle, Idealism as a Philosophy, 163. 
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To Schopenhauer, however, this was impossible. He was too deeply 
impressed with the problem of evil. The irreconcilable conflict of 
desire and duty which seemed to Kant to imply God, Freedom, and immor-
tality, to Schopenhauer suggested "an ultimate reality not only careless 
of our happiness, but condemned by our moral reason."l In view of his 
pessimism he would have agreed with Hartmann: 
Devilishly horrible would it be in fact to call 
forth with conscious purpose creatures not asking 
for it from the peace of nothingness to make them 
endure the world's suffering. In abstract as in 
concrete monism it is God himself, in the last 
result, who, as absolute subject in the limited 
subject endures the world's suffering, and there-
fore can fall back on the maxim: -volent! non fit 
injuria; but in theism he appears hard and loveless 
enough to cast the world's suffering off from him-
self upon innocent substances created ad hoc, and 
it is precisely this which transforms monotheism 
into monosatanism.2 
Schopenhauer thus stressed the idea of an unconscious metaphysical 
ground. He seems to have failed to develop fully as a metaphysical 
position, however, the concept of unconscious purpose, for the Platonic 
ideas, the individual forms, which will assumes are not given meta-
physical validity, but only ' phenomenal reality. 3 
Accordingly, it was Hartmann who first developed a systematic 
use of the concept of unconscious purpose as a metaphysical principle.4 
1 Garritt, POB, 136. 
2 Hartmann, R11il, 262. 
3 In his Philosophie des Unbewussten. 
4 Cf. Hartmann's statement, "This reason ••• cannot be merely the 
result of an accidental conflict of unreasoning, lawless elements, II 
but must be put into things by the order establishing cause. If 
God, as the absolute world cause, has established the will as the 
existence of existing things as their nature, he .must also have 
put into them those conditions by virtue of which they exert them-
selves with a rational regularity." RM, 127. 
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Hartmann was greatly attracted by the system of Schopenhauer, but he 
was troubled with the complete separation of will and representation 
( der Wille und die Vorstellung), and the way in which Schopenhauer made 
representation merely a secondary thing. 1 He saw that tendency is only 
an abstrac·tion, volition is existential or actual only in its relation 
to the representation of a present or a future state. "No one can 
really will purely and simply, without willing this or that."2 
The representation Schopenhauer lacked, Hartmann found in 
Schelling and Hegel. 3 He particularly admired the completeness \rlth 
which Hegel developed it in systematic for.m. Consequently since 
4 Schopenhauer' s world-will "was without reason," and "Hegel's world 
5 intelligence, or logos, was without energy," Hartmann sought to combine 
the two. 6 
The world is neither an auto-movement of the blind 
will, as Schopenhauer will have us believe, nor 
an auto-movement of the world-intelli~nce as Hegel-
ian panlogism teaches7 us; it is neither illogical 
nor logical. If the world were as Hegel thought, a 
purely logical process, it would be thoroughly pur-
posive, a thing which is manifestly untrue for the 
1 "Ganz secondM.ren Ursprungs." 
2 Janet, FC, 352. 
3 "Schelling's and Hegel's identity philosophy committed the double 
error, first, of confounding unconscious with conscious thinking 
and representation, and second, of confounding purely ideal (con-
scious or unconscious) thinking and representation with well-
realized thinking and representation." Hartmann, Rlvl, 142. 
4 Stein, Ludwig, Evolution and Optimism (EO), 61. N. Y.: Seltzer, 1926. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Hence, his system is termed panpneumatism. See Webster, New Inter-
national Unabridged Dictionary, 2nd ed., p. 1?65b. 
? "There are not two drawers in the Unconscious, in one of which lies 
the irrational Will, in the other the powerless Idea, but they are 
two poles of a magnet with opposite qualities, on whose opposition 
the world rests in its unity." Hartmann, PU, III:l91. 
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pessimist Hartmann. If the world were on the 
contrary a creation of an absolutely illogical 
principle of a blind will, any such purposive-
ness as is undoubtedly exhibited in the world 
of organism, would be absolutely unintelligible. 
_And so everything tends to that sJ~thesis of the 
absolute which Schelling calls 'the eternally 
unconscious.'l . 
Hartmann, accordingly, attributed both volition and representation to 
the metaphysical ground; 2 the cosmic mind wills (also feels) and knows, 
but does both without consciousness; it proposes and executes but with-
out consciousness. The two mingle in the unconscious inextricably. 
Causality is to be identified with logical necessity, and the will makes 
3 the logically necessary actual. 
From his work, it is apparent that it was not simply 
speculative zeal, but a certain romantic interest in religion that 
prompted Hartmann to undertake this merger. His aim was to show that 
the scientific mode of explanation is not sufficient; that, on the 
contrary, side by side with the causes assumed by the mechanical con-
ception of Nature, we must assume a spiritual principle to be at work. 
To avoid anthropomorphism he calls this principle 'the Unconscious.' 
He appeals to it whenever he feels that the causes which empirical science 
is able to assign are, in his opinion, insufficient. This is what he 
means by "arriving at speculative results by inductive methods."4 
1 Stein, £E.• cit., 61. 
2 Hartmann states, "If Will and Presentation were separate substances, 
an insurmountable dualism would pervade the world, and leave its 
mark in the soul of the individual - but of such a dualism there 
is nowhere any trace." PU, III:l91. 
3 Hartmann, PU, III:l86-187. "The notion of logical necessity is the 
super-ordinate of causation, final causality, and motivation ••• " 
4 See H8ffding, HMP, II:534. Cf. Hartmann's discussion, PU, I:6-16. 
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In his Religious Metaphysics and in his Religion of the 
Future, as well as in the Philosophy of the Unconscious, ·Hartmann attempt-
ed to work .out a position 'beyond theism.' 1 
greatly impressed with the reality of evil: 2 
As Weber states, he was 
Das Ubel ist kein blesses Nichts, wie Stoiker 
und moderne Optimisten in eitler Selbsttauschung 
sich einreden m5chten, 'Die Welt liegt im Argen,' 
und das Leben ist 'ein Jammartel.' Die Natur, 
von deren GUte und mUtterlichen FUrsorge der 
frUhere Optimismus so view Sch8nes und Rfthrendes 
zu erzghlen musste, ist in der That ebenso sehr 
eine herzlose Schlgchterin als eine glltige Mutter, 
ebenso sehr yiva als Vishnu. 3 
This attracted him to the Hindu Trimurti, where it seemed impersonalism 
had achieved to some extent a solution. 
The Brahmans have got rid of the contradiction by 
representing the impersonal Brahm as the one 
Essence underlying the three persons ••• For fif-
teen centuries the Christians have been entangled 
in this contradiction because they had not the 
courage to resolve it after the fashion of the 
Brahmans.4 
Hartmann made no attempt to restrain his own youthful en-
thusiasm for the values of his theory. But when one goes beyond his 
1 See Walter Bundy, The Psychic Health of Jesus, pp. 9-16, "Eduard von 
Hartmann.n N. Y.: Macmillan, 1922. 
2 One can scarcely read Hartmann's Religion of the Spirit, and espe-
cially the subsection, Religion of the Future, without observing 
that Hartmann, like the English Spencer was more interested in 
synthesizing than in understanding. His knowledge of higher cri-
ticism and the history of dogma is surprisingly superficial. 
2 This seems to be due to three factors: his study of Schopenhauer, 
his interest in Oriental thought, and the development of Darwinian 
evolutionism. In any case, the ease with which he forgets the 
evilness of evil indicates his interest in it was intellectually 
and not morally or religiously grounded. 
3 Weber, \r.LWG, 34. 
4 Hartmann, PU, II: 27. 
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claims to a criticism of his exposition of the unconscious as the sole 
metaphysical principle, one finds it difficult to discover what advan-
tages his metaphysical omnibus gained for him. Its problems loom up 
more largely than its values. 
In the first place he leaves the part which the Unconscious, 
conceived as Noumenon, plays in the scheme, extremely obscure. 1 As 
Janet points out, there are three modes of action in nature -- mechanism, · 
instinct, and thought. "Of these three modes two only are distinctly 
known to us, mechanism and intelligence. Instinct is the most obscure, 
most unexplained." 2 Yet, Hartmann taking his cue from Schopen:hauer,3 
chooses instinct. 4 He necessarily does so in order to escape (1) the 
materialism of mechanism, and (2) the apparent exclusion of unconscious 
5 
will in the latter. 
It is difficult to see how such instinctive action can give 
rise to contradictory situations without the Unconscious being responsibl 
1 Sully, PES, 178. 
2 Janet, FC, 349. 
3 Schopenhauer referred to instinct as a co1rumentary of the creative 
activity. 
4 "Dess das 'Unbe\vusst e' soll trotz seines Namens wissend sein, nur 
nicht in der Form, in welcher 'Ich' als bewusster weiss. Hart-
mann vergleicht sein Wissens mit dem der Instinktive, z. B. der 
Insekten, auch zieht er das empirisch seltene PhRnomen des mensch-
lichen Hellsehens heran. Das Unbe\vusste wird geradezu als all-
hellsehend bezeichnet; es weiss alles. '' Driesch, Handbuch der 
deutschen Philosophie, II:B:72, 23-28. 
5 Hartmann says of instinct, "Instinct is not the result of conscious 
reflection - not a consequence of bodily organization - not mere 
result of a mechanism founded in the organization of the brain 
- not the effect of a dead, and essentially foreign mechanism, 
externally adhering to the mind -- but the individual's own activi-
ty, springing from his inmost nature and character. PU, I:ll3; 
cf. Butler, UM, 212. 
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for them. Hartmann is conscious of this difficulty and vacillates. 
Sometimes he denies evil as in the statement, 
Christianity is right in its idea of Providence, 
for all that happens happens with absolute wisdom, 
with absolute fitness, i.e. as means to the fore-
seen end, by the never-erring Unconscious, which 
is itself the absolutely logical.l 
At other times he avoids this contradiction by falling into another. · 
More in harmony with his general position he states: 
That evi l may be possible without restricting 
God's absoluteness, the individual, first must 
be no pure appearance, as in abstract monism, but 
a reality; second, the defining of the actions of 
the individual must not come from without , as in 
fatalistic theism; and third, the individual with 
his will-decisions, must not lie outside the 
domain of the absolute will of God, as in inde-
terministic theism, but wi thin it. These condi-
tions point to the solution. The individual who 
must be neither determined from without nor un-
determined must, in his actions and in his will-
decisions, determine himself, provided that this 
self-determination falls within the domain of the 
divine knowledge and will. Since this is possible, 
the very centre of being of the individual from 
which he determines himself, must lie, not out-
side but inside the divine being wi thout losing 
its individual reality. The first proposition 
signifies that the true mean between fatalism and 
indeterminism is psychological determinism; the 
second, that the true mean between abstract monism 
and theism is concrete monism, which gives its 
due to the unity of all being in God, as well as 
to the reality of the many beings towards one 
another. 2 
To maintain this position, however, (which only accounts for moral evil) 
Hartmann must surely qualify his monism. Either the individual wills 
-- or instincts are final -- and the Unconscious is not responsible for 
1 
2 
PU, II:27. 
RM, 185. 
Cf. PU, II:368. 
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them, 1 or Hartmann's solution is merely verbal. Is it any wonder, 
Arreat observes that in fact "we have here two subjects, instinct and 
the unconscious, which remain distinct, however, allied they may be.n2 
Hartmann faces even a more serious problem when he approaches 
the B8hme-Schelling-Hegel problem of the self-diremption of the Absolute 
in creation. It is here that it appears that Hartmann is not successful 
in merging the 'blind will' of Schopenhauer and the 'powerless idea' 
of Hegel. 3 Stein relates that, 
In one of his letters Hartmann sketches the 
cosmic process of the formation of the world in 
words which exhibit a leaning toward religious 
myth. In the original consciousness Will and 
Idea lay undifferentiated from each other. In 
an unconscious moment, Will, this blind partner, 
as if impelled by a demon, takes the false step 
of uniting itself with Idea or Reason. Our world 
is to be looked upon as a product of this unequal 
union. It is thus the melancholy product of a 
clumsy, evil father, Will, and of a sublime, mag-
nanimous Mother, Idea. As the result of this 
false step our world is now loaded with unhappi-
ness. True, the good mother Idea, through art 
and science endeavors to make existence bearable 
for her only child, the World. But unfortunately 
she cannot prevail against the operation of the 
evil Father, Will, who produces sorrow, misery, 
unhappiness and privation. But Idea helps us to 
bear sorrow with courage, and so prepares the way 
for the self-emancipation of self that will lead 
us back to the primitive condition of Nirvana, of 
blessed unconsciousness. Consequently, there was 
at first a neutral something, unconsciousness, a 
masculine something Will, and finally something, 
1 This is the point of Sully's criticism, PES, 1?8. 
2 Arreat, Monist, 21 (1911), 26?. 
3 Ward states, "Hartmann has not synthesized Hegel's absolute with 
Schopenhauer's: he has simply set them over against each other 
in irreconcilable conflict. •••" ROE, 335. Cf. Windelband, HP, 
621, note 1. 
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feminine, Idea.1 
Thus the great coordinator of all is itself in need of coordination; 
the Unconscious is in a state of unstable equilibrium, and we never know 
when the "peace-disturber in the rigid repose of the All-One, that 
seizes the initiative in order to interrupt the same"2 may break out 
anew. Instead of the unconscious being co-extensively will and repre-
sentation, the unconscious is will, then representation, or vice-versa. 
The world process began when blind will seized the aggressive. 3 "The 
fatal deed is done before that Reason emerges from its pristine latency." 
The World-redemption arrives when the powerless idea frees itself from 
the will. 6 Hartmann's synthesis thus fails in this respect: 
Hartmann's God qua willing and absolutely irra-
tional and his God qua thinking and absolutely 
rational may be two Gods, perhaps, or God, and 
something else; but one God simply it cannot be 
The dualism into which he is driven in spite 
of himself comes out clearly in the fine ethical 
appeal that he makes to us to sympathize and co-
operate with God in effecting his redemption and 
our own. 6 
Finally there is the problem of the consciousness of the 
unconscious. On the face of it, this would appear a contradictory 
question. As a writer in the Westminster Review7 states, it appears that 
I 
1 Stein, EO, 63. Of. Sully, PES, 131; also, 131, note 1. Jl 
2 Hartmann, PU, III:l92. 
3 "The world-appearance of the divine being is, however, the teleologi-
cal exaltation of transcendent unhappiness to immanent unhappiness 
during the finite continuance of the world~process, in order 
thereby to avoid an infinite continuance of transcendent unhappi-
ness." Hartmann, RM, 265-266. 
4 Ward, ROE, 33?. 
5 Sully, PES, 139. 
6 Ward, ROE, 336; cf. Hartmann, PU, II:368. 
? New series, vel. 49:151. 
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"it is not only like ancient Athens to an unknm.,'n, but to an unknowing 
God, that modern Pessimism rears its altar." On investigation, though, 
Hartmann's position is not so clear. 
This problem demands a definition of ter.ms which must wait. 
Suffice it here to point out that Hartmann really looks upon the uncon-
scious as super-conscious so far as knowledge and volition are concerned. 
He objects to consciousness because he considers it capable of becoming 
diseased and exhausted, involves duration and memory, is liable to error, 
and is conditioned by a material brain or nervous ganglia. Metaphysical 
being can be subject to none of these. But most of all 
It is not sensuousness, as men know it from 
their experience, which is the condition of con-
sciousness, but receptivity, the psychical 
reaction against action coming from without, 
which as something unwished for lays hold of the 
very will-state of the spirit. To assume such 
a receptivity in God is the same as setting up 
an externality for God, and imagining actions 
which affect his will-state as something not 
l wished by him •••• 
In this sense, Hartmann's Unconscious may become conscious in man, but 
in itself is unconscious. 
God, in his being, is as much unconscious 
spirit as man is, and in certain of his uncon-
scious functions he comes into consciousness as 
much as man does, only he does not come into 
a consciousness of his own, nor to any other 
consciousness than man does, but in the human 
consciousness from him he comes into conscious-
ness of himself, in order thereby to procure for 
man consciousness from him. Apart from limited 
human consciousness, God is, above all things, 
entirely unconscious.2 
1 Hartmann, RM, 149. 
2 Hartmann, RM, 161. 
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The Unconscious, Hartmann then would conclude, is "the One super-
existent, which is all that is, 'we may therefore now define as pure, 
unconscious (impersonal, but indivisible, therefore individual) Spirit,' 
" i.e. "cognition of the first order."1 
It is obvious that Hartmann here and elsewhere plays fast 
and loose with the most important terms. On the one hand he speaks of 
the conscious being higher than the unconscious in the individual, and 
the Unconscious as being higher than the conscious in the Absolute. 2 
Fortunately, the unconscious has meant for most thinkers something that 
stood in contrast to the conscious, and will be used in that sense here 
when we no longer have to wrestle with Hartmann's thought. 
Although Driesch speaks3 very highly of Hartmann's work, the 
greater number of thinkers criticize it quite sharply. 4 Although it 
1 Hartmann, PU, III:l84-185. Cf. RM, 151, "Wherefore, it is in the . 
highest degree justifiable to depict the divine being as like 
the human, -- as spirit, -- though consciousness is wanting to him, 
for he still possesses the best part of the human spirit, and has 
a higher substitute for consciousness, -- creative productivity 
and productive ·omnisapience." 
2 Hartmann, PU, II:41; cf. Driesch, CP, 4. 
3 "W'ir koiiDnen zum letzten der historisch gewordenen Naturphilosophen, 
zu E. Hartmann, welcher einer der bedeutendesten von allen ist." 
Handbuch der deutschen Philosophie, II:B:69:49-50. 
4 Thus Urquhart, PVL, 50, "For Hartmann the secret of all things is 
in a cold, unconscious thought, pitilessly moving onwards, with-
out concern for the fate of human beings, and without realizing in 
any degree any end which might be called good." 
Hartmann's scientific data also comes in for considerable 
criticism. Hartmann later admitted he read only one biological 
text for material for his examples in the Philosophie des Unbewuss-
ten. 
Sully, " •• The unconscious, therefore, tends to be a simple phrase 
and nothing more •••• What, in fact, is this 'unconscious' but a 
high-sounding name to veil our ignorance?'J' Westminster Review, 
n.s., 49 ( ), 143. ~uoted also in Butler, UM, 138. 
'~fuen we grasp it (the philosophy of von Hartmann) as a whole, 
it amounts to nothing more than this, that all or (see next page} 
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passed through some ten editions in twenty years, and evoked fifty-
eight volumes in criticism in the first five years after it was 
nearly all the phenomena of the material and spiritual world rest 
upon and result from a mysterious, unconscious being, though to call 
it being is really to add on an idea not immediately contained with-
in the all-sufficient principle." Westminster Review, n.-s., 49: 
143. 
Ward, "Hartmann's initial state of the Absolute as empty will is the 
most glaring contradiction of a writer who has perpetrated more 
absurdities than any other writer .of repute that I know. How, it 
has been often asked, can the Absolute lack anything? And how too, 
we may add, can the finite Many, if parts of the Absolute, lack 
anything?" ROE, 329. 
James, Wm., "But as James says, 'his logic is so lax and his failure 
to consider the most obvious alternative so complete, that it would 
••• be a waste of time to look at his arguments in detail." 
Feingold, Monist, 2? (1917), 206. Q.uoting James, Psychology, I:l?O. 
Lange, "All the grosser and more palpable, on the contrary; does the 
false teleology appear in Hartmann's Philosophie des Unbm~ssten 
- that teleology which creates mechanical work out of nothing, and 
thereby destroys the causal connexion of nature. H. protests, 
indeed, against the view that his 'finality' is 'something existing 
in addition to or even despite causality,' but his application of 
'finality,' and especially his remarkable establishing of it by a 
supposed calculus of probability, show at once that this very 
interpretation of the strict causal connexion of nature forms the 
basis his whole philosophy which is a complete return to the stand- I 
point of the charcoal-burner and of savage peoples." Lange, History 
of Materialism, III: 71. 
Weber, "Dieses aber ist, nach Hartmann's Voraussetzung, allweise: 
Hartmanns Fehler ist also seine Personifizirung von Wille und Vor-
stellung, wobei er das eine Absolute libersicht und in einen Dualis-
mus ge~th, den Schopenhauer sorglichst vermieden hatte. Dass 
das Wesen, dem der Wille zukommt, absolut intelligent, dieser sein 
Wille aber absolut dumm sei, ist schlechthin undenkbar. Der Wille 
eines allweisen Wesens hat Theil an dieser Allweisheit und kann 
keine Thorheit begehn." WLWG, 33. 
"In a little volume entitled, 'Die naturwissenschaftlichen Grundlagen 
der Philosophie des Unbewussten,' Schmidt examines (Professor Oscar} 
the basis of natural science which Hartmann boasts of having given 
to his system, and the result is sufficiently disastrous to Hartmann s 
pretensions. The critic proves that Hartmann has again and again 
resorted to writers on biological subjects now recognized as value-
less, just as though they were on a level with the latest authori-
ties. He further fast~ns on Hartmann a number of inaccuracies as 
to statement of fact whi,ch prove his scientific reading must have 
been one-sided and hasty. Finally, in an able review of Hartmann's 
whole method of interpreting biological phenomena, (see next page) 
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published, 1 its extreme claims for the unconscious, Northridge notes, 
were "one of the leading factors in the reaction from the study of the 
subject."2 It was not Hartmann but psychological and evolutionary 
factors that most deeply grounded the idea of unconscious purpose in 
modern thought. 
In conclusion, we must recognize that Hartmann's attempt to 
develop a philosophy around the concept of unconscious purpose had many 
faults and fell into numerous inconsistencies. Yet, despite these 
inconsistencies, his 'extreme claims,' and much adverse criticism, 
Hartmann's work made at least two important contributions to modern 
philosophy. 
In the first place, Hartmann moved toward a more concrete 
metaphysic than his Hegelian and Schopenhauerian predecessors in making 
his ultimate of ultimates "neither Will nor Idea: that is, neither one 
as growth, reproduction, and the development of species, Schmidt 
brings to light the essentially unscientific character of Hartmann's 
standpoint. He charges Hartmann with credulity and even an inclina-
tion to superstition, and affirms that by the super-natural mechan-
ism of his Unconscious he simply manages 'to cover with a word an 
incorrectly observed phenomenon, or what is unknown, that is, not 
yet sufficiently investigated.' Particularly able is Schmidt's 
answer to Hartmann's attack on Darwinism." Sully, PES, 204, note 1. 
"A much more thoughtful demonstration of the untenability of Hart-
mann's biological assumptions and of their essentially unscientific 
nature, may be found in a work entitled 'Das Unbewusste vom Stand-
punkt der Physiologie und Descendenztheorie' (Berlin; 1872). In 
the last work it is suggested that a good .part of Hartmann's system 
was put together before the author had studied Darwin." Sully, ibid 
.Tames referred to Hartmann's Unconscious as a "tumbling ground for 
whimsies." Principles of Psychology, !:163; cf. Varieties of Reli-
gious Experience, p. 232 et ~· 
H8ffding, "We may say of it, as Galilee said of an appeal to an al-
migh~will, it explains nothing because it explains everything." 
Quoted in Subconscious Phenomena, pp. 106-10?. 
1 H8ffding, H1~, II:533. 
2 Northridge, MTU, 1?4. 
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to the exclusion of the other."1 Vihile he failed to combine the two 
systems satisfactorily, as we have seen, and critics sometimes laughed in 
scorn at both his "doctrine of creation" and his eschatology, he saw 
clearly that both Hegel and Schopenhauer were in the "similarly grave 
embarrassment of treating an attribute as the substance, and trying to 
derive the other attribute from it."2 In attempting to go beyond these 
attributes he was moving toward a more adequate metaphysical position, 
even a personalism. His own later criticism of the Philosophy of the 
Unconscious, which the public generally insisted upon viewing as his 
final philosophy, 3 and his increasing stress upon the non-hedonic values 
of life4 emphasize this trend. He continued loyal to the idea of an 
unconscious world-ground throughout, however, and as Professor R. A. 
Tsanoff points out, in the Grundriss der Metaphysik he answers eleven 
arguments in favor of an absolute consciousness with eighteen against 
the belief. 5 He thus remained in abstraction and failed to unit~ will 
and idea in the only principle where we experience not only each but 
both - namely, conscious experience. 
In the second place, Hartmann contributed largely to the 
criticism of materialism and mechanism, and the defence of the teleo-
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Tsanoff, Nature of Evil (NE), 316, "Schelling called it ::b.A· 
Hartmann calls it the Unconscious, Absolute Substance, Absblute 
Subject or Spirit.ff 
Ibid. , 315-316. 
Thus, fifteen years after its first publication, Hartmann said in 
pref'acing a new edition, "It is not the product of reflection and. 
maturity, but the bold experiment of juvenile talent, presenting 
all the def'ects and qualities ef the work of youth." PU, I:ix. 
In the Grundriss der Ivietaphysik, and the Grundriss der :Axiologie, 
Tsanoff, NE, 338. 
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logical point of view. His survey of nature led him to reject the 
former views, for he was impressed as greatly as the ancient Anaxagoras 
or the genial, ironic Socrates with their inadequacy. "That mere 
mechanics or mere chance can explain, for instance, eyesight, he regards 
a s outside the bounds of probability."1 In his own calculation this 
probability is less than fifteen in ten million. 2 Through the physical, 
bodily, and mental spheres attempted to trace a creative, contriving 
Unconscious. He thus shifted the teleological problem, and, as ~anet 
puts it, "The question would no longer be as to an intelligent cause, 
but as to an unconscious intelligence which is different. The question 
changes ground. Can there be representations without consciousness?n3 
follows: 
Professor R. A. Tsanoff summarizes the strange result as 
Particular interest attaches to the fact that 
Hartmann, pessimist though he is regarding the 
unattainability of positive happiness, and rather 
lukewarm and grudging in his affirmation of 
attained moral, aesthetic, or religious value: 
the reality of aims, goals in the universe which 
render our present activity significant. In thus 
emphasizing real purposiveness in the world, he 
is inconsistent; for what purpose, what end or 
aim or teleology could the Unconscious have? 
That he insists notwithstanding on his teleo-
logical optimism is doubly insignificant: despite 
his pessimism and. alongside his alogical Absolute 
is this reality of the reach after value,_ this 
purposiveness and self-transcendence essential to 
value which he recognizes clearly in the world-
process, even if he is unable to provide adequately 
for them in his metaphysics. 4 
1 Tsanoff, NE, 317. 
2 Hartmann, PU, I: 51. 
3 ~anet, FC, 352. 
4 Tsanoff, NE, 339-340. 
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The Effect of' Evolutionary Thought. 
The theory of' evolution which has played one of the most 
important roles in establishing the metaphysical temper of unconscious 
purpose began on a very sober, restricted basis centering mainly in the 
relation of the species one to another. It was Darwin's purpose to 
inquire into the series of biological linkages from amoeba to man, and 
the religious struggle that resulted was not so much over the theistic 
implications as it was over the assault upon the dignity of man. Tb 
the religious thought of t he period, Darwin was a new Copernicus, at-
tacking not the supremacy of man's earthly habitat, but the supremacy 
of' man himself. 
Upon the early extension of the evolutionary theory into 
the inorganic realm, 1 however, evolution began to take on more serious 
metaphysical implications. The old arguments against creatio-ex-nihilo 
were implemented with a natural order derived wholly from successive 
variations exacted in gratuitous time from an inconceivable yet limited 
number of possible combinations. The ~ posteriori approach was broad-
ened so rapidly that the difficulties which David Hume2 pointed out such 
a method finally faces in inquiring into metaphysical ultimates, were 
either discounted or entirely forgotten. 
At first the methodological value of the genetic approach 
overshadowed its metaphysical difficulties. Herbert Spencer, the 
1 Thus, Spencer' s First Principles, 1862; Fiske's Outlines of Cosmic 
Philosophy, 18?4. See Bogardus2 History of Social Thought, 299-320; Los Angeles; Miller Press, 1928 ; Farrington, Main Currents in 
American ThOUght, III:203-211, N. Y.: Harcourt, Brace. 
2 In his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, primarily. 
II 
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acknowledged leader in its interpretation, 1 traced the developmental 
principle through his Synthetic Philosophy into a large number of 
realms of human study, including ethics. Meanwhile, he attempted to 
limit knowledge in a positivistic way, 2 endowed the evolutionary princi-
ple with universal and compelling force, and tumbled all other meta-
physical issues into a convenient category which he termed "the Unknow-
able." In America, Spencer's disciple, .Tohn Fiske, attempted to recon-
cile Spencer's agnosticism and theism. But while Fiske's theism made 
the idea of automatic progress more acceptable, his contribution was 
chiefly practical, not logical. His primary value was in making the 
evolutionary principle acceptable to the New England mind. 3 
The same year that Fiske made public his attempt to recon-
cile evolution and theism, .Tohn Stuart Wdll's Three Essays on Religion 
were published. In these Ifill pointed out clearly the contradictory 
character of the ~ posteriori evidence. He called attention to the 
ruthlessness that is a part of the evolutionary process; gave his famous 
indictment of nature4 and reasserted that "whatever incidental and --
1 "Darwin hailed him (H. Spencer) as 'our greatest philosopher' for 
he made evolution a universal solvent and not merely a means for 
explaining the different forms of plants and animals." Sorley, 
History of English Philosophy, London: Putnam's, 1921. P. 261. 
2 Spencer was somewhat influenced by Comte, but was earlier influenced 
in that trend by Hamilton and Mansel. 
3 Farrington comments, "But like his genere.tion, he suffered his ener-
gies to be dissipated, and he ended in a somewhat blowsy optimism." 
Main Currents of American Thought, III:2ll. 
4 See Mill, TER, 28ff., "In sober truth, nearly all the things which 
men are hanged or imprisoned for doing to one another, are nature's 
every day performances. Killing, the most criminal act recognized 
by human laws, Nature does once to every being that lives; and in 
a large proportion of cases, after protracted tortures such as 
only the greatest monsters whom we read of ever (see next page} 
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unexpected benefits may result from crime, they are crime nevertheless."1 
purposely inflicted on their living fellow-creatures. If, by an 
arbitrary reservation, we refuse to account anything murder but 
what abridges a certain term supposed to be allotted to human life, 
nature also does this to all but a small percentage of lives, and 
does it in all the modes, violent or insidious, in which the worst 
human being~ takes the lives of one another. Nature impales men, 
breaks them as if on the wheel, casts them to be devoured by wild 
beasts, burns them to death, crushes them with stones like the 
first Christian martyr, starves them with hunger, freezes them with 
cold, poisons them by the quick or slow venom of her exhalations, 
and has hundreds of other hideous deaths in reserve, such as the 
ingenious cruelty of a Nabis or a Domitian never surpassed. All 
this, Nature does with the most supercilious disregard both of 
mercy and of justice, emptying her shafts upon the best and noblest 
indifferently with the meanest and worst; upon those who are engaged 
in the highest and worthiest enterprises, and often as the direct 
consequence of the noblest acts; and it might almost be imagined as 
a punishment for them. She mows down those on whose existence hang 
the well-being of a whole people, perhaps the prospects of the 
human race for generations to come, with as little compunction as 
those whose death is a relief to themselves, or a blessing to those 
under their noxious influence. Such are Nature's dealings with 
life. Even when she does not intend to kill, she inflicts the 
tortures in apparent wantonness. In the clumsy provision which 
has made for that perpetual renewal of animal life, rendered 
necessary by the prompt tennination she puts to it in every individ 
ual instance, no htiman being ever comes into the world but another 
human being is literally stretched on the rack for hours or days, 
not infrequently issuing in death. Next to taking life (equal to 
it according to a high authority} is taking the means by which we 
live; and Nature does this too on the largest scale and with the 
most callous indifference. A single hurricane destroys the hopes 
of a season; a flight of locusts, or an inundation, desolates a 
district; a trifling chemical change in an edible root, starves a 
million of people. The waves of the sea, like banditti seize and 
appropriate the wealth of the rich and the little all of the poor 
with the same accompaniments of stripping, wounding, and killing 
as their human antitypes. Everything in short, which the worst 
men commit either against life or property is perpetrated on a _ 
larger scale by natural agents. Nature has Noyades more fatal than 
those of Carrier; her explosions of fire damp are as destructive as 
human artillery; her plague and cholera far surpass the poison cups 
of the Borgias. Even the love of 'order' which is thought to be 
a following of the ways of Nature, is in fact a contradiction of 
them. All which people are accustomed to deprecate as 'disorder' 
and its consequences, is precisely a counterpart of Nature's ways. 
Anarchy and the Reign of Terror are overmatched in injustice, ruin, 
and death, by a hurricane (concluded with note 1 on next page) 
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Consequently it was impossible for him to believe there was an all 
powerful Creat or of all things consciously working out his plan2 in the 
universe. 3 Instead, he revived and defended the concept of a finite 
God. 4 
In addition to re-emphasizing the problem of natural evil 
with redoubtable vigor, the evolutionary theory also brought a great 
deal of criticism to bear upon the importance of consci ousness. In reply 
to Berkeleyan idealism, evolution seemed to indicate that matter and a 
non-conscious world ~ere here long before consciousness could have been 
present to perceive them. This appeared to make it necessary to give 
up the Berkeleyan position unless one was willing to entertain the 
notion that the entire evolutionary process was merely a recapitulatory 
phantasy in the individual's consciousness. If one accepted the evolu-
tionary account, consciousness seemed to disappear as the creative, 
directive force behind cosmic process. It became an eleventh hour way-
farer in a primarily non-conscious world. In addition, evolution seemed 
to stress that man should trust t~e instincts which echo nature rather 
than the consciousness or reason which may lead him astray. 5 Friedrich 
and a pestilence." 
1 Mill, T.ER, 34. (See preceding page.) 
2 Mill states, "There could be no real belief in one Creator and Gover-
nor until mankind had begun to see in the apparently confused 
phenomena which surrounded them, a system capable of being viewed 
as the possible working out of a single plan." TER, 131. 
3 "The physical government of the world being full of the things which 
when done by men are deemed the greatest enormities, it cannot be 
religious or moral in us to guide our actions by the analogy of the 
course of nature." Mill, TER, 31. 
4 Cf. Hume's Dialogues on Natural Religion. 
5 It will be noted that this is scarcely in harmony with Mill's stress 
upon the contradictory nature of natural process. 
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Nietzsche's attack on consciousness in his .Joyful Wisdom reflec.ts a 
general attitude: 
Consciousness is "the source of countless follies 
and errors. To its activities are due the per-
plexities and the despair of man. Conscious activ-
ity is superficial and credulous. It judges per-
versely and dreams with open eyes. It is the 
unconscious or the instincts to which man's pre-
servation is really to be ascribed.l 
Coupled with this view was the belief that man's consciousness is even 
dangerous if it attempts to go contrary to natural forces. In preserving 
the life of the crippled and weak it defeats the law of the survival of 
the fittest, weakens the human race and prepares for the downfall of the 
people. Thus Christian teaching and evolutionary process were placed 
in contradiction to each other. 
At first this criticism by evolutionists seemed to end in 
mechanism and a form of materialism. 2 Beginning with Henri Bergson, 
around the turn of the century, however, the uniqueness of higher forms 
of existence beg~ to receive a qualified recognition. More and more 
thinkers began to take the position that "a self-stoking, self-repairing, 
self-preservative, self-adjusting, self-increasing, self-reproducing 
machine is only an abuse of language spoken of as a machine at all. 113 
1 Trans. by Thomas Common, p. 47. 
2 This, however, had its own critics. Huxley, despite his science, 
leaned toward Berkeley's idealism, and asserted the autonomy of 
mants moral consciousness. He asserted a 'gladiatorial view of the 
cosmic process, claiming "that the ethical progress of society 
depends not on imitating the cosmic process, still less in running 
away from it, but in combating it." Scullard, The Ethics of the 
Gospel and the Ethics of Nature, 209, N. Y.: Doubleday and Doran, 
1927. 
3 Pringle-Pattison, IOG, 77, referring to Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft 
sect. 77. 
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Moreover, they began to see that such an organism was not the product 
of a machine. As they inquired into the arrival of, as well as the 
survival of the fittest, it was seen that neither time nor numbers 
necessarily sufficed to explain why a machine ~hould produce a product 
unlike its own pattern -- and not only produce, but perpetuate it. 
Above all, it seemed folly to think a machine could continuously exert 
an effort toward refinement reaching across the aeons from the earliest 
form of life to the present man. 1 
Consequently, in his Creative Evolution, Bergson attempted 
to account for a non-mechanistic force at work in nature, driving 
steadily, or at least persistently, toward the achievement of higher 
levels of existence. 2 He was followed in this general trend by Lloyd 
Morgan, Hans Driesch, 3 and others, and the interpretation in an adapted 
form found special favor also with such realists as Samuel Alexander. 4 
This interpretation recognized a creative and a questing5 - if not a 
directing effort in the development of the world. As Professor L. T. 
1 As Pringle-Pattison would say, mechanism seemed unable to account for 
"continuity of process and the emergence of real differences," •• 
"the twin aspects of cosmic history." Of. IOG, 103. 
2 "Unlike Schopenhauer, Bergson regards the life-urge as conscious ••• 
'In principle, consciousness is co-extensive with life.' •• (Bergson, 
Mind-Energy, 11; underlining is Bergson's). The sense in which the 
Elan is conscious is left ill-defined by .Bergson, and approaches at 
its lower end, the blindness and unconsciousness of Schopenhauer•s 
Will." Hoernle, IAP, 168. 
3 A criticism of these views is found in the Proceedings of the Sixth 
Int'l Congress of Philosophy {1930). We are interested in this 
historical summary, however, in their effect, not their inner 
consistency or validity. 
4 See his Space, Time, and Deity. 
5 Hoernle states: "NOr, as Bergson explicitly tells us, is the existing 
world to be understood as the realization of any 'purpose' or 'aim' -
pursued by the Elan." IAP, 169. 
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Hobhouse pictured it in his book, The Rational Good: 
A process thus determining and determined by its 
own outcome is of the nature of Effort, and the 
world development must therefore fall under this 
category •• 
This effort is the creator of gods and men, 
of beaut iful fictions and of what is noble in 
fact, of law and morals, of science and art, 
perhaps of what is beautiful in nature, certainly 
of the significance of that beauty to us. Its 
operation is intelligent and purposive and all-
embracing. An effort involving, even one 
evolving into, purpose i mplies Mind, and Mind 
that makes for harmony must have some unity 
throughout, however rudimentary its achievement. 
Hence if the world-process is directed towards 
harmony we legitimately infer a Mind at its 
centre, but the form of unity which such a Mind 
possesses is less easily detennined. It is 
possible that personality on the one hand and 
the social union of personalities on the other 
are rather its creations than adequate expressions 
of its substantive essence. 1 
Or, as ~ulius FrauenstKdt pictures it f rom a more mat erialistic bias: 
There is no contradiction whatever in admitting 
that a f orce, a plastic instinct, by a blind 
tendency creates works which then are revealed 
to the analytic understanding as conformed to 
an end. An unconscious finality is not, then, 
a contradiction in adjecto; and from the denial 
of a personal creator of the world, a iming at 
conscious ends, there no more .follows denial of 
the harmony of the world than the denial of the 
harmony of the organs follows from the affirma-
tion that a plastic organic virtue acts uncon-
sciously in plants and animals. The Aristotelian 
opposition between the efficient and the f inal 
cause is in no way identical with the opposition 
between the unconscious and the intelligent cause. 
For the final cause itself may be unconscious. 2 
Under the influence of the Hegelian dialectic, 3 the same 
1 Pp. 229-230. Quoted also by Patrick, ITP', 2?0. 
2 Briefe nber die Schopenhauersche Philosophie, Leipzig, 1854, letter 
21, p. 442. Quoted by ~anet, FC, 34?. Cf. Tsanoff, NE , 343ff. 
3 Particularly by the Hegelian doctrine of the (see next page) 
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vim~ of a creative effort was traced in other spheres. Thus Gustav 
Freytag gave it a place in cultural development. In the preface to the 
first volume of his Bilder aus der deutschen Vergangenheit, he states: 
All great creations of popular force, --ancestral 
religion, custom, law, polity, -- are to us no 
longer the outcome of individual effort; they are 
organic products of a higher life, which in every 
age only attains manifestation through the medium 
of the individual, and in all ages gathers up into 
itself the spiritual wealth of individuals into a 
mighty whole ••• Thus one may speak without in-
tending anything mystical, of a national soul ••• 
But no longer conscious, not so purposive and 
rational as the volition of the individual man, 
is this life of the people. All t hat is free and 
rational in history is the achievement of the 
individuals; the national energy works untiringly 
vnth the dark compulsion of a primitive power, 
and its spiritual productivity sometimes corres-
ponds in a surprising manner to the formative 
processes of the silently creative forces of 
nature, which urge stem, leaves1 and blossom out of t he seed-grain of the plant. 
Interpreters of the evolutionary process in this way came 
to criticize the earlier mechanism as inadequate to explain the actual 
development of the world, and to criticize mere chance as unable to 
account for its constancy and consistency. In place of both, they recog-
nized a creative principle which moved nisus-like toward the novel and 
comples, and was grounded in some way in. the metaphysical nature of things 
"Guile of Reason." Strange to say, through the development of the 
theory of evolution, Hegelian dialectic regained the empiricism whic 
Hegel attempted to give it at the beginning. 
1 Fifth edition, pp. 23, 24. Q,uoted by Hartmann, PU, I:41. 
2 Bergson particularly restored consciousness to a unique place: "Thing 
seem to happen as if an immense current of consciousness (a con-
sciousness which includes a multitude of potentialities a11 crowding 
in and hindering each other) had traversed matter in order to entice 
it to organization and make of this matter, which is necessity 
itself, an instrument of liberty. But it has scarcely escaped being 
itself ensnared. Matter, which is essentially (see next page } 
---f!f----__ -_-_-_--_ -__ 
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But while critics recognized such a creative principle 
they severely limited it. Many followed Bergson in opposing to the 
elan vital a biological series, a tendency in nature to resist1 and 
revert to the earlier level. 2 Others, who attempted more completely 
to escape from dualism held to a creative metaphysical monism. These, 
however, attacked the consciousness of such a metaphysical ground. They 
preferred to leave it an Unconscious Purpose in order to soften the 
antagonism of good and evil, explain the vestigial and the lost, and to 
account for the tardy realization of consciousness and the higher values. 
The -Effect of Psychologies of the Unconscious. 
Meanwhile along with evolution another modern study was 
undermining the importance of consciousness. Even as evolution had 
discredited consciousness as a tardy emergent in the evolutionary series, 
psychological research tended to show that most human behavior is uncon-
scious rather than conscious. Under the combined efforts of such men 
as Bain, Binet, James, Freud, Jung, Adler, Levine, Mftnsterberg, Prince, 
Ribot, Charcot, Rivers, Taine, Coue, Hadfield, Sidis, Tansley, and 
others, "a mass of confusion, irrationality, baffling and inexplicable 
automatism and necessity, enfolds the consciousness which seeks to 
entice it, converts it to its own automatism, and lulls it into 
its ovm unconsciousness." Bergson, "Life and Consciousness," 
Hibbert Journal, 10 (1911-1912), 39. In Bergson's thought the 
necessity of the material world stands in sharp opposition to the 
freedom of consciousness, and time becomes the measure of duration 
present in consciousness. 
1 Marlatt, Class lectures in the "pri nciples of moral and religi ous 
education," Boston University School of Theology, 1931. 
2 "The difference between unconscious purpose and mechanism is negli-
gible. An interesting illustration of this fact is found in the 
way Bergson vacillates between the vis~ tergo and conscious pur-
pose in describing the elan vital." Brightman, ITP, 308. 
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states of consciousness"1 was revealed underlying the proud, pure 
reason, the immaculate logic, and cool rationality of men. 
These darker and obscurer aspects of the mind 
modified vastly man's conception of the relation 
between the life of reason and the life of 
'instinct,' revealing the predominance not o~ 
the former but overwhelmingly of the latter. 
Psychological investigation called attention anev1 to the 
much debated instincts, and the part they play in human behavior. It 
stressed the peculiar capacity of mental mechanisms to measure time, 
enabling a delayed con~and registered by auto- or by hypnotic suggestion 
to find effect, and to motivate at a given time an act of which the 
individual was unconscious. Sir William Hamilton stressed this factor 
in his Metaphysics: 
Thus the infinitely greater part of our 
spiritual treasure lies al~ys beyond the sphere 
of consciousness, hid in the obscure recesses 
of the mind. This is the first degree of latency. 
In regard to this there is no difficulty, or 
dispute •••• The second degree of latency exists 
when the mind contains certain systems of know-
ledge, or certain habits of action, which it 
is wholly unconscious of possessing, in its 
ordinary state, but which are revealed to con-
sciousness in certain extraordinary exaltations 
of its powers (which reveal themselves in delir-
ium, somnambuli.sm, and other abnormal states. )3 
In addition to such mechanisms, psychological analysis 
revealed that frequently the conscious life of the individual was even 
dominated and distorted by a complex in the unconscious. This discovery 
1 House, "Psychologies of the Unconscious," Psychoanalytic Review, 
15 ( 1928)' 4. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Lecture XVIII, p. 236. ~uoted also by House, loc. cit., 15 (1928) 
ca. 18. 
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is generally attributed to Freud. But long before Freud, Herbart had 
noticed the phenomenon and fashioned many of the "architectonics" of the 
Freudian system. In his "calculus of consciousness" he clearly defined 
the concepts of conflict, submergence, repression, threshold, incompati-
bility of ideas, the nature of forgetting, and the dynamic aspect of 
suppressed and ejected ideas.1 His chief difference from Freud was 
that he placed incompatibility upon a cognitive rather than an emotional 
basis. According to Herbart there are three classes of ideas: those 
that are alike and may therefore co-exist harmoniously in consciousness; 
those that are disparate but yet co-exist in consciousness because of 
their complementary relation to one another; and ideas that are contrary, 
the co-existence of which is impossible; hence, the ensuing conflict, 
each idea trying to exclude the other from an achieved place in conscious-
2 
ness. As Dr. Northridge points out further: 
Whether or not the newcomer will be banished 
into the unconscious depends on the position 
and strength of the system of ideas with which 
it seeks attachment •••• But, as in the Freudian 
theory, the ejected ideas do not remain in a 
passive position in the unconscious, their ten-
dency is rather, to regain a foothold in con-
sciousness. That is, as it were, the goal of 
their ambitions, and accordingly as they succeed 
or fail they are said to be "rising" or "falling." 
The point below which ideas become unconscious 
is called by Herbart the "threshold of conscious-
ness~tt3 
Herbart distinguishes two thresholds, the statical and the dynamical. 
Ideas reach the statical when they_ sink to a level where they can co-exist 
1 House, loc. cit., 15 (1928), 13. 
2 See Northridge, ~ITU, 15. 
3 Northridge, MTU, 16. 
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without further conflict and ideas reach the dynamical threshold when 
they are expelled altogether from consciousness, existing then in a 
spirit of suppression. The clear anticipation of the Freudian stand- _ 
point is represented in the Herbartian emphasis upon the fact that such 
suppressed ideas become very active and operate as significant factors 
in determining conscious states.1 
The views of Herbart made little impress upon his contem-
poraries, but the graphic claims of Freud at the dawn of the Twentieth 
Century found many advocates. They also found much support from clinical 
studies. Although Freud's school developed two wings headed by Jung 
and Adler2 respectively, and though many psychologists rejected his 
concept of the "censor," or his notion of the dominance of the "sex" 
factor, Freud's emphasis upon the emotional and the unconscious was 
accepted. Morton Prince's study of The Dissociation of a Personalit~ 
became a classic delineating the thesis of a multiple-personality, and 
novels like Stevenson's Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, or Tarkington's Bunker 
Bean popularized the notion that consciousness is only the 'pale cast 
of thought' cloaking the deep, dread, drives of emotional depths. 
Psychology became leavened by the view that "men live by impulses; that 
actions express the efforts of a vital energy which moves darkly on the 
wings of heredity through the generations of men; that we do not act 
from conscious reasons, but rather construct reasons to explain what has 
1 House, Psychoanalytical Review, 15 (1928), 13. 
2 Alfred Adler developed his school of individual psychology and C. G. 
Jung developed the Z~richer school. See Schmidt, Philosophisches 
w5rterbuch, 19308; p. 336b. 
3 Freud published his study of dreams in 1900. Prince's work appe~red 
in 1906. From this time writings rapidly multiplied. 
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1 been done in and through us." In the analysis of conduct, whether 
normal or abnormal, the idea became prevalent that the consciousness 
does not really act, but rather serves to recognize and appropriate the 
actions of an unconscious force. Such terrns as neuroses, complexes, 
obsessions, frustration, libido, r'eeling of inferiority, claustrophobia, 
unconscious, non-conscious, sub-conscious, co-conscious, super-conscious, 
supra-conscious, et cetera found their way into the vocabulary of the 
layman. It mattered little that such concepts were generally vague, 
intangible, mystical, unanalyzable, bewildering, and unscientific. The 
notion grew that it was more important to mold the unconscious than to 
make a rational appeal to the conscious. Thus, "the flight from 
consciousness"2 set in in full swing, and it was forgotten that "all the 
facts we have from which to infer subconscious, or body, or God, or 
world are facts of our own consciousness. "3 
It was impossible that this development should not have an 
influence upon metaphysical speculation. Mingling with the evolutionary 
emphasis, earlier referred to, it did do so. As Professor Cohen has 
written, against the charge that the old rationalism absurdly over-em-
phasized the power of conscious reasons or motives, 
the romantic movement since Schlegel, Schelling, 
and Savigny has emphasized the fact that human 
institutions are matters of growth rather than 
creation, and that the great achievements of 
life are the results of unconscious spirit rather 
1 Brett, History of Psychology, "criticism of Hartmann", III:l93-202. 
London: Allen and Unwin, 1921. Cf. House, loc. cit., ?. 
2 Brightman, PR, 29. 
3 Brightman, loc. cit. 
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than conscious deliberation. Even Hegel, 
despite all his extravagant panlogism, so em-
phasized the immanent, necessary evolution (or 
dialectic) at the basis of human history, poli-
tics, religion, arts, and philosophy as to leave 
nothing to human effort.l 
The Present Status of Unconscious Purpose. 
Through these many factors the concept of unconscious 
purpose has come to a place of influence, if not of dominance in modern 
thought. By means of this concept men in many schools of thought would 
provide a metaphysical ground for evolutionary development; account for 
the cosrric harmony which underlies extensive interaction; explain the 
mind-like quality of existence; and allow for the late emergence of 
consciousness; yet, escape making the metaphysical ground into a con-
scious agent, intentionally responsible for the cruel antagonism in the 
evolutionary series, and the continual destruction of conscious values 
in death. 
In his "dualistically-tinged metaphysics,"2 Bergson has a 
metaphysical ground which produces the creative elan, but also produces 
the reactive matter or nature. 3 It allows for a degree of purpose 
and consciousness, but is itself scarcely conscious or omniscient. 
1 "The Insurgence Against Reason," Journal of Philosophy, Feb. 26. 
1925, p. 11'7. Quoted also by House, ~· cit., 15 (1928), 6-'7. 
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2 Thilly' HP' 578f. I 
3 "So we ought to conclude, still remaining faithful to rea son, that , 
from the point of view of God, of the Creator, all is clear, all 
1
1 
is rational, intelligible, in the highest sense of the word, whilst IJ 
from the point of the world or of effects - when t hese are taken I 
to be causes -- everything appears obscure and unintelligible, II 
irrational and absurd. The first method outdistances reason, 1 
but satisfies and completes it; the second denies it." Bergson, 
TSMR, 291. 
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In the realism of S. Alexander, we have the metaphysical 
ground of space-time driving on nisus-like through the creative series 
to the emergence of deity. In the similar system of Bertrand Russelll 
we have a neutral substance giving rise to matter in one form and. mind 
in another, and finally emerging in consciousness. 
Professor A. N. Whitehead states! 
••• Intellectual feelings are not to be under-
stood unless it be remembered that they already 
find at work "physical purposes" more primitive 
than themselves. Consciousness follows, and 
does not precede, the entry of the oonceptual 
prehensions of the relevant universals. 2 
Thus, when we make a distinction of reason, 
and consider God in the abstraction of a pri-
mordial actuality, we must ascribe to him neither 
fulness of feeling , nor consciousness. He is 
the unconditioned actuality of conceptual feel-
ing at the base of things; so that, by reason 
of this primordial actuality, there is an order 
in the relevancy of eternal objects to the process 
of creation. His unity of conceptual operations 
is a free creative act, untrammelled by reference 
to any particular course of things. It is 
deflected neither by love, nor by hatred, for what 
in fact comes to pass. The particularities of 
the actual world presuppose it; while it merely 
presupposes the general metaphysical character 
of creative advance, of which it is the primordial 
exemplification. The primordial nature of God 
is the acquirement by creativity of a primordial 
character. 3 
'• 
I 
I\ 
I 
1 "Russell is qui te willing to regard both mind and matter as temer- 1 
gents' in the sense that both mind and matter have properties that I 
cannot be inferred from the character of the oo nstituent events, but ! 
he does not recognize that the character of these emergents has any I 
significance in the interpretation of reality ••• It is simply that 
'events' aggregated in a certain way and under certain conditions I 
appear as what we call 'matter,' when aggregated i n other ways, as 
'mind.' Ramsdell, Methodist Review, 112 (1930), 378. 
2 Vfhitehead, PR, 416. 
3 Vfuitehead, PR, 52lf. 
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In the dialectical materialism of Karl Marx, the concept lj 
~~ of unconscious purpose is well recognized. It likewise appears in the !I 
I 
I 
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I 
I' ,, 
II ,, 
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materialism- critical realism of George Santayana.1 il II 
The concept has even found its place among the idealists. 
Beginning with Schelling, Schopenhauer, and Hartmann, who were all 
'I 
II 
idealists, it has also found expression in the thought of such an able II 
,, idealist as Paulsen.2 It is implicit in E. G. Spaulding's Platonic 
idealism, since Professor Spaulding "leaves out the God which Plato and 
j' 
II 
personalism recognize and teaches that the ideal values are impersonal I 
I 
II 
I 
principles and that God is not a person, but instead is the totality 
of these impersonal values. n 3 
1 
2 
3 
I Santayana states in his Realm of Matter: "I am not tempted seriously I 
to regard consciousness as the very essence of life or even of 
1 being. On the contrary, both my personal experience and the little j, 
I know of nattu'e at large absolutely convince me that conscious- jl 
ness is the most highly conditioned of existences, an overtone of j 
psychic strains, mutations, and harmonies; nor does its origins I 
seem more mysterious to me than that of everything else." (p. 154-
155). On the other hand, he states: " ••• Matter is no model devised I 
by the human imagination, like Egyptian atoms or the laws of physics ; 
but is a primeval plastic substance of unknown potentiality, per- '1 
petually taking on new forms; the gist of materialism being that I 
these fonns are all passive and precarious, while the plastic stress 1 
of matter is alone creative and, as far as we can surmise, inde- II' 
structible." RM, 100. I 
Lindsay states in his Recent Advances in Theistic Philosophy: It has 11 
yet to be shown why scientific or naturalistic pantheism, such as 
Paulsen embraces, must, in the vaunted name of evolution, have will l1 
which is blind. Yet a blind striving of wills after an unconscious 
1
1 
ideal is the immanent tendency by which he metaphysically interprets I 
evolution and maintains his so-called aesthetic theology." (P. 198) I 
"The natural causes, one would think, must be in a very bad way, 1 
when they are best helped by blind will or impulse (Trieb), instead II 
of being allowed to have intelligence working through them -- and 
not merely from without, as Paulsen incorrectly apprehends the J! 
theistic view -- no less than will." (P. 199). j 
Brightman, IGP, 25. I 
II 
I( I. 
II 
~ criticizes For a somewhat similar view, Professor P. A. Schilpp the v~rk of his contemporary, Nicolas Berdyaev, as follows: 
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I do not think that I am exaggerating the 
facts if I say that the various writings of 
Nicolas Berdyaev are the strangest combina-
tion of (occasionally profound) sense and the 
most unadulterated kind of non-sense that 
this reviewer has ever read. To begin with 
the worst, I do not believe that there has 
ever been put into print such absurdity 
about history as Berdyaev writes ••• On the 
one hand, - ~e completely personalizes history; 
talks as if history not merely had a meaning 
wholly independent of man, but as if it had 
a will, a purpose, an intent of its own, just 
like a personality. At the same time, he 1 insists that it is "wholly independent of man." 
In short, the study of evolution has made it easy for modern 
man to believe in a teleology grcunded in cosmic process, but the late 
emergence of consciousness, the contradictory character of nature, and 
the ineffectiveness of consciousness have made it difficult for him to 
believe that that process is a conscious one. 
1 The Christian Student, 41 (Feb., 1940), 27b. 
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She lives entirely in her 
children: and the mother, 
where is she? 
Goethe, on Nature 
See Wallace, LOH-P, 294. 
=============·--- --=======if=·=----_:=--
Chapter III 
AN EXAMINATION AND DEFINITION 
OF TERMS 
**** 
* 
A Criticism of Moore and Gurnee's Division 
between philosophy and psychology 
Science deals with facts and their description; philosophy 
deals with values, meaning, purposes, and their explanations. 1 
This well known distinction2 Professors Moore and Gurnee apply to 
the study of psychology. 3 As these writers have a genuine ap-
preciation of metaphysical problems they draw the distinction 
primarily to simplify the quest of scientific psychology. In making 
the distinction, however, they tend to identify philosophy, or meta-
physics, with the deductive method, and science with the inductive 
method, and leave the two in dichotomy. This is unfortunate. 
While science may dispense with the quest for values in order 
to carry out better its quest for facts, philosophy cannot yield its 
1 This dist i nction has been repeatedly made since Albrecht Ritschl 
gave ~t ;a sharp formulation and vigorous defense. 
2 For a criticism of this view see Benjamin, An Introduction to 
the Philosophy of Science. Macmillan, 1937, Pp. Sf., 13f. 
3 In their text, The Foundations of Psychology, seep. 8ff, and 
Chapter IV. The same point of view appears in t he earlier 
book of the same name written by Professor Moore alone. 
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fnterest in facts, and turn. to speculate at will about the nature 
of things. Philosophy seeks to give an interpretation of.,.actual 
existence and to discover the metaphysic that can best account for 
it.1 If it indulges in arbitrary deduction, it becomes no longer 
the beloved quest for wisdom, but a foray in intellectual pleasure. 
On account of the self-limitation and abstraction of science, we may 
agree that "the question of the nature of consciousness"2 should be 
"handed over by the psychologist to the metaphysician."3 But while 
the nature of consciousness and of the self may be accounted 
"Phi1osophically4 rather than ~· scientifically relevant questions,"5 
the positing of and the content ascribed to these concepts must be 
in line with empirical facts. Although, ~priori difficulties must 
be considered, it is primarily upon an empirically oriented meta-
physics that such concepts as that of unconscious purpose must stand 
or fall. 
** ** ** 
The Meaning of the Term, "the Unconscious" 
From the time of Descartes's sharp distinction between 
1 As Bowne states in his Metaphysics, 165, "The only means of knowing 
the nature of an agent is to observe what he does." 
2 Moore and Gurnee, FP, 204. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Moore, along with J"ames Ward and others, would make the "me" as 
known an object for psychology, but the "I" as knower he would 
ascribe to philosophy. See Brightman, Personalist, 20 (1939}, 
132. 
5 Ibid., 92. 
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~ cogitans and~ extensa 1 "~here has been a general tendency to 
identify mind with consciousness."1 This tendency2 is incompatible 
with the idea of an "unconscious", and has led to a great deal of 
ambiguity in the latter concept. 
As early as 1902, PTofessor William James said, "the sub-
conscious self is nowadays a well-accredited psychological entity.n3 
Professor James, however, was overly optimistic. "The science of the 
unconscious is yet in its infancy, and has not learned to know its 
right hand from its left, to distinguish good and evil, to discern 
4 between fact and fancy." At least six different variations of the 
term have been coined in the attempt to express more definitely what 
was meant by the concept.5 Since all of these hinge upon the meaning 
placed in the term "consciousness," it seems best to identify this 
term in a preliminary way at the beginning of this study, as simply 
6 
"awareness." This serves to differentiate mind and consciousness, 
1 Sabine, Philosophical Review, 24 (1915):334. Sabine continues, , "If, 
however, as seems likely, psychologists are led more and more to 
the admission of an unconscious, the identification of mind with 
consciousness must be given up, and this must lead to a revision 
of the concept of mind and of its metaphysical presuppositions." 
2 To some, this identity is more than a tendency. Mark Baldwin, in 
the Handbook of Psychology, Vol. I, p. 45, states, "Consciousness 
is the common and necessary form of all mental states: without it 
mind is not and cannot be conceived." Cf. Moore, FP, 209, note 22. 
3 Varieties of Religious Experience, 510. Cf. Moore, FP, 189. 
4 Gardner, "Subconscious and Superconscious," Hibbert Journal, 
4 (1905-1906):4'78. 
5 I.e. subconscious, preconscious, fore-conscious, co-conscious, super-
-----conscious, supraconscious. 
6 Morton Prince distinguished consciousness from personal consciousness 1 
and called only the latter "awareness." It seems preferable how- I 
ever, to drop such a distinction. See Moore, FP, footnote 8, p. 206 ~ , 
Freud also speaks of the consciousness as "all those mental proc- ! 
eases of which at any moment we are aware." See Northridge, MTU, 1 
124. Cf. Warren, DP, article, "Consciousness." 
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and leaves the way open for activities which are intelligent and yet 
not conscious. 
If we interpret consciousness as awareness, it seams contra-
dictory to say there are mental facts of which one is not conscious. 
" Munsterberg holds that "to have psychical existence at all means to 
be object of awareness for a consciousness"1 and that "psychical objects 
which have their existence below consciousness are as impossible as a 
wooden piece of iron."2 One would certainly have to admit that "sub-
conscious thinking is of no importance to us whatever until its results 
emerge into consciousness."3 Tb derive the idea of the unconscious 
from traces in our awareness does not make it conscious, however, any 
more than "the mere fact that a concept is derived from phenomenal data 
4 " does not make it an anthropomorphic cone ept," as KOhler points out. 
In this case the unconscious remains a postulate5 or an inference de-
rived from our awareness that we performed an intricate act of which 
we were unaware at the time, or the belief that someone else is per-
6 forming such activity without awareness on their part. 
As a postulate, moreover, the concept of the unconscious has 
PGhotherapy, 133. Cf. Moore and Gurnee, FP, 252; or Moore, FP, 209. 
M terberg, Psychotherapy, 134. 
1 
2 
3 Brightman, journal of Phiosophical Studies, 4 (1904), 502. 
4 K8hler, PVWF, 374. 
5 "Looked at from the standpoint of methodology, the hypothesis pre-
sents the following peculiarities: It is not strictly verifiable, 
since th e unconscious as such cannot be experienced; it can be 
called into operation only where the physical substrate of mind 
6 
is insufficient to explain the facts; it presupposes that the 
mental may be either conscious or unconscious, for the unconscious 
is not merely the physical." Sabine, Philosophical Review, 
24 { 1915}' 334. 
As Moore and Gurnee point out, "Acceptance of the subconscious is 
based primarily and historically on theoretical grounds •• " FP', 233. 
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been a veritable Proteus. Its ~ere negation of consciousness has 
aided the ambiguity into which it has fallen. It is used to refer to 
instinctive acts, habitual action or acquired reflexes, wholly mechan-
ical behaviour, psychical complexes, and superconscious activity, 
whatever that might be. Since the unconscious is necessarily an in-
terpretative concept, and, therefore, a systematic term dependent on 
its relations, it will be best to look at the chief theories of the 
unconscious before we attempt a satisfactory definition. 
(a) The Unconscious as a "Psychical"! Continuum2 
Professors ~. s. Moore and H. Gurnee point out that "histor-
ically, the concept of the subconscious was constructed to fulfill a 
demand for continuity in mental life, corresponding to that which char-
acterizes the physical world."3 The desire has been to give continuous-
ness to the intermittent flashes that constitute our awareness. This 
has been done in two ways. 
At present for an idea to pass from one person to another, it 
is necessary for an event in the psychic continuity of the first person 
to effect the physical oontinuum, and from there awaken a correspondingly 
1 The continuum referred to here is certainly immaterial, but its 
•psychical' character would be subject to question in some theories. 
2 Alexander would make the continuum, physiological. This escapes a 
mysterious "third" substance, but does violence to the privacy of 
the psychical. "Now it is just because the neural structure is 
(at least relatively) continuous, so that all its divided processes 
of consciousness, so as to make these belong to one mind. In 
other words, because conscious processes are part of a larger whole 
which is not all of it conscious, in spite of the absence of con-
scious connections there is still connection." STD, II:24. 
3 FP, 233. 
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meaningful event in the awareness of the other person. Tb escape this 
difficulty "some have suggested that there may be a subconscious 
continuum between minds, as there is a submarine continuum between the 
various continents and islands on the surface of the earth. n1 G. A. 
Feingold has called such a theory the "psychometaphysica1."2 It has 
been advocated by Hartmann, Myers, Delboeuf, and others, with the 
suggestion that there is intelligence in all animals, plants, and 
even inor~nic matter. Von Hartmann particularly stressed this point, 
claiming that the continuity of all minds as well as of one mind issued 
from the Unconscious. In criticism, it may be pointed out that such a 
continuity is scarcely demonstrable; that it could not retain and 
3 transmit the meaning of psychic events; and that, therefore, its ef-
ficiency would scarcely be different from that' of the physical 
continuum. 
The discontinuity within the individual mind is a more im-
mediate problam. 4 To solve it, the theory of a soul has been de-
veloped. According to this t heory, there is an underlying stratum 
5 
which gives rise to consciousness as an attri bute. This is a 
1 Ibid., 191. 
2 Monist, 27 (1917), 231-232. 
3 As Hartmann says, " ••• ; for one cannot directly furnish anybody 
with a conception; one may assist him in his abstraction by 
bringing forward very many sensuous particulars and excluding 
already f amiliar conceptions, but he must in the end find the 
notion for himself." Pa, !:304. 
4 Moore, FP, 192. 
5 Lewes, Mind, 2 (187?), 166, "The term Soul is the personification 
of this concept of present and revived feelings, and is the 
substratum of consciousness." 
Driesch, "'The cons ciousness' is a quite impossible word for the 
soul or mind, which is most decidedly unconscious." CP, 72. 
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spiritual substance which is continuous and immortal.1 The chief 
difficulty with this theory is that it gives us an unintelligible 
2 
substance. Its substance is essentially unknowable since it is to 
be discovered neither in consciousness nor in the material realm. 3 
Any idea which arises from it has to be recognized in consciousness 
just as though it arose from material sensation. The soul theory 
needlessly complicates the problem, therefore, since it adds no in-
trinsic advantage. 4 
(b) The Unconscious as a Physiological Functioning. 
Another common use that has been made of the unconscious has 
been to explain organic action that is highly intelligible, yet 
wholly unconscious. 5 Theories that center their answer to this 
1 See Brightman, outline, The Philosophy of Religion, 1931, P• 20. 
2 Tyler's description of the soul is characteristically ocult: "It 
(the soul) is a thin unsubstantial human image, in its nature 
a sort of vapour, film or shadow, the cause of life and thought 
in the individual it animates; independently possessing the 
personal consciousness and volition of its corporeal owner, 
· past or present; capable of leaving the body far behind, to 
flash swiftly from place to place; mostly impalpable and in-
visible, yet also manifesting physical power, and especilly 
appearing to men, waking or asleep, as a phantasm, separate 
from the body, of which it bears the likeness, continuing to 
exist and appear to man after the death of that body, able to 
enter into, possess and act in the bodies of other men, of 
animals, and even of things." Primitive Culture, 
(London, 1871), Vol... I:420. 
3 Brightman asks, "If the soul be immaterial, its continuity is 
nothing physical; but if it be throughout of the nature of con-
sciousness, where is its continuity?" .ITP, 1?4. 
4 As Laird says, ~r.hy complicate the discussion by seeking a permanent 
in any further sense?" (I.e. further than consciousness}. 
Problems of the Self, 271. Cf. Brightman, ITP, 176. 
5 Murroy, NED, 21:230b, "that action of the brain which, though un-
accompanied by consciousness, produces results which might have 
been produced by thought." 
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problem in physiology may be divided into two groups: the so-called 
"unconscious cerebration" theory, and the theories of physiological 
conditioning.1 
Since cerebration is the function which, according to 
physiological psychology, is normally2 the most conscious,3 un-
conscious cerebration4 seems like a contradiction in terms. Tb avoid 
this difficulty, Professor E. H. Lewes has suggested "we may sub-
stitute the ter.m, "unconscious neural process."5 
The theory of unconscious cerebration would hold that t here 
may be activities involving the neural centers, yet not affecting 
consciousness. This is merely to say with s. Alexander that "not a 11 
neuroses are psychoses. "6 It is quite plausible. Undoubtedly, we 
frequently forget the delicate nature of our neural system, and. the 
1 In making this distinction we restrict the meaning of unconscious 
cerebration more than is sometimes done. 
2 Indeed, we could say, "is alone conscious." Rosett states, "Only 
nerve impulses Which enter the cerebral cortex may be productive 
of the subjective experience of a sensation, though not neces-
sarily so even then." MT (1939), 64. 
3 Dr. Cannon says in his book, The Wisdom of the Body, and which 
·w. K8hler praises in his PVWF, "By means of the cerebral cortex 
we have all our intelligent relations to the world about us. By 
means of it we analyze experience, we move from place to place, 
we build airplanes and temples, we apint pictures and write 
poetry, or we carry on scientific researches and make inventions, 
we recognize and converse with friends, educate the young, ex-
press our ~pathy, tell our love - indeed, by means of it we 
conduct ourselves as human beings." Cannon, WB, 303. 
4 "The theory and the term 'unconscious cerebration' we owe originally 
To William B. Carpenter." Moore and Gurnee, FP, 25?. Cf. Murray, 
NED, Vol. 21 :230b. 
5 Lewes, Mind, II {187?), 160. 
6 We may admit this while we still question, or reject, the prior 
statement, "The puzzle arises from the fact that while all 
psychoses are neuroses, not all ••• " STD, II:23; cf. p.?. 
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dynamic nature of its environment.l Set up to receive sensations and 
to transmit impulses, such a system would be strange, indeed, if 
sensations did not have an impressive effect upon it. Such changes, 
not being consciously formed, could not be ~called or recognized.2 
They could only be discovered, and in case they eventuated in action 
prior to such discovery, such action could only be interpreted as 
unconscious, yet intelligible activity. 3 
Most theories that would explain the unconscious physiologically 1' 
do so upon the basis of prior conscious activity, either on the part 
of the individual or of the race. This makes it a residual con-
ditioning. The theory in this form appears in the works of "James, 
Hering, Butler, Huxley, Mllnsterberg, Pierce, Ribot, Janet, Jastrow, 1i 
Prince, and others."4 According to this view, behavior patterns do 
not originate in unconscious reactions, but are set up by an aggressive 
consciousness and contrived by a purposive awareness. Hering states 
1 
2 
3 
4 
:I 
Moore and Gurnee write, "And yet the fact that I did pass him, and j, 
that the light reflected from him stimulated my optic nerve 11 
even if it did not penetrate my consciousness, requires me to admit , 
that I was subconscious of him all along." FP, 257. 1 
Sir William Hamilton suggested that there were unconscious mental 
modifications. John Stuart Mill criticized them as as contra- 1
1 dietary as "unconscious ideas." Mill preferred the idea of 
physiological traces of former conscious action. See Mill's 
criticism of Hamilton's philosophy. 
The theory of unconscious cerebration does not go so far as behavior- [, 
ism for it does not deny consciousness. Carpenter, in coining the I 
phrase, said, "It seems convenient to designate as functions of d 
the nervous system all those operations which lie below the level II 
of consciousness." (Mental Physiology, Chapter XIII, p. 517; cf. II 
House,££· cit., 15 (1928), 19.) Feingold does not believe the I 
theory can do this successfully. "It is doubtful whether the 
theory of unconscious cerebration can account for the whole of I 
unconscious phenomena." Monist, 27 (1917), 220. 
House, ££• cit., 15 (1928), 19. 
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-it picturesquely: 
Memory is a faculty not only of our conscious 
states, but also, and much more so, of our uncon-
scious ones. I was conscious of' this or that 
yesterday, and am again conscious of it t oday. 
Where has it been meanwhile? OUr ideas tread but 
for a moment on the stage of consciousness, and then 
go back behind the scenes to make way for others to 
take their place ••• How do they live when they are 
off the stage? ••• The bond of union which connects 
the individual phenomena of our consciousness lies 
in our unconscious world."l 
MOrton Prince, in his book The Unconscious, refers to such 
patterns as neurograms. "The unconscious is a great storehouse of neuro-
grams which are the physiological records of our mental lives."2 Dr. w. 
L. Northridge, noting the way in which Dr. Boris Sidis's suboonscious 
resembles the complexity of conscious states, prefers to view the subcon-
scious as "consisting only of traces or tendencies3 left behind by exper-
ience."4 - Dr. Olaf Stapledon, in his article, "A Theory of the Unconscious" 
says, 
The only course open to us is to hold that in such 
behavior all that is necessarily due to mental 
activity must be attributed to past consciousness 
whether explicit or marginal, and that, owing to 
repression, this past consciousness is no longer 
1 Quoted by Butler, in Unconscious Memory, ?0-?2. 
2 P. 149; also p. 253. Of. Prasad, Indian Journal of Psychology, 4 
(1929), 81. Of. also Feingold, Monist, 2? (191?), 229-230. Lewes 
states, "Unconscious is by some writers called latent consciousness. 
Experiences which are no longer manifested are said to be stored in 
Memory, remaining in the Soul's picture-gallery ••• We are not con-
scious of' these feelings, yet they exist as latent feelings, and 
become salient through associations." Ndnd, 2 (18??), 166. 
3 C. s. Pierce called matter "mind hide-bound with habit." Cf. Boodin, 
"Reinstatement of Teleology," Harvard Theological Review, 6 (1913), 
8?. 
4 NOrthridge, MTU, 85. This need not be limited to the physiological, 
but it does hold to the priority of' the conscious state. 
10? 
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accessible; while all that is necessarily uncon-
scious in such behavior is present neural activity.l 
EXtending this view beyond the individual, the physiological becomes 
the great monument summing up the achievement of consciousness to the 
present moment. This is the well known view of Henri Bergson. It is 
shared by ~oseph ~astrow. 2 E. B. Titchener goes so far as to say, in 
his A Textbook in Psychology, 3 "Consciousness is as old as animal life, 
all the unconscious movements of the human organism, even the auto-
matic movement of heart and intestines, are the descendents of past 
conscious movements." And Nietzsche, even while he attempts to deny the 
importance of consciousness, appeals to us "to embody knowledge in our-
selves and make it instinctive."4 
The difficulty with this point of view is that 
Such mechanism is only the bridge· between, on the 
one hand, present consciousness, and, on the other, 
the past consciousness of the individual or the 
past psychological nature of the race. 4 
While it stresses the importance of consciousness, it fails to preserve 
the most essential characteristic of conscious activity, explaining 
memory and the content of pre sent experience. As Professor ~. S. Moore 
6 points out in criticism of 'unconscious cerebration,' this position 
1 Monist, 3? (192?), 441. 
2 "Consciousness is, so the author maintains, an evolutionary agent, 
an elaborator of 'means and measures,' a reflective centralized 
'leader' which cooperates with the organized activities of the 
nervous system." See the review of ~astrow's book, The Subcon-
scious, by I. M. Bentley, Philosophical Review, 1? (1914), 93. I 
3 Pp. 451-452. Cf. Cannon, WB, . 303-304, "These devices for maintaining ! 
constancy in the organism are the result of myriads of generations 
of experience ••• " 
4 The ~oyrul Wisdom, trans. by Thomas Common, I:ll. 
5 Stapledon, Monist, 3? (1927), 443-444. 
6 See Professor Moore's extended criticism, FP, 215-219. 
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conruses the physiological with the psychological. While it is prefer-
able to the idea of an unconscious continuum because it does not 
introduce still another "unknown,' it leaves the nature of conscious 
recognition, and intelligent awareness a problem.1 Tb go back into the 
files of the cerebellum and pull out the seological drawer marked 
'Cenozoic' involves not only a trace capable of being awakened and re-
cognized, but also a prior knowledge and awareness present in conscious-
ness. 2 In view of this difficulty, attempts have been made to supplement 
or replace physiological theorie'S of the unoonscious3 with theories that 
1 "Now in order to account for normal memory we must posit that ideas 
which have passed through the mind have been conserved through 
some residuum left by the original experience. This residuum must 
be either psychological or physiological ••• This physiological 
conception is at the basis of the association the~ry, wherein it 
is assumed 'that whenever a number of neurones involved in a coordi-
nated sensory-motor act are stimulated into functional activity, 
they become so sensitized and associated, and the paths become so 
opened between them, that a disposition becomes established for 
the whole group to function together and reproduce the original 
~eactibn when either one or the other is afterward stimulated into 
activity. This 'disposition' is spoken of in physiological 
language as a lowering of the threshold of excitability. This 
change we may speak of as a residuum, says Prince," Feingold, 
Monist, 2? (191?), 22?. 
2 James's description of memory is not very physiological, "Suppose 
we try to recall a forgotten name. The state of our consciousness 
is peculiar. There is a gap therein; but no mere gap. It is a 
gap that is intensely active. A sort of wraith of the name is in 
it, beckoning us in a given direction, making us at moments tingle 
with the sense of our closeness, and then letting us sink back 
w1 thout the longed-for term. If wrong names are proposed to us, 
this singular gap acts immediately so as to negate them. They 
do not fit into its mould." See James, Principles of Psychology 
(1896), I:251. cr. KBhler, PVWF, 119. 
3 It will be noted that the psychophysiological conception, as inter-
preted by Feingold, would make consciousness the mere result of 
physical conditions: "Finally the psychophysiological theory with 
scientific leanings asserts that neurological modifications are 
the essential factors of conscious and unconscious phenomena. That 
consciousness appears only when the neurones attain a certain 
tension, or function in a certain relation; (see next page) 
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are more definitely psychological.l 
(c) The Unconscious as the Fore-conscious 
Some writers, like John Dewey, prefer to "make experience 
broad, and consciousness only the focal point."2 This leads to the 
view of the unconscious as simply the fore-conscious. This view, 
reflecting as it does the petites perceptions of Leibniz, is one of the 
oldest theories of the unconscious, and is one of the most recurrent. 
Thus "Prince and James at times conceive of the subconscious as the outer-
lying fringe of consciousness, as dim consciousness, or better still, 
as the base of a cone, the apex of which is attentive consciousness."3 
The problem of attention involves the very nature of 
psychic existence. Professors J. S. Moore and H. Gurnee state, "If the 
If the evidence of subconscious mental process -
of processes going on in the individual which are 
psychical in their nature, but of which the person-
ality is unaware - is strong enough to be 
that consciousness may or may not accompany so-called intelligent 
actions performed under pathological conditions; that, it is 
certainly not present in instinctive functioning which characterizes 
the life of lower animals; that the unconscious is not the store-
house of the conscious, that there is nothing mysterious or wonder~ 
ful about it, and that with further investigation its precise nature 
and place ~n the scale of psychogenesis will be at the command of 
psychologists. This view is held by writers like Ribot, Peirce, 
King, and Jastrow." Monist, 2? (191?), 231-232. 
1 "The dominating question becomes then, this: .A:re the phenomena called 
subconscious really manifestations of Subconscious Mentation --
i.e. psychical, but not conscious; or are they merely expressions 
of-Unconscious Cerebration -- i·~· of brain processes entirely 
unaccompanied by any psychical activitY?" Moore and Gurnee, FP, 
245. 
2 Brightman, Journal of the Philosophical Studies, 4 {1929}, 500. 
3 Feingpld, Monist, 2? (1917}, 209. 
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convincing, we must alter our notion of 'mind' 
to make it include these new facts, only taking 
care ,of course, that we do not allow ourselves 
to fall into real contradiction. 
Meanwhile Irving King is of the opinion that consciousness either exists 
or does not exist, that "it may be more intense at one moment than another 
• •• But at any one moment it is ••• a unitary existence without parts."2 I 
Consciousness must indeed be unitary, but it is probably a 
mistake to identify conscious with the focus of attention. Bergson 
strongly objects to limiting consciousness to the reason of introspective 
analysis. 3 Professor Paul Janet supports him in this stand,4 and 
Professor E. s. Brightman reminds us that "every mind contains principles 
which drive it beyond its present self."5 If we think of consciousness, 
not as an attribute of an unknown substance, but as itself identical with 
the self, and the only substantial self, it will consist not only of the 
present moment, but of its memory of past moments and its anticipation 
of future events. 6 
1 FP, 252-253. 
2 "The Problem of the Unconscious." Psychological Review, 13 ( 1906), 43. 
3 Cf. R. B. Perry , Journal of Philosophy, 18 {1921), 89, "The failure 
of introspection to give any satisfactory account of feeling, desire,, 
will, and conation does not admit of doubt." 
4 ttConsciousness is the whole of an individual's reactions to his own 
actions, and the becoming aware of an act of consciousness always 
consists in superimposing on a preceding act a new reaction of a . 
higher order." See Math. H. Pieron's review of Janet's book, La. 
relativitat de la subconscience, in Psychological Abstracts, 6:-1780. 
5 POI, 19. 
6 Laird says, "When I reflect on what I mean by a wish or an emotion 
or a feeling I can only find that I know and think of them simply 
as different forms of consciousness. I cannot find any distinguish-
able element in these experiences which can be called consciousness 
separatedfrom the other elements evenin thought so as to leave 
anything determinate behind. And to ask us to think of something 
which has all the characteristics of a wish or a feeling except that 
it is not conscious seems to me like asking us {see next page) 
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The factor of recognition seems to mark the difference 
between a physiological conditioning and a psychological one. Conscious-
ness stumbles on to unconscious cerebration With the surprise of discovery 
It comes onto a psychological conditioning With a vague sense of remem-
bering. As the Indian psychologist, Jamuna Prasad, remarks, "This 
passage of the unconscious into the conscious, as also of the conscious 
into the unconscious shows tba. t the two are of the same kind and order. "l 
The unconscious in this sense is often called the subconscious,2 a 
psychological residuum known and available to consciousness. 3 
The difficulty with this view of the unconscious is that 
it does not have a true unconscious. It accounts only for the residual 
data which consciousness can recall and check on from time to time. It 
fails to cover "those phenomena which seem to be mental rather than 
physical in their nature, and yet which cannot by any effort on· the part 
of the individual be observed by him."4 This drives us on to a more 
adequate conception of the unconscious. 
to think of something which has all the attributes of red or green 
except that it is not color." Mind, 31 (1933), 413f. 
1 Indian .Journal of Psychology, 4 ( 1929) , 88. 
2 Unfortunately there is little constancy in the use of the term 
subconscious or of the ter.m unconscious. In this dissertation the 
terms are used interchangeably except where a nice distinction is 
drawn and cited. Logically, though, the subconscious is more 
dependent on the conscious, than the unconscious is, and this 
should link them more nearly together. N.B. 
3 Thus Moore calls Freud's "foreconscious" tne-"subconscious." See 
Philosophical Review, 3? (1928), ?3. 
4 Moore, Philosophical Review, 3? (1928), ?3. 
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(d) The Unconscious as the Non-introspectible 
Since the time of Sigmund Freud, psychoanalysis has re-
ferred to the unconscious as consisting of mental phenomena which not 
only lie outside of consciousness but~ resist one's attempts to become 
aware of them. In contrast to the fore-conscious activity which passes 
into consciousness with no difficulty, unconscious activity seems cut 
off from consciousness. 1 To characterize this activity, Mr. C. D. 
Broad has adopted a term from Dr. W. H. R. Rivers2 and called it the 
non-introspectible.3 
In much this same manner, Freud4 distinguishes three levels 
of psychical existence -- the conscious, fore-conscious, and uncon-
scious.5 
The 'conscious' is what one is cognizant of at 
the moment; the 'pre-conscious' (fore-conscious) 
is what one is not actually cognizant of at the 
moment, but what one can recall to consciousness 
at will. The 'unconscious' he cannot recall at 
1 Feingold, Monist, 27 (1917}, 215. 
2 Broad, MPN, 360f. 
3 Broad, MPN, 37_9, distinguishes mental events thus: 
{By controlling mind (all-conscious) 
{
Introspectible By non-controlling mind (relatively 
iOwned unconscious MENTAL EVENTS Non-Introspectible} Absolute Unconscious. Unowned . 
4 For Freud's theory see Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, 425-535, 
483-493; also the British Journal of Psychology, 6:265-271. 
5 Moore and Gurnee, F.P, 265. 
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will or summons to his consciousness; but it can 
be recalled by special methods, as by psycho-
analysis and by hypnotism.l 
To explain this opposition between the conscious and the unconscious, 
Freud posited a resistance which he called the censorship. 2 This 
resistance prevents the consciousness from being affected overmuch by 
the unconscious, the real self.3 
4 The psychic conflict revealed by psychoanalysis is too real 
and supported by too many case studies to be set lightly aside. HOwever, 
. 5 
the nature of the repression has been and is being seriously debated. 
Its picturesque appeal has unfortunately left the way open for specula-
tion, exaggeration, and charlatanism. Men quickly yielded to a pecuniary 
urge, or to the ease of imaginary explanation, and rapidly confused the 
issue. 
According to the Freudian interpretation, the conscious 
element is secondary while the unconscious is primary. Freud explicitly 
states that the unconscious contains much that never saw the light of 
consciousness. 6 The idea of repression, however, suggests. conscious 
1 Calwell, Journal of Mental Science, ?1 (1925), 98. 
2 See Brown, NI?, 189. 
3 The Unconscious consists of the thoughts, desires, and memories of 
the real self. Since these center around a libido having a power-
ful sex-drive they are contrary to the higher moral nature, and 
a certain resistance is set up against thei.r recall into conscious-
ness." 
4 Jung modifies the position of Freud by using the term libido in a 
broader sense than merely a sexual drive. 
5 Thus Stapledon wrote, "But in the Freudian cases, I suspect that 
the origins of ideas are to be found in ~ast explicit consciousness. 
The patient may not be now conscious of that past experience." 
Monist, 3? (192?), 42?. 
6 The Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis, p. 28?. Cf. Northridge, 
MTU, 102. 
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recognition and rejection, and men like Professors W. E. Hocking and 
H. K. Haeberlin lean more toward a Herbartian interpretation.1 PTo-
fessor Haeberlin frankly states, 
It would seem to me that the unconscious is 
simply a special phase of the conscious. More 
precisely stated, the conscious is the fUndamental 
concept, while the unconscious is its limiting 
concept. 2 
••• I have postulated that the unconscious is part 
and parcel of consciousness, and that the one must 
be interpreted iri the light of the other. The 
notion of a separate realm of the unconscious is 
a monstrosity of popular psychology.3 
Professor Hocking is more tolerant in his tone, but no less definite 
in his position. Believing with Professor Brightman that "there may be 
suppressed desires, but unless there is same anomaly of conscious 
experience there is no reason for inferring that there are suppressed 
desires,n4 Professor Hocking prefers the term subconscious, and writes: 
It is well to emphasize the fact that subcon-
sciousness is not an endowment but an incidental 
acquisition, due to the strain of voluntary atten-
tion. It is a by-product of determinedly self-
conscious life. No infant has a subconscious: no 
adult is without one.5 
Professor Hocking distinguishes two divisions in the subconscious and 
defines them by their relation to the voluntarily conscious self: 6 "the 
1 See Chapter II, part 2, page 90 of this dissertation. 
2 "The Concept of the Unconscious." Journa1 of Philosophy, . 4 { 1907}, 
545. 
3 Ibid., 4 {1907), 550. 
4 Brightman, Journal of the Philosophical Studies, 4 ( l929l, 501. 
5 MGHE, appendix, p. 527. Cf. Taylor, EM, 338, "On the other hand, 
it seems difficult to say whether there is anything which ordinarily 
forms part of the 'self' which may not, under special condi tiona 
become a part of what we recognize as the 'not-self.'" 
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6 Cf. Professor Brightman, "••• we may properly speak of every sub-
conscious process as belonging to ~self. (See next page} 
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first is allied with it, the second is more or less hostile to it, or 
critical to it."1 Since, the second, however, is a division within 
consciousness, he prefers to draw a distinction "between the conscious 
and the artificial, or central, self, not between the subconscious and 
the conscious."2 
In view of the concepts of repression and forgetfulness 
and the way in which events may be restored from the non-introspectible 
to the conscious, the key to the situation seems to lie in the conscious 
and not in the unconscious approach. vVhen one surveys the field, one 
is surprised to note how little of the activity of men, involving the 
whole being, and not merely such organic functioning as digestion, 
perspiration, et cetera, is accomplished by the so~called unconscious. 
:Even in the few case.s, where an individual has carried on intelligent 
activity in an extensive way, one finds the activity dominated not by 
the unconscious3 in any of the forms thus far dealt with, but by a co-
conscious. 
1 MGHE, 527ff. 
2 Ibid., 528, note 1. Thus, Hocking says, WWherever the strains of 
artificiality and attention can be released, as in privacy and the 
ease of friendly intercourse, the subconscious begins to find its 
way back to the focus." MGHE, 533. 
3 This is the essence of Arreat's appeal in the Monist, 21 (1911}, 
270, "An eminent geometrician, Henri Poincare, has pleaded that 
we should leave some part, in mathematical invention at least, to 
reason, to the self-conscious intellect. Here too, I have 
supported his contention. With him I have shown that every sudden 
illumination of the mind, though it may seem unconscious, is 
nevertheless prepared, supported, and surrounded by an act of 
will." ' 
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(e) The Unconscious as the Oo-conscious1 
Although Morton Prince's study of Sally Beauchamp is a 
classic, and unusually involved, it is not wholly without its parallels. 
Infrequently, but occasionally, one hears of a person coming to himself 
in a distant city and remembering where he had left off his former life, 
a week, six months, or some years befoie. In this case, the first 
person, "A", is unconscious while the second individual, "B", is in 
control of the body, and vice-versa. It is conceivable that each would 
be who~ly non-introspectible to the other, although in Dr. Prince's 
study2 this was not the case. 3 
In entertaining contradictory or hostile ideas, one of which 
should be accepted and the other repressed, the person might emotionally 
accept both. Doing this in a manifold of situations, it is conceivable 
that one might develop two contradictory notions of himself, including 
details or ideas which resisted introspection by the other.4 In this 
1 "This division of subconscious into coconscious and unconscious 
we owe to Morton Prince •••• The coconscious ••• is a psychological 
concept, the unconscious a physiological one in Prince!s system." 
MOore and Gurnee, FP, 242, note 17, alsop. 264. 
2 The Dissociation of a Personality. 
3 "We call the same experiences 'unconscious' simply because the only 
mind which could have introspectively discriminated them at the 
time when they were happening was a mind which was not then in 
control of the body concerned in the experience. Such experiences 
as these I shall call 'relatively unconscious.'" Broad, MPN, 374. 
(Mr. Broad had been discussing Miss Beauchamp.) 
4 Charles E. Cory concludes from a study of the causes of dissociation, 
"Always there is found some deep-seated emotional conflict. Ten-
dencies that are apparently irreconcilable press their claims. 
In this conflict each elicits all the associations that are con-
genial to it." Journal of Abnormal Psychology and Social Psych-
ology, 16 (1921), 377-378. 
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way "a co-existing consciousness of which the personal consciousness 
is not aware"1 may come into being. Where such alternation of person-
alities occurs, however, the activity of the person cannot be said to 
be unconscious. 2 Its intelligible behavior must, to the contrary, be 
ascribed to the cons~ious supervision of the co-conscious self.3 
The problems involved in a co-consciousness would seem to 
offer insurmountable difficulties to one who would "go beyond the mere 
correlation of the mental with neural processes and identify them. "4 
In regard to Miss Beauchamp's personality, S. Alexander writes, 
Groups of mental processes with their neural 
basis are formed which have no complete connection 
with one another; although they may and do in 
certain cases overlap, each for instance using 
the . common speaking apparatus. They are compara-
ble to those systematized groups of mental processes 
which constitute interests, when in persons of 
normal conditions these interests are exercised 
almost in independence of each other, the week-day 
mind and the Sunday-mind which in many pergons 
seem to have little to do with each other. 
This explanation seems seriously inadequate. Mr. Alexander fails to 
explain why the same neural processes give rise to different "groups of 
1 Feingold, Monist, 27 (1917), 229-230. Of. Prince, The Unconscious, 
253. 
2 Mr. Cory gives two interesting case studies: that of "Patience Worth" 
in the Psychological Review, 26 (1919), 397-406; and of "A Divided 
Self", J"ournal of Abnormal Psychology, 14 {1919), 281-285. Mr. 
Cory does not speak of the personalities as alternating unless they 
have an antagonism for each other. Of. Broad, MPN, 374, where 
Broad makes the same distinction. 
3 Indeed, in referring to the co-conscious as a for.m of' the unconscious 
a special difficulty arises. Since each series of events may appar-
ently be equally conscious, neither is truly unconscious. If they 
are nearly equally stable and equally valuable it may be difficult 
to determine which should be labelled as the co-conscious and be 
subordinated ·in the new unified self'. 
4 s. Alexander, STD, II:5. 
5 Ibid., II:26. ==~~~~~~~=======---------==-=-==============-=-~=-~===== 
mental processes. ,l He also fails to account for the "given facts 
of consciousness"2 upon which any "hypothetical interpretations of human 
knowledge" must be based. We are not conscious of being "mental 
processes formed;" we are conscious rather of forming them. We are not 
aware of ourselves as polarizing interests, but as having interests. 
The problems of the co-conscious appear to make it essential to differ-
entiate clearly between physiological and psychological events, and to 
accept Dr. Bernard Hart's principle of their independence of each other, 
even while we stress the interrelation that seems empirically given. 
Thus, ~ames ·nrever rejects a physiological ground or explanation of 
unconscious processes. He prefers a psychological explanation and posits 
a psycbic structure which influences consciousness, yet is not itself 
conscious. He states, 
There is a psychological 'unconscious' but it is 
of a different order from the psychological 'con-
scious•. · Conscious process is a real process or 
event; the 'unconscious' in psychology is a con-
ceptual construction for explanatory purposes.3 
A resume and reconstruction. 
In resume, it is hardly necessary to point out that the 
"unconscious" has indeed been a confused and a confusing concept. It 
has been treated as a continuum between minds, or as a support for the 
fragile individual consciousness. It has been presented as a physiologi-
cal residue of neural patterns developed by the individual, or by the 
1 "All human knowledge ••• is a hypothetical interpretation of the given 
facts of consciousness." Brightman, Proceedings (1930), ?7. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 25 (1925}, 148ff. 
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raee.1 It has been varyingly pictured as a vague, semi-conscious 
region, of semi-automatic behavior. It has been staged as the unknowable 
tyrant of psychoanalysis; or, represented as the cumulative victim of 
conscious repression, the by-product of strenuous goodness, or willful, 
artificial selfhood. And finally, it has triumphantly emerged, like 
a Pyrrhic victor, as the unified awareness which successfully appropri-
ates the family body from time to time. 
It will be noted, upon reflection, that apart from the 
Freudian interpretation, the unconscious has seldom played the all-
important role in human behavior it has often been popularly granted. 
Nor, has the individual consciousness been so unimportant as is often 
assumed. In order that we may determine the relative status of the 
conscious, subconscious, and unconscious more definitely, let us attempt 
a brief but comprehensive survey of the self, its body, and its larger 
environment. 
Professors Moore and Gurnee would strictly avoid the 
concept of the self as a metaphysical issue. Yet, it seems impossible 
to explain adequately the data of abnormal and even normal psychology 
without it. 2 If we agree with Dr. W. L. Northridge that nthe genuine 
diffe~entiating mark of the unconscious is its incompatibility with 
consciousness,"3 it is obvious that we must revise our use of the latter 
1 Pierre janet says graphically, "The life of the waking self-conscious-
ness flows within the larger life of the sub-waking self like a 
warm equatorial current within the cold bosom of the ocean." The 
Psychology of Suggestion, 162; quoted by Northridge, MTU, 83-:--
2 See Brightman, journal of Philosophical Studies, 4 (1929), 503. 
3 MTU, 12'1. 
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term as simply "awareness." We must attribute to it an inner unity 
1 and consistency. This brings us to the self posited by self-psychology2 
"not the unity of a 'pure' ego, but the unity of a living whole, or a 
duree reelle."3 
This self is not the substratum of the old soul concept. NOr 
is it identical with the consciousness as such.4 It is rather a selective 
unity in consciousness5 consisting of sensations, hopes, anticipations, 
reasonings, inferences, beliefs, emotions, memories, and 1maginations.6 
1 T. H. Green spoke of self-consciousness, or thought, or spirit, as 
the "only agent that we know as maintaining an identity with itself 
throughout a series of changes." See McGilvary, Mind, 10 new 
series, (1902), 490-491. -----
2 Miss Calkins did not stand alone. As she said in the .American 
Journal of Psychology, 26 (1915), 519, "Self-psychology in its com-
plicated form, the doctrine that consciousness involves always a 
consciousness of self has been explicitly avowed by James, Ward, 
by J. Rehmke, by Robert M. Yerkes, by Eleanor A. McGamble, by w. 
Mitchell, and by the writer. James R. Angell and c. S. Judd should 
be added to this list." 
-Moore and Gurnee would add Franz Brentano, G. F. Stone, J. M. Baldwin, 
Josiah Royce, J. E. Creighton, and W. McDougall. See FP, 79. 
3 Brightman, Proceedings Sixth Congrees, 1930, p. 72. 
4 Professors Moore and Gurnee say of l.J!iss Calkins's self-concept, "Her 
'self' is described as 'relatively persistent,' 'complex,' 'unique,' 
'related to objects'; the 'I' which knows, rather than, in James's 
terminology, the 'me' that is known and can be studied scientifi-
cally ••• " .F.P·, 86. 
5 As Professor Brightman notes in his article in Barrett, CIA, 171-172, 
"The Finite Self." "It cannot be said that there is a single 
consistent doctrine of the self shared by the idealists. However, 
there are four propositions which conspicuous idealists have held, 
although relatively few have held consistently and with equal 
emphasis to all four. The propositions are: (1) The self is a 
system (organic); (2) The self is a self-existent unity (monadic); 
(3) The self is a conscious experience (mentalistic); and (4) The 
self is active (activistic)." 
6 Of. Brightman, Personalist, 20 (1939), 135, "All that we actually 
find in consciousness." 
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"The knowledge which present feeling has of past feelings is often 
taken to imply the existence of a pe~ent principle of conscious-
ness. It was the impossibility of understanding how 'something 
which~ hypothesi is but a series of feelings (see next page) 
---· ==========J:I==== 
At first it is hardly existent. 1 Sensations come and go upon a response 
basis. But about the ffbeginning of the third year"2 the individual 
begins to show symptoms of arriving at self-consciousness. From this 
time on, the self may become dynamic and purposive, as Professor W. E. 
Hocking pictures it. Awakening to an ideal which commits it to a 
strenuous life, the self becomes discriminating critical.3 Unable to 
guard the threshold of awareness,4 it retreats to the inner court of 
acceptance, and there keeps its watch. This it may do as a man goes 
busily about his work, oblivious to everything but his task, forgetting 
the mundane even as Hegel lost a sho·e in the mud and trod on to his 
class5 unaware of his loss, or ignoring distraction as a sick Cellini 
rises to salvage his half-formed Perseus from a flaming shop. 6 On the 
other hand, the selective consciousness may guard the inner court as a 
conscript sentry whose family is divided by the civil war that wages. In 
the former case the self becomes like Browning's "Grammarian;"? in the 
can be aware of itself as a series,' which almost persuaded J. s. 
Mill to accept a Self, or Ego. From our standpoint, hov;ever, we 
can find a still stronger reason for maintaining the permanence, 
or identity, of Thought. For, from the point of view of knowledge, 
we have seen that consciousness is not a series of feelings, but 
an ideal, or intelligible unity." Creighton, Philosophical Review, 
6 ( 1897)' 168. 
1 Cf. Hocking's genetic parallel in Types of Philosophy, par. 11. 
2. Coffin, Personality in the Making, 57. 
3 Mr. Bosanquet's statement regarding consciousness we would apply to 
the self: "At every moment it is an implicit affirmation of its 1 
view of the world revised up to date." See Creighton, Philosophical! 
Review, 6 (1897), 165. . ' 
4 "To will the habit or desire to be otherwise is already, in principle 
to expel it from the teleological unity which makes up our inner 
life." Taylor, EM, 338. 
5 -Caird, Edward, Hegel, ?9-80. (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1892.) 
6 See Benvenuto Cellini's autobiography. 
· 7 See Browning's poem, "Grammarian's Funeral." 
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latter case, it becomes an "unhappy consciousness,"1 the "Two Voices" 
of Tennyson, or the other self in Augustine's Soliloquies. In the former 
case, the psychical activity in the outer court is supplementary; in 
the latter case it has been ejected from the sanctum sanctorum, and 
remains critical and possibly antagonistic.2 In either case, let us 
call this activity the subconscious. 
The self, however, is not the only dynamic factor. The 
self resides in a body which is also dynamic and belongs to a larger 
dynamic environment. Let us posit that the body is a relatively 
independent "given."3 It takes in fuel, converts it into energy, and 
has no choice but must needs expend it in activity and growth. It is 
also highly sensitive, and receives sensations from both itself and its 
environment. These may activate, at an early age, instinctive patterns 
that linger over from the race, and produce a response that may not 
enter into consciousness at all. Still later it is possible that 
stimuli continuously sent up to the cortex from the body or its environ-
ment, may build up into neurotic quanta, cross over into motor impulses 
and result in neurosis patterns without psychosis. At other times the 
1 Hegel's "unglllckliches Bewusstsein." Phlinomenologie, (1928), 158ff. 
2 "'It seems to me that we meet two types of personality based on this 
distinction: one, the ~nial, tolerant man who impresses us as 
reeking with a rich and friendly co-consciousness which gives subtl 
color and tone to all his sayings and doings; and the other one, J 
whose helping co-consciousness is meager, but whose critical or 
antagonistic co-consciousness is rich.'" ~uoted from Professor I 
Angier's comment upon Hocking's view. See Hocking, MGHE, 529, 
note 1. 
3 As Moore and Gurnee put it, "Psychology must postulate two things -
a true knowledge of the material world by the mind, and an 
effective power of the Mind to make changes in the material world." 
FP, 204. 
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impulses may be admitted into consciousness, and behavior patterns will 
be established for present and future use.1 
As the body grows, new organic impulses will arise and force 
their way into unconscious cerebration. Here they may be received by 
consciousness and not only recognized, but guided into proper or subli-
mated motor activity. But if unrecognized, or ignored, or entertained 
in inaction, they will drive on over the dam into whatever pre-establishe 
motor patterns are most available. The resulting behavior may thus 
revert to a degree of infantilism, and the psychological unconscious will 
be increased by another ejected meaning incompatible to the self. In 
so far as this neural process remai~s wholly a physiological condition-
ing and fails to force its way into psychic awareness, let us call 
this activity the 'unconscious.' 
By way of summary, the chart on the following page attempts 
to show the relation of the conscious, the subconscious, and the 
unconscious in our theory, and endeavors to help explain the two-fold 
influenced exercised upon mind in its individual aspect. 
If our brief construct be sound as far as it goes, it will 
be noted that the unconscious is indeed the region of physical activity 
2 and power. It is left, however, to express its driving power in 
instinctive behavior patterns, or in previously established neural pat-
terns developed by the cumulative force of continuing environmental 
1 The fact that a pattern once founded tends to persist is a tremen-
dous saving of energy, so long as it is desireable. See Cannon, 
WB, 303. 
2 Hocking denies to the 'unconscious' the fabulous power often credited 
to it. See :MGHE, 537. 
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influences or executed by conscious behavior. On the other hand, in 
the realm of the conscious, the difficulty is to reconcile the 'selective' 
self with the given data. The self cannot build the world out of itself, 
or be satisfied with a criticism or selection from among the given data. 
Its problem is to recognize need, to supervise and direct the causal 
series of which it becomes aware. The healthy self does this gladly. 
It is on friendly, cooperating terms with the subconscious, which it 
has no need to fear, and is ever actively attempting to understand and 
control the ordinarily non-psychic or physical realm of the unconscious. 
The sick self, or the selfish self, on the contrary, is afraid of the 
notions it has had to reject and cast into the subconscious. Consequentl 
it is on the defensive, and either has a freezing or inhibiting effect 
upon the physical realm, or it abandons the effort to know and control 
the unconscious, leaving it to the functioning of established behavior 
patterns. The sick self is in need of a converging faith in the reality 
of forgiveness and the fundamental goodness of the conserving forces in 
being. 
In life it i~ only possible for us to know the self as it 
has learned to adapt the body to its expression. If there were a co-
conscious self which never gained possession of the body it would be 
impossible for us to know it. As Jacques Maritain rather quaintly says, 
It is written that God made for Adam and Eve in their 
exile garments of skin. He has alike made for us, by 
means of his prophets, then of his incarnate Son and 
his Church, clothing woven of words and of notions to 
hide the nakedness of our exiled minds until we see him.1 
1 The Degrees of Knowledge, 300. 
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The Meaning of "Purpose" 
Etymology and uses of the te:rm. 
The term purpose comes from the Latin term, propositus, 
meaning, "to place before" (pro - ponere). In view of this it is 
generally defined as "a project which is adopted for execution, but not 
yet executed."l 
Pringle-Pattison distinguishes three elements in purpose. 
He states, "The idea of Purpose as we meet it in experience, appears to 
imply (1) desire for an as yet non-existent state of affairs, (2) the 
conception of a plan for bringing the desired state of affairs into 
existence by selection of appropriate means, (3) the act of will proper, 
which realizes or carries out this plan."2 
Dr. D. M. Allan, in his doctoral dissertation at Harvard 
University, distinguishes only two elements: 
Purpose or purposive activity is a serial organ-
ization of psychophysical data characterized by: 
(1) Effective conscious anticipation of an end, 
either approximate or ultimate, and adaptive pre-
paration for it -- the end being a pleasurable 
and beneficial state of psycho-physical equilibrium. 
(2) The subordination of variable means to persis-
tent ends, both native and acquired. This implies 
selection in terms of relations of fitness or con-
gruity, between means and end, a form of appercep-
tive synthesis b~st understood from the conscious, 
meaningful side. 
1 Baldwin, DPP, II:404a. Cf. Murray, NED, ?2:162?b. "That which one 
sets before himself as a thing to be done or attained; the object 
which one has in view.~ 
2 IOG, 323. 
3 See Harvard summary of dissertations for 1926, p. 203. 
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On the other hand, Mark Baldwin and Professor H. W. B. Joseph 
tend only to emphasize one element. To Baldwin, a purpose is primarily 
an End in the large sense of the term, and to Joseph, it is primarily 
a rational goal. 
The degree to which consciousness enters into purposive action 
depends somewhat upon the school of thought. Thus Joseph states in 
criticism of another: 
••• As Professor Stocks, describing what I think 
he is presenting as the general view, and himself 
vnshes rather to supplement than to reject, says 
that 'below purpose we have the more obscure states 
called impulse, instinct, appetite, and so on.' 
(Stocks, The Limits of Purpose, 12). These, he 
says, are directed to 'nearer ends and not necessarily 
involving consciousness even of these.' But I doubt 
whether the possible absence of consciousness is their 
distinguishing mark, and feel certain that nearness 
of end is not. 
I do not question that purpose is the distinguishing 
mark of rational action, although it is hard to say 
where the first germs of this are to be recognized. 
Vlhat I do question is the assumption thai purpose 
involves a distinction of means and end. 
Professor R. B. Perry reflects a more realistic and behavioristic posi-
tion and states: 
Let us now sum up our conception of purposive or 
interested action, as a basis for discussing the 
very intimate, confused, and compromising relations 
which it sustains with reason or intellect. A 
determining tendency is a general response-system, 
tentatively advancing towards completion, or tenta-
tively renewing itself. Interested or purposive 
action is tentative action adopted because the anti-
cipatory responses which it partially arouses coincide 
with the unfulfilled or implicit phase of such a 
determining tendency. 2 
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2 Journal of Philosophy, 18 (1921), 104-105. 
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Purpose as End, or Zweck. 
Because of our concentration upon the objective method, 
and our tendency to consider the physical and biological sciences as 
more basic than the sociological, we have come to identify purpose with 
the end-product of teleology, and call anything purposive if it 
functioned toward an intelligible end. 1 As a result, when the realm 
of discourse transcends the intimate and the personal, we have come to 
separate the term purpose from its subjective and conscious connotations 
and let it denote achieved ends only. 
This favor was brought into favor when it was discovered in 
evolution that ends were achieved in intelligible progress before con-
sciousness arose. Before even the special interpretations of emergent 
evolution appeared on the scene, T. H. Huxley2 and others3 acclaimed 
Charles Dantin for reviving teleology4 and bringing about a reconcilia-
tion of teleology and morphology. Although the later dominance of, 
and speculation with, chance variation inclined even Dan1in to doubt his 
earlier theism, it was a passing mood. Increasing study, resulting in 
the development of the emergent theories, marked the increasing 
rejection of the materia-mechanistic views of Ludwig Bllchner and Ernst 
1 I.e. the end may commend itself to intelligence, but is not necessa-
-rily intelligent. 
2 See Pringle-Pattison, IOG, 328, note 1; or cf. his Collected Essays, 
2, 109. 
3 So Asa Gray said, "Let us recognize Darwin's great service to 
natural science in bringing back to it Teleology; so that instead 
of Morphology vs. Teleology, we shall have Morphology wedded to 
Teleology." Pringle-Pattison, lee. cit. 
4 Francis Darwin wrote, "One of the greatest services by my father •• 
is the revival of Teleology." See Pringle-Pattison, loc. cit. 
Cf. Ward, ROE, 83. -- --
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Haeckel. In their place, Sir James Jeans was finally to write, "If 
the universe is a universe of thought, then its creation must have 
been an act of thought,"1 and Einstein states, 
It is enough for me to contemplate the mystery 
of conscious life perpetuating itself through all 
eternity -- to reflect upon the marvellous struc-
ture of the universe which we can dimly perceive, 
and to try humbly to comprehend even an infinitesi-
mal part of the intelligence manifested in nature.2 
Mr. E. H. Cotton, summarizing the views of sixteen men of science, says, 
The conclusion of some of the best scientific 
minds civilization has produced, as stated in 
this discussion, proving that we are not living in 
a mechanistic dispensation, but in a universe of 
order and design responding perfectly to the 
nicety of mathematical law, and of beneficent 
purpose also, is not only one of the most impor-
tant facts that confronts us -- it is the most 
important. It may be the h'UliiB.n appeaio'f Huxley, 
the mysticism of Eddington, the reverence of Mather, 
the convictions of Millikan, or the simple faith of 
Einstein. Whatever is its for.m, it is sending 
men's minds rapidl~ forward to belief in the 
'vision splendid.' 
One of the most novel interpretations is that developed by 
Professor L. J. Henderson who finds noteworthy instances of an antici-
pation of life in inorganic nature -- in the "fitness of the environ-
ment."4 Henderson, as a scientist, refrains from admitting that the 
world is teleological, but does conclude that it is biocentric. He 
thus argues for purpose while he carefully avoids the supposedly 
1 Quoted in the preface to Mason, TGD, 5. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Has Science Discovered God? A Symposium of Modern Scientific Opinion 
edited by Ed. H. Cotton, N. Y.: Crowell, 1931. 
4 See Henderson, The Fitness of theEnvironment, and The Order of 
Nature. Cf. Baldwin's appraisal in the Journal of Philosophy, 
33 (1936), 113. Cf ~ also Patrick, ITP, 166ff. 
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anthropomorphic idea of a purpos!!• 
In the nmver teleology suggested by Kant, 1 and developed by 
Professors Windelband, 2 Patrick, 3 and Hocking, 4 purpose is spoken of 
simply as the "determining of events from ahead in time."5 In this 
form, purpose is found throughout organic life, since "in the organic 
whole, the parts themselves are conditioned by the whole and are only 
possible in it."6 In the interpretation of Professor Vfui tehead, the 
view is made individually all-inclusive: 
Science is taking on a new aspect which is neither 
purely physical nor purely biological. It is 
becoming the study of organisms. Biology is the 
study of the larger organisms; whereas physics 
is the study of the smaller organisms. There is 
another difference between the two divisions of 
science. The organisms of biology include as 
ingredients the smaller organisms of physics ••• 
• The concept of an organism includes, therefore, 
the concept of the interaction of organisms.? 
The entire universe thus becomes an organic whole. But the only purpose 
it necessarily implies is self-contained. Although Professor Patrick 
believes, "While the 'spectator of all time and all existence' may 
see it under the aspect of intelligent plan and purpose,"8 the reality 
of such a spectator, Hume9 would assert, was not a logical or a 
necessary conclusion. 
1 In his Kritik der Urteilskraft. 
2 In his Introduction to Philosophy, as tran~lated by J. McCabe. 
Pp. 144-146. N. Y.: Holt and Co., 1920 • 
3 ITP, 1?3ff. 
4 TP, Chapter VII. 
5 Hocking, £E.• ill•, p. 10?. Cf. Sorley, MVIG, 406ff. 
6 Windelband, ITP, 145; quoted by Patrick, ITP, 1?4. 
? Science and the Modern World, 150-151. N. Y.: I~cmillan Co., 1925. 
8 Patrick, ITP, 1?8. 
9 Cf. Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. 
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In fact, the tendency in the «newer teleology" is to identify 
the purposive and the teleological with the individual units. The 
view tends to emphasize individual achievement in a democratic way, and 
makes it possible for the harmony of the whole to be interpreted as a 
fortunate result, obtained by way of individual enterprise and laissez 
faire. If, with this view, we go further and interpret all organisms, 
and particularly man, 1 in a purely naturalistic sense, according to 
behavioristic psychology, we not only consider purpose as achieved apart 
from consciousness, but consciousness is left meaningless in the whole 
series. 
The Relation of Purpose and Consciousness. 
But while we recognize that "the vital processes of the plant 
and the deliberate plans of man are alike purposive,"2 it is also 
1 Professor A. N. Whitehead is not a naturalist. Yet consider how he 
uses the term 'vector' in interpreting experience, "The experience 
has a vector character, a common measure of intensity, and specific 
forms of feelings conveying that intensity. If we substitute the 
term 'energy' for the concept of a quantitative emotion intensity, 
and the term 'form of energy' for the concept of 'specific form 
of feeling,' and remember that in physics "vector" means definite 
transmission from elsewhere, we see that this metaphysical desg 
cription of the simplest elements in the constitution of actual 
entities agrees absolutely with the general principles according 
to which the notions of modern physics are framed. PR, 177. 
On p. 247, he says regarding primitive experience, "Thus the Primi-
tive experience is emotional feelings, felt in its relevance to 
a world beyond. The feeling is blind and the relevance is vague. 
Also feeling, and reference to an exterior world pass into appeti-
tion, which is the feeling of determinate relevance of a world 
about to be. In the phraseology of physics, this primitive ex-
perience is 'vector feeling,' that is to say, feeling from a 
beyond which is deter.nunate and pointing to a beyond which is to 
be determined." 
2 Sorley, MVIG, 414. 
- - -----_---=----=-=-==!+==-==----~-
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true "that in the .former we have no evidence o.f the presence o.f an idea 
guiding the series of movements which takes place, whereas in our own 
experience, we have an immediate consciousness o.f such an idea."1 More-
over, "the end is not merely a result towards which the various reactions 
o.f the organism concentrate;2 it is the fulfilment o.f a puxpose already 
present in the consciousness of the subject.n3 
In man, at least, we find "an inside view"4 of purpose. 
"Conscious purpose is known to us directly only as it exists in the mind 
of man,"5 yet, we cannot deny it or the important it plays in experience. 
As c. H. Judd says in his article, "Evolution and Consciousness," 
"Consciousness is the essential fact in human life ••• 1J.hat man does with 
his environment depends upon oonsciousness." 6 Wnenever we get away from 
the instinctive and habitual, we need conscious reflection7 to guide our 
1 Sorley, ~mTIG, 414. 
2 A striking instance of unconscious purpose is given by Robertson T. 
Brailsford in Scientia, "Osborne and Mendel offered to rats two 
diets, differing in no particular: from one anather save that the 
one diet contained in small amount an amino-acid or an accessory 
.foodstuff which is essential to life and well-being, while the 
other diet was deficient in this single respect. It ·will be 
recollected that these substances suffice in minute quantity, so 
that the difference between the two diets could not in any way 
have been accessible to the projicient sense organs of the animals. 
Yet they deliberately chose the sufficient diet, and rejected the 
inadequate diet." 
3 Sorley, I\'IVIG, 412. 
4 Drever, Proceedings o.f the Aristotelian Society, 25 (1925}, 143. 
5 Sorley, MVIG, 41?. 
6 Psychological Review, 1? (1910), 77. 
7 Janet states, "Take away consciousness from an intellectual act, and 
what will remain but an empty dead concept, a potential concept? 
Take away this concept itself from the efficient cause, and what 
will remain but an inde~erminate tendency, which nothing will lead 
towards one effect rather than another? Take away even this tendenc 
and what will remain? NOthing -- at least, nothing that can serve 
to connect the present with the future; nothing (see next page) 
-++------- --------------------
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action. 
'I cannot draw the moon,' wrote Berlioz to 
Wagner, 'except when I am looking at its reflec-
tion in the bottom of a well.' By this he meant 
that an act of thought must always intervene between 
the emotion of the scene and its reproduction 
in art. 1 
Likewise when c. D. Broad speaks of the need for balancing the three 
branches of knowledge (inorganic, organic, and social) he asks for con-
scious, purposive action. "Now it cannot be corrected except by a 
deliberate modification of human organisms, which shall proceed as fast 
as the deliberate modification of their environment now proceeds."2 
As consciousness "has always consciousness as its origin, "3 
it alone gathers the world into an experiential unity, and enables man 
not simply to function as an organism achieving an organic goal through 
blind persistence of effort and strange discrimination of means, but 
causes him to order his ideas coherently and purposively, 4 and build the 
world of experience into a unity which he can see steadily and see as a 
whole. In this way conscious purpose stands unique in nattn'e and marks 
that can explain the rencounter of causes with the effect." FC, 
413. 
1 Arreat, Monist, 26 (1916), 271. 
2 .MPN, 665. . 
3 Sorley, I~IG, 449. 
4 Boodin rebukes the nattn'alist in his "Reinstatement of Teleology", 
Harvard Theological Review, 6 (1913), 86, with the words, "It is 
the naturalistic materialist who has violated the principle of 
continuity in nature by cutting the higher stages of the process 
loose from the earlier. Why the materialist, who is always 
emphasizing continuity, should turn around when it comes to human 
nature and its ideals, and here insist upon discontinuity, a complete 
break, absolute irrelevance to what precedes, can be explained only 
as the result of prejudice. He had rather make any sacrifice than 
give up his faith in the adequacy of the mechanical way of reading 
the facts." 
the chief distinction between the activity of men and the behavior of 
nature. If causal relations are to be maintained, the one must be inter-
preted in terms of the other.1 But which one will it be? 
However firmly the causal connectedness of 
successive stages may be maintained by those who 
trace the historical process, it has to be ad-
mitted that no plausible account has yet been 
given of the causal transition from physico-
chemism to life, or from merely vital process to 
consciousness. Two interpretations of the facts 
remain possible: that which holds that the trans-
ition will yet be made clear and will be seen to 
be due simply to the growing complexity of physi-
cal and chemical processes frOm which first life 
and afterwards consciousness arise; and, on the 
other hand, the view that the earlier stages of 
cosmic development have not been fully stated 
by the physicist and chemist, and that, hidden 
from their analysis, life and mind have somehow 
been present from the first. Between these two 
views the theory of an unconscious purpose or 
immanent will attempts to mediate, and like many 
mediating theories it is beset by the difficulties 
of both the views between which it occupies an 
uncertain positio~ Like the mechanical theory 
it has to face the most awkward of all problems, 
the transition from the unconscious to conscious-
ness; and it shares with the opposed view the 
assumption of an internal factor of whose operation 
there is no direct evidence in the early periods of 
cosmic history. 2 
In view of our inadequate knowledge of the 'evolution' of consciousness, 
let us see what use can be made of the concept of unconscious purpose as 
a metaphysical prin~iple. 
* *** * 
* 
1 Lindsay sharply inquires, "What do we know of intelligence and will 
acting as severed from consciousness?" RATP, 273. 
2 Sorley, l@{IG, 416. 
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The Chief Forms of Unconscious Purpose 
The Voluntarism of Schopenhauer. 
Although Schopenhauer held only to an unconscious will and 
not to an unconscious purpose, metaphysically speaking, his use of the 
1 
will prompted many later developments in the roncept of unconscious 
purpose and may be placed first. 
Schopenhauer begins the second volume of his World as Will 
and Idea with the words: 
The will, as the thing in itself, constitutes 
the inner, true, and indestructible nature of 
man; in itself, however, it is unconscious. For 
consciousness is conditioned by the intellect, 
and the intellect is a mere accident of our being. 2 
The will, then, for Schopenhauer is "unconscious, destitute of intel-
lectual representation, or prevision."3 It simply drives on as a never-
ceasing, blind impulse to self-preservation through "striving and wishing, 
••• pleasure and pain, hope and fear, love and hate."4 It is never a 
process of deliberation culminating in intelligent choice as we are wont 
to think of it.5 Having no purpose of its own, it finds purposes stre\vn 
throughout nature in a phenomenal way, for it drives the organisms it 
1 See Sully, PES, 86. 
2 Schopenhauer, WWI, Chapter 19, paragraph 1. From the translation by 
Haldane and Kemp. 
3 Sully, BES, 86, "Purpose to Schopenhauer is synonymous with motiva-
tion, and so with limitation and determination ••• '•Absence of end,' 
says Schopenhauer, 'of all limits belongs to the nature of will 
per~' which is endless striving.'" 
4 Schopenhauer, WWI, Ch. 19, par. 3. Of. H8ffding, HMP, II:-228. 
5 Cf. Hoernle, ~' 159; also H8ffding, HMP, II:227. 
creates, and brings to expression the instinctive forms latent within 
them. 
Although instincts are only "a commentary on the creative 
activity"1 of the ultimate irrational will, which itself "should include 
only that which is common to man and beast,"2 they are our key to the 
order which the will works in the world. Hence, Schopenhauer's theory 
is sometimes referred to as one of instinctive finality. 3 Professor 
Paul ~anet comments: 
To attribute to nature an instinctive activity, 
is to say that nature acts like bees and the ant, 
in place of acting like man; it is zoomorphism 
substituted for anthropomorphism. We see no 
advantage in it.4 
Schopenhauer's psychology, like his cosmology is romantic, 5 but it is 
difficult to see how instinct is a better explanation of experience than 
intelligence and consciousness. Is "the proround seriousness which both 
sexes display in selecting their lovers ••• to be explained as an uncon-
scious recognition of the importance of the end to be gained,"6 or is 
this seriousness not dependent upon a conscious appreciation of the desire 
for home, for honor, and chastity, which when not present, lets love 
revert to the merely sensual? 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
The mechanical and routine course or instinct not only7 is 
~anet, FC, 349. 
H3ffding, HMP, II:227. See Schopenhauer's ~ Paralipomena. 
~anet, in FC, Book II, Chapter III, gives an excellent criticism of 
this entire position. 
Janet, FC, 349; cf. p. 379. 
Hgffding, HMP, II:227. 
Schopenhauer, WWI, Chapter 44. Cf. Sully, PES, 91. 
"··· How can we confound •• inspiration, in which the ancients saw 
the seal of the divine, with a blind instinct, (see next page) 
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unable to e~ress the full nature of man's experience, but it also fails 
to explain its origin. Why should the irrational will create these 
instincts? Cr, does _it simply find them coeval with itself? Schopen-
hauer, himself, realized this difficulty after a time, and James Sully, 
Julius Frauen.stMdt, and H~rtmann all point out that "there is a manifest 
leaning to an objective teleology in Schopenhauer's later writings, where 
he conceives will as universally accompanied by unconscious representa-
Schopenhauer thus moved more definitely toward the idea of 
unconscious purpose as instinctive finality proved hardly adequate either 
to explain the phenomenal world or serve as a sufficient metaphysical 
ground. 
The "Unconscious" of Hartmann. 
· Unlike most thinkers, Hartmann considered the derivation of 
the unconscio 1s from the conscious to be a greater problem than the 
emergence of t;he conscious from the unoonscious. In his Religious Meta-
physics he st9.tes: 
1 
If •Jod were conscious, he would have, in order to 
crea.te the existing world, first to put off his 
consciousness and descend into nature as uncon-
scious. This self-divestment of consciousness in 
an .9.bsolute pure spirit is as unthinkable as is 
the continuation, assumed by theism, of divine 
self-consciousness and world-consciousness, under 
and in spite of the subjection to unconsciousness 
of t;he original consciousness in nature. God must 
rat:aer have previously been unconscious spirit in 
order to be the cause of unconscious nature, just 
as :ae must have been the unconscious spirit, in 
with the mechanical and routine course of a watch that goes alone, 
which is what the instinct of animals resembles?" Janet, .FC, 364. 
Sully, PE:3, 87. 
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orier to be the cause of conscious spirit. 1 
God then is ·l.lllconscious, but the all-wise Unconscious has formed con-
sciousness "in order to release the will2 from the unblessedness of its 
willing, fro;n which it cannot release itself. n3 
Hartmann is not certain when consciousness arises. He even 
entertains the possibility that the atoms have a consciousness. 4 How-
ever, he is ·~areful to point out that there are a great many instances 
where activity is unconscious, and he is equally careful to point out 
that whereve:r there is conscious activity, it is only an expression of 
the unconscious. In this Wf}.Y it is the great unifying force, in which 
"the individuality both of the organized body and of consciousness is 
only a phenonenon, that disappears with death, and only the subs:tance, 
the one Unconscious remains 
Tlw Philosophy of the Unconscious is replete with instances 
to show "the purposive activity of unconscious will."6 Hartmann cites 
instances of loyalty in animal life, and describes for example, how, 
in various eJ:periments, a decapitated frog7 "overcomes different obstacles 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
Hartmann, BM, 156. 
See Chapter II, p. 73 of this dissertation. Cf. Sully, PES, 139. 
"The world-appearance of the divine being, is however, the teleologi-
cal exf.ltation of transcendent unhappiness to inuna.nent unhappiness 
during the finite continuance of the world-process, in order 
thereby to avoid an infinite continuance of transcendent unb.appi-
ness." Hartmann, ·RM, 265-266. 
"The que~::tion might be raised here whether the atoms have a con-
sciousrLess." Hartmann, PU, II:l83. Anyway, "the Unconscious mani-
fests itself equally in mind and matter." II:lSO. 
Hartmann, PU, III:S2. 
PU, I:l96. Thus, II:l77; I:223f; I:l98; I:62; I:l38; I:ll3, 
cr:-Feine:old, Monist, 27 (1917), 229, "That memory is ultimately a 
physiological phenomenon was demonstrated by the experiments of 
Rothmar. who showed that decorticated animals can (see next page) 
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in a different way, but equally suited to the purpose; when, having 
taken a fixed direction, and being turned therefrom, i t tries with rare 
obstinacy constantly to regain it; when it creeps away under a cupboard 
or into other odd corners, manifestly to seek protection from its 
persecutors, --there is unmistakable evidence of non-reflectorial acts1 
of will ••• "2 Like Schopenhauer, Hartmann interprets i nstinct3 also 
"as action d1me with a purpose, but without consciousness4 of purpose. n 5 
be edunated, .!.·~·, new dispositions and new associations may be 
establ:L shed in the lower centers 'without the intervention of the 
integ~tting influence of the cortex or conscious intelligence.'" 
(Yet, does this cover the full problem, or only the matter of 
physical adaptation?) 
1 "Cerebral refl ection frequently surpasses the reflection of the 
spinal cord, and prevents its occurrence; ~·£•, a decapitated frog 
scratches the nipped place on the skin, a living one hops away. 
Here iB seen the direct trans! tion from cerebral reflection to 
conscious psychical activity, between which no line can be drawn. 
There tollows from this the unity of the principle underlying all 
these J>henomena. There are, therefore, only two logical ways of 
looking at these things; either the mind is everywhere only the 
last rnsult of material processes, both in the brain and in the 
rest of the nervous life (then, however, purpose would also have 
to be Elverywhere denied when not posited by conscious nervous 
activity, or the soul is everywhere the principle iying at the 
basis of :material nervous processes, causing and regulating them, 
and consciousness is only a phenomenal form of the same, brought 
about by means of these processes." PU, !:138. 
2 PU, !:62. 
3 "Instinct. is not the result of conscious reflection -- not a conse-
quence of bodily organization -- not mere result of a mechanism 
foundec. in the organization of the brain -- not the effect of a 
dead, end essentially foreign mechanism, externally adhering to the 
mind -- but the individual's own activity, springing from his in-
most na.ture and character." PU, !:113. 
4 Yet, "the, question of the greater or less intelligence of animals 
no more pre-judges that of t~eir degree of consciousness than a 
concept of tropism implies the absence of consciousness." This is 
the view of Claparede, quoted in Parmelee, Science of Human 
Behavior, 316. 
5 Butler, ]nconscious Memory, 212. Cf. Sully, P.ES, 118; also ~anet, 
FC, 349. 
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liartmann is by no means averse to recognizing conscious 
purposes, to1>. He unhesitatingly calls friendship "a product of the 
conscious miJld"l and evil, "every thinking or doing which goes contrary 
to the moral world-order."2 He states that "the redemption of the world 
through Chriflt comes to pass ••• through this, that all men follow him 
in despising the world, and in living in faith and hope of a hereafter •• "3 
For, after all, "even in this emergence of certain truths to the light 
of consciousness, and in their struggle and victory over dominant ideas 
of the time, there rules again, •• an unconscious logic, 4 a historical 
providence~ ~hich has never been perceived more clearly than by Hegel."5 
Hartmann conceives the Unconscious in organic evolution to be "something 
quite apart from the material forces or volitions implied in bodily 
changes. It is a will enlightened by an intelligence which presides 
over these, which every now and then interferes with their action by 
introducing a new element."6 
1 PU, I:230. It is rather amusing to note Hartmann's opinion, "women 
are gen,erally capable of no pure and true friendship, with men as 
little .~s with one another, because friendship is a product of 
the conscious mind." 
2 Hartmann, RM, 184. 
3 Hartmann, PU, III:80, Hartmann continues with the rash judgment, 
"'I'J::!;is i ;3 the historical and only important content of the doctrine 
preached. by .T esus. '' Cf. with Hartmann, RF, 92. 
4 "The logi1~al principle guides the world-process most wisely to the 
goal of the greatest possible evolution of consciousness, which 
being attained, consciousness suffices to hurl back the total 
actual 'rolition into nothingness, by which the process and the 
world coases, and ceases indeed without any residuum whatever 
whereby the process might be continued. The logical element 
therefoJ~ ensures that the world is a best possible world, such 
a one, namely, as attains redemption, not one whose torment is 
perpetuated endlessly." PU, III:l42. 
5 PU, !:324., 
s Sully, m;, 123-124. 
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The Unconscious, thus, is exceedingly able, although it 
only comes to consciousness, personality, and selfhood in man.1 "As 
the transcendent cause of the conscious spirit life"2 it maintains 
"the steady growth of spirit-development."3 In fact, "the present 
state of the world is comprehended as the realized contents of the 
present divine thought-contents,n4 and it is difficult to see how Hart-
mann can place all responsibility for evil on man, 5 when he says, 
" 
... since always only that is which God thinks, so it is self~evident 
that nothing is which he does not think, and thus all existing things 
are by him thought or known." 6 
But the Unconscious of Hartmann is too "able."7 H8ffding 
criticizes, "We may say of it, as Galilei said of the appeal to an 
almighty will; it explains nothing, because it explains too much."8 
F. A. Lange says, "The Australian savage, •• and the Philosopher of the 
Unconscious halt where their power of natural explanation ceases, and 
attribute all the rest to a new principle, by which a single word very 
1 Hartmann, RM, 164-165. 
2 Ibid., 140. 
3 Ibid., 190. 
4 Ibid.' 128. 
5 Ibid., 128. 
6 Cf. also, " ••• For the same Unconscious which wills life, and more-
over, for its quite special ends wills just this l ife in spite 
of its wretchedness, will certainly not omit to fit out the crea-
tures of life with j~st as many illusions as they need,in order 
to make life supportable." PU, III:9. Cf. RF, 5, preface to 
the second edition. 
7 Lange rightfully calls attention to the danger, '~at would have 
become of all these valuable investigations if the respective in-
quirers had referred the phenomena to the teleological interference 
of the "Unconscious" or of any other phantom?" HM, III: 73, note 
85. 
8 HMP, II:535. 
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satisfactorily explains everything."l Hartmann thinks he ends with a 
pantheism. This, he considers the only religion which realizes the most 
daring dreams of the Mystics without contradicting Reason. 2 However, 
since Hartmann's ultimate being only comes to consciousness in man3 it 
might be argued, as Professor Brightman points out, that "if unitary 
consciousness occurs only in individual centers or monads, a theistic 
personal pluralism is more probable than a pantheistic monism."4 
The Blind, Creative Impulse of Creative Evolution. 
History is by no means a "clear record of the will of God,"5 
and since evolution through Henri Bergson and William James, has brought 
a temporal view to favor in modern philosophy, even God has been "put 
6 
on the move." "If the universe is truly creative," says Sirs. Radha-
krishnan, "God works as a creative genius does."7 
The story of evolution is represented as a story of the 
increasing development of devices and means by which the hormic energy 
might achieve satisfaction. Professor William McDougall distinguishes 
the following stages: 
(1) The vague, almost undifferentiated striving of 
the animalcule in pursuit of his prey. (2) The 
strivings of animals in which the instincts are 
sharply differentiated and directed toward specific 
goals that are vaguely anticipated by the creature. 
1 Lange, HM, III:72. 
2 RF, 113. 
3 Hartmann, ru~, 161. See this dissertation, p. 74. 
4 Proceedings of the Sixth Congress, (1930), 75. 
5 Brightman, FC, 112. 
6 DeBurgh, "Modern Gospel of Unreaso1.1," Hibbert Journal, 35 (1936-1937) 
397. 
7 An Idealist View of Life, 340. Quoted by Luard, Hibbert Journal, 
36 (1937-1938), 348. 
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(3) The instinctive strivings of primitive man 
toward goals more rully imagined and anticipated; 
the strivings of instinctive desire. (4) The 
strivings of men prompted by desire for instinc-
tive goals, but directed also to goals which are 
conceived and desired only as means to the in-
stinctive goal. (5) Conduct of the lower l~vel; 
that is, instinctive desire regulated and controlled, 
in the choice of means, by anticipation of rewards 
and punishments. (6) Conduct of the middle level; 
that is, the same instinctive impulses regulated 
in the choice of goals and of means by anticipation 
of social approval and disapproval. (7) Conduct of 
the higher level; that is, striving regula:bed in 
the choice of goals and means by the desire to 
realize an ideal of character and conduct, a desire 
which itself springs from an instinctive disposition 
whose impulse is turned to higher uses by the subtle 
influences of organized society embodying a moral 
tradition.1 
In "newly devised intermediaries"2 such as these, a "newer 
and now more basic principle of purpose"3 has been developed, sharp 
distinctions have been obscured, and "many who are unable to think 
clearly see no difficulty whatever in a gradual transformation from the 
inorganic to the organic, and from the non-conscious to the conscious."4 
Thus, Professor Gustave Geley5 pictures evolution as an advance from 
the unconscious to the conscious. Between these two there is no gulf. 
The two interpenetrate throughout and condition 
each other in the individual. The unconscious is 
progressively becoming conscious; ultimately the 
unconscious will become all conscious; each individ-
ual consciousness will become all conscious. The 
summit of evolution can thus be imagined as a sort 
conscious Nirvana.6 
1 McDougall, Outline of Psychology, 448-449. See Moore and Gurnee, 
:F.P, 105. 
2 Hocking, TP, 52. 
3 Moore and Gurnee, FP, 98. 
4 Hocking, lac. cit. 
5 De l'inconscienr-au conscient. Paris: Alcan, 1919. 
6 Tsanoff, Philosophical Review, 28 (1919), 643. 
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One cannot help asking, however, why there has been this 
continual quest for complexity, reaching across aeons of temporal 
existence from the unicellular to the "multi-thinkular" and producing 
the autonomy of conscious, thought-life in spite of " ( 1) destructive 
action; (2) imperfect or frustrated execution; (3) useless or mischievous 
contrivance; (4) arbitrary, capricious, and whimsical treatment; and 
(5 } circuitous treatment."1 Unconscious purpose says, simply, it has 
been a blind, creat1ve quest. Mr. B. R. Hanson suggests, 
If it be only possible to describe the evolutionary 
process from without then the most that ean be said 
is that it displays a nisus towards deity. But 
from the intelerable contradictions involved in the 
idea of a God who comes to be at the end of the 
process we may escape, if we will, by apprehending 
the process from within, by vigorously exercising 
our birthright as privileged experients. Viewed from 
within the dualism is no longer ultimate. It is 
apprehended indeed as necessary for the expression 
of life; but it provides no exhaustive or even 
credible account of the nature of life as such. If 
the conflict or increasing complication of deity, it 
is the business of metaphysics at least to suggest 
a reasonable ground for this. The philosophy of 
emergence does not do so. It describes life, it 
does not characterize it.2 
While we should question Mr . Hanson's ability to perform the task he 
so cheerfully proposes, of introspecting the evolutionary process, we 
must agree that the emergent thesis alone is rather hollow, or insub-
stantial. For a more adequate interpretation we would view the Cosmic 
Power, 
Not in the light of the elementary beginnings of 
the evolutionary process, but in the light of 
1 Call, FC, 125. 
2 Supplement to the Proceedings to the Aristotelian Society, 4 ( 192'l.~ , 
1922), 208. 
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the whole process and its highest forms. Hence, 
the Cosmic Power must at least be such as to 
contain within itself a full explanation of the 
highest and best in human personality, which is 
the supreme instance of emergence.l 
The Purposive Being of DIAMAT. 2 
Santayana is like Schopenhauer in that his metaphysical 
principle is unconscious, but not purposive, since a particular trope, 
seed, or coiled spring is a garment matter wears but once, and may never 
wear again. 3 His materialism4 is at an opposite pole from Schopen-
hauer's idealism; yet, he suggests that perhaps it is but a question of 
the point of view; "Matter to blind feeling, is but force without, and 
will within. n 5 
In the interpretation of Dialectical Materialism, however, 
the concept of unconscious purpose appears in full form. Combining the 
materialism of Ludwig Feuerbach and the dialectic of Hegel, Karl 1~rx, 
Friedrich Engels, and Nicolai Leni~attempted to trace a materialistic 
interpretation of history. They traced in history a dialectic which 
moved on apart from human consciousness, 7 molding human society, and 
bringing about change that ultimately would lead to a classless society. 
1 Brightman, FC, 103. 
2 I. e. Dialectical Materialism. 
3 Santayana, RM, 87, "The matter which by taking a particular form 
becomes a particular thing need never have worn that form before 
and may never wear it again." 
4 Santayana, RE, 51, "Substance is Matter." 
5 Santayana, RM, 303. 
6 ~. ~· Vladimir Ilyitsch Ulianov. 
7 Lenin, Materialism and Empiric-Criticism, 96, "••• The doctrine 
of the independence of the outer world from consciousness is the 
fundamental doctrine of materialism." 
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"Consciousness does not determine life," Marx wrote, "but life deter-
mines consciousness."1 Engels, in his sketch on Ludwig Feuerbach and 
the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy, held that those who believe 
in nature are materialists and said: 
Nature exists independently of all philosophy. 2 
It is the foundation upon which we human beings, 
ourselves products of nature, have grown up. 
Nothing exists outside of nature and man, and 
the higher beings our religious phantasies have 
created are only the fantastic reflection of our 
own essence. 3 
In dialectical materialism -- at least as its 'orthodox' followers 
present it -- we find the most complete affirmation of unconscious pur-
pose upon a metaphysical basis. Here the purpose depends in no wise 
upon the phenomenal manifestations of the instinctive activity to which 
Schopenhauer and Hartmann appealed; it scarcely depends upon the course 
of events in the evolutionary series.4 Here too, strange to say, 
purpose occupies a position in the ontology of being comparable5 to the 
1 In The German Ideology (1845-1846); see Catlin, Story of the Poli-
tical Philosophers, 571. N. Y.: McGraw-Hill, 1939. 
2 "For the Communist movement started when Marx said, 'Let us turn 
from ideas to reality, let us look not at people's theories but 
at their actions. It is by seeing how societies and their insti-
tutions work in practice, and not by accepting their own ideal 
accounts of what they are after that we shall understand their 
real faith.'" l~cmurray, Creative Society, 26. 
3 See Catlin, SPP, 571. 
4 Sidney Hook points out that the materialist is dependent upon a 
realistic epistemology and a realistic epistemology presupposes 
an evolutionary biology. (See "The Meaning of Marx," pamphlet}. 
However, Lenin attacks the analytic phase of realism bitterly, 
in his Materialism and Empiric-Criticism. 
5 Bertrand Russell says, "I cannot assent to Marx's philosophy, still 
less to that of Lenin's Materialism and Empiric-Criticism ••• 
I do not believe that there is any dialectical necessity in I 
historical change." See "Meaning of Marx" pamphlet, p. 52. 
This pamphlet was edited by Sidney Hook. j 1 
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position which the unconscious holds in the metaphysic of Schopenhauer 
and the metaphysic of Santayana; for it is the unconscious which is 
"weighed in the balances" and found dubious. Professor Hook explains, 
Whoever understands the universe properly ••• 
from the standpoint of dialectical materialism, 
will see (1} that the vrorld of nature and society 
could not have been different from what it is and 
the victory of communism still be possible, and 
(2) that the structure of the universe is such 
that that victory is logically already involved 
in the relationships discovered by dialectics. 
This is the promise of entire creation. The stars 
in their courses proclaim it; the ocean floor 
sup~orts it; and man in his brief career realizes 
it. 
I 
I 
If we may say with Professor Macmurray, "He (the Communist) judges men 
and their institutions in the light of his faith in the power that works 
through human history for the establishment of a universal society of 
freedom and equality, •• "2 and were to continue that "anyone who con-
eluded that the behavior of the Christians showed that they did not reall 
believe in God, but only thought that they believed, might then equally I 
1 
2 
I 
I 
Hook, "The Meaning of Marx," 83f. Cf. " ••• Nature in the orthodox I 
philosophy of dialectical materialism plays the same role as God." 
Hook,~~, 80. \ 
L. Rudas of the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute, Moscow writes, "Dia-
lectics not only points out to the proletariat its historical task, 
1
1 
but it gives the proletariat the certainty of victory; it is to 
a certain extent the guarantee of this victory." 
This is even cosmic. "But what passes away at one point of 
the universe, develops anew at another. One solar system passes 
away, new ones develop. Life passes away from the earth, it arises 
elsewhere anew. In this sense, dialectical materialism asserts an 
eternal movement; what exists develops. It evolves because the 
dialectical self-movement of everything which exists is a driving 
force towards development. Decay holds in general for special cases· 
the endlessness of development holds only for the infinite universe 
sub specie aeternitatis." Cited from Rudas, "Dialectical Ni8.terial-
ism and Communism~ Labour Monthly, Sept. and Oct., 1933; quoted 
by Hook, ££.:.. cit., 79, 84. 
Macmurray, CS, 28. 
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yanclude that the Communists really believed in God and only thought 
1 they did not," - we would have .to say that the Unconscious Purpose of 
dialectical materialism has many of the attributes of conscious, theistic 
purpose although the Communist fails to realize their significance. 2 
Principles which we only know of as Attributes, and are left in Abstrac-
tion. 
Professor Weber once characterized the modern philosophical 
quest in the words: 
Die moderne Philosophie strebt nach einer 
Synthase von Idealismus und Realismus, nach 
einem Prinzip, woraus beida, Geist und Materia, 
sich ableiten und erklHren lassen.~ 
This is another way of saying that modern philosophy strives after a 
principle that can explain a cosmic order characterized by intelligence 
and purpose, on the one hand; yet developing consciousness as a late, 
end product on the other. 
Those who do not come to view metaphysical reality as an 
unconscious purpose because of dialectical materialism, evolutionism, 
or the influence of the German pessimists, often tacitly do so by des-
cribing the metaphysical ground as the 'First Principle,' the 'Order 
of Reality,' 'Nexus of Law,' 'Process of Integration,' the 'Cosmic 
Force,' the 'Power not ourselves that makes for righteousness.' 4 It 
1 Macmurray, CS, 28. 
2 The "guile of reason" in dialectical materialism; thus far, is dis-
torted and misled by 1~rx's reaction to the only religion he knew, 
a pseudo~religton. See Macmurray, CS, 133. 
3 Weber, WLWG, 3. 
4 See Van Ueusen, ~5G, 143ff. Cf. Brightman, PG~ chapters 1, 2, and 
3. See also Brightman, IGP, 4, "It is my conviction that the 
movement away from a personal God in recent thought is not a move-
ment towards greater truth, but simply a {see next page) 
-==#=========-~--~~-------
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will be observed that we know of these qualities only as attributes and 
that they are left in abstraction.1 In this way they introduce order, 
yet do not imply personal or conscious agency back of the order. 
On reflection, it will appear, as Professor E. s. Brightman 
says, that "What we have here is an analysis of personality into 
2 
abstractions." With the exception of Matthew Arnold's phrase, these 
terms might well be changed to 'purpose,' 'intelligible order' or 
'intelligence,' 'organizing will,' and 'creative will-power' or mere 
'force.' These terms are valuable as far as they go, but they are not 
adequate to define the metaphysical ground of being. To explain the 
multifariousness of existence by one of them is like attempting to explain 
the character of the American nation by dwelling upon the keen-minded 
intelligence of Alexander Hamilton. These terms are only descriptive 
3 products gleaned from the ongoing of being. In attempting to use them 
to account for the material cause, formal cause, efficient cause, and 
final, or first cause of the world of our experience, one is quickly 
impressed with their insufficiency. 
The principle of personality avoided most by all the terms, 
it will be noted, is that of consciousness. They thus become in a practi-
cal way, forms of unconscious purpose. 
movement towards obscurity and pseudo-simplicity." 
1 As Lindsay asks, "What do we know of intelligence and will acting as 
severed from consciousness?" RATP, 2?3. 
2 PG, 58. 
3 "Professor Sir ArthurS. Eddington, F. R. S., remarks that the 
crudest anthropomorphic image of a spiritual Deity can scarcely be 
so wide of the truth as one conceived in terms of metrical equations " 
Drawbridge, C. L. (ed.), The Religion of Scientists: being recent 
expressions of Two Hundred Fellows of the Royal Society •.• N.Y.: 
Macmillan, 1932. 
151 
==!:l====-=·--==-=-===========---=-=-=-=--·--- -------
Summary. 
In summary, we may briefly conclude that the concept of 
unconscious purpose has not proved wholly satisfactory as a major thesis 
in the interpretation of experience either in regard to man's conduct 
or his environment. In addition, despite the strong claim of evolution 
that consciousness follows and does not precede a large proportion of 
the evolutionary series,1 we must conclude that it has not proved wholly 
satisfactory as a metaphysical principle in explaining the cosmic develop-
ment of things. 2 I 
I 
I 
It seems only reasonable to assert that an adequate metaphysic I 
shall meet at least two requisites: (1) it shall be adequate to explain 
the nature of our experience; (2) it shall be adequate to produce the 
world as we have come to know it. These two are necessarily closely re-
lated. Vlard and K8hler both3 point out that " ••• the main structure of 
our concept of Nature is entirely anthropomorphic."4 
Science presupposes and demonstrates that nature 
is in certain respects like us. Our experience 
is of space and time; and nature is in space and 
time. We think in terms of universal, mathematical 
laws, and nature behaves in terms of universal, 
1 Cf. Whitehead, PR, 416. 
2 "Indeed the r e is vastly more proof that the power which works in 
nature is intelligent than there is that men are intelligent." 
Bowne, liiET, 165. 
3 Ward, ROE, 11, "The unity of Nature is the ! 'deal counterpart of 
the actual unity of each individual experience ••• " K8hler, 
' 
~lF, 376, goes on to point out t~at, "If all such meanings belong 
exclusively to human experience, if none apply to physical facts 
at the same time, then physics will forever remain an anthropo-
morphic delusion." Professor ~anet reflects essentially the same 
position in his FC. I 
I 4 In character, though not in cause. 
152. 
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mathematical laws. Sensations appear in our 
personal consciousness; as is the structure and 
sequence of our sensations, so is the structure 
and sequence of nature. Unless these statements 
are true, science is impossible and its achieve-
ments lead to no conclusion.1 
The structure and sequence of nature, however, can only be discovered 
by us in experience in a phenomenal way, -- as it comes to us in the 
short life span of our own consciousness.2 From Hume to James, writers 
have pointed out that our knowled@B of its 'first' cause can only be 
analogical. 3 However, a good analogy is to be preferred to a bad one. 4 
Janet points out that we know three modes of action in nature; mechanism, 
instinct, and (conscious) thought. 5 Of these three, instinct is the 
most inadequate. 6 Conscious intelligence alone can explain the highest 
1 Brightman, PR, 43. 
2 "We cannot but .endorse her (theistic philosophy's) view of Hartmann's 
recognition of the presence and evidence of mind as disclosed in 
the universe, while he attributes them to nothing higher than an 
intelligent and unconscious potentiality, as a contradictory and 
irrational position.n Lindsay, RATP, 273. 
3 "Our knowledge of the first cause, as all the great theologians have 
thought, is only analogical, and not ontological.n Janet, FC, 409. 
4 "But to the philosophy of theism it can be no great advance on a 
purely mechanical view of things if the intelligence from which 
we are sprung is so unconscious and unrelated to our life as neither 
to appoint its ends, nor impart its higher worth, nor lend supernal 
aid in the fulfilment of its imposed ends and aims." Lindsay, 
RATP, 274. 
5 There are, in fact, three modes of action in nature, -- mechanism, 
instinct, and thought. "Of these three modes only two are dis-
tinctly known to us, mechanism and intelligence. Instinct is the 
most obscure, most unexplained. vVhy, of the three modes of action 
of nature, should the most luminous commentary of the creative 
activity be precisely that of which nothing is understood? All 
since Descartes tends to suppress occult tendencies. Instinct is 
essentially an occult quality." Janet, FC, 349. Cf. Lindsay, 
RATP, 274. 
6 " ••• While it may be possible, setting out from mind, to account for 
mechanism it is impossible, setting out from mechanism to account 
for mind." Ward, ROE, 18. 
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( 
without an analysis and reduction that destroys it.1 Conscious intelli-
gence is the only one of the three also, that we know of, as a creative 
principle and not simply as an imitative or a reactive agent. 2 
Conscious purpose and conscious intelli@Snce is also the 
only concept that can adequately explain the nature of our own experience, 
and this, after all, is our "only possible starting point."3 As even 
Hartmann acknowledges, 
To me the Beyond of conscious thinking is uncon-
scious thinking; it is an unattainable Beyond, for 
consciousness cannot think unconsciously; if it 
thinks 'unconscious thinking,' it thinks its own 
conscious thought and yet supposes something else. 4 
In contrast to the difficulty that Hartmann encounters in attempting to ·I 
i 
make the unconscious primary, let us set an explanation oriented from 
consciousness: 
1 
2 
3 
4 
I 
"Thus the doctrine of the Nous, or of intentional finality, has no 
other meaning than this, that intelligence is the highest and most 
approximate cause we can conceive of a world of order. All other 
causes, chance, laws ~f nature, blind force, instinct, as symbolic II 
representations, are beneath the truth." Janet, FC, 385. 
Bowne states, "Thus reason finds no rest in the assumption that the 
infinite is determined by its states. We must, then, assume that 
the infinite determines its states, and that it is always, and at 
every point, what it determines itself to be. There is nothing 
dynamically deeper than this self-determination. It is first, 
not second. It grounds everything w1 thout being itself grounded. II 
Thus we escape the endless degrees of necessity. But, on the 
other hand, the abyss of arbitrariness yawns to engulf us. To 1 
escape this, we must assume that this self-determination is not in 1 
the dark of chance, but in the light of intelli@Snce, and hence, ·1 
that the self-determiner is personal and intelligent. Only in this I 
conception of the free person can thought be reconciled with itself, ' 
and a true explanation be reached." Bowne, MET, 163. 
Brightman, PR, 28. Cf. "Conscious purpose represents the future in 
the present, foresees, transcends time, and thus possesses proper-
ties that are clearly foreign to a principle of mechanism." Bright l 
man, ITP, 308. 1' 
Hartmann, PU, III:200. 
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If there is a subpersonal God, such a God would 
be unconscious, impersonal energy or structure or 
organization. Such a God would fail to explain the 
given facts of personal experience. On the other 
hand, to say that the real is super-personal, as 
certain writers do, is less clear, although moxa 
inclusive. It may mean, and. is usually said to mean, 
that there is a God who is personal and also moxa 
than a person. If this signifies only that the 
divine personality is immeasurably superior to the 
human, both quantitatively and qualitatively, the 
word "super-personal" is really but a contraction 
for "superhumanly personal, " and carries no meaning 
which is not implied in the usual theistic conception 
of the transcendence of God.l 
I 
I, 
'I 
lj 
ll 
ll I, 
lj 
'I 
I' II 
In view of the explanatory value of the concept of conscious purnose, it lj 
may seem strange that unconscious purpose has proved so popular. Let us, 1 
therefore, turn our attention now to some of the special difficulties 
that intensify the problem. 
1 Brightman, PR, 56 
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The Eleatic Stranger asks: 
But for heaven's sake, shall we 
let ourselves easily be persuaded 
that motion and life and soul and 
mind are really not present to 
absolute being, that it neither 
lives nor thinks, but awful and 
holy, devoid of mind, is fixed and 
immovable? 
Sophist, 248E, 249A 
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Chapter IV 
mE ARGUMENT FOR UNCONSCIOUS PURPOSE FROM rmE 
NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
**** 
* 
The Significa~ce of Consciousness 
Although the Gospel records are not agreed upon the physical 
nature of the resurrection of the resurrection story, they are all 
agreed that it was a conscious experience,l and that Jesus was aware 
of his disciples even as they were aware of him. No one would have been 
interested in the resurrection if it had been only a physical one. 
The peculiar fact about the higher, or conscious, levels 
of life is that they are a quest for such awareness, and in their supreme 
form awaken an eternal hunger. Hwnan progress is sometimes crowded into 
the epitome: "Man first thinks in order that he may eat: he later eats 
in order that he may think." But there is another degree more honored 
and elite: Wffe thinks in order that be may think better, and eats when 
the body protests overmuch."2 
Professor Brightman points out that "if we take ourselves as 
we are at any given moment, we find a flowing stream of experience 
(James's stream of consciousness, or the field of attention} which 
1 As Brightman says, 11 The immortal! ty of a soul apart from conscious-
ness would be worthless." Proceedings Sixth International Congress, 
(1930), p. 76. 
2 Or, succeeds in getting its distress signals understood. 
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Professor Donald C. Williams has called the given, and which is the 
same as Berkeley's conscious being or person.n1 We identify ourselves 
with this stream, and if there flows into it anything we see vaguely, 
as "through a glass darkly," we pounce- upon it, and wrestle like Jacob 
of old, until, if possible, we see it face to face. Life consists in 
this process. The possibilities in man's literary traditions from the 
past, properly seen, awaken a desire to realize their experiential truth 
in the enduring fabric of present consciousness; the legend of the Holy 
Grail becomes the Vision Splendid, and the two-edged sword of Peter 
becomes the dialectic of truth. The mystic quest is the attempt to 
bring into consciousness clearly what it believes might be there, 2 and 
the rational search is the attempt to bring into conscious awareness the 
necessary relations the reason thinks it can discover. 
Awareness not only seems desirable, but it is necessary for 
the highest experiences. As Professor R. B. Perry admits, "That there 
is no purpose without cognition may be taken for granted. Shall we then 
slur the difference •• ?" On the contrary, "One cannot expect to follow 
two closely interwoven strands until one has first clearly identified 
each of them ••• "3 He w:>ul.d surely agree, then, that "Subconscious 
thinking is of no importance to us whatever until its results emerge into 
consciousness and are tested by the waking reason of conscious daylight."4 
1 Personalist, 20 (1939), 133. 
2. See E-velyn Underhill's article on "Theology and the Subconscious," 
Hibbert Journal, 9 {1910-1911), 646. 
3 Perry, Journal of Philosophy, 18 (1921), 169. 
4 Brightman, Journal of the Philosophical Studies, 4 (1929), 502. 
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159 
==--------=== =::-c:c--_:_----------===---l+----==---==---_ 
"Reason itself 1 s a conscious process. "l 
** ** ** 
The Intermittent Nature of Consciousness 
But while we recognize the significance of awareness; admit 
the importance of a "unitary consciousness, "2 and identify the self "as 
the spiritually alive subject of consciousness,n3 or, as "an individual 
regarded as conscious of his own continuing identity and of his relation 
to the environment,"4 it seems palpably false to look upon the con-
sciousness or the self as being substantial. It seems too intermittent 
and fluctuating. 5 We instinctively turn to seek a more constant ground, 
a continuum, 6 and possibly return to the older idea of soul-substance, 
saying with Hans Driesch, "My soul is the unconscious foundation of my 
consciously having; thus, it is 'posited' in the service of order."7 
We have already criticized this point of view.s 
1 Brightman, ~ournal of the Philosophical Studies, 4 (1929), 502. 
2 Brightman, Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress, (1930), 
p. 75. 
3 Hodgson, Hibbert ~ournal, 20 (1921-1922), 771. 
4 Warren, DP, article, "Self." 
5 Cf. Cunningham, I.ARP, 136, "'We, our subject selves, are in truth 
much more to be compared to a rising and falling tide, which is 
continually covering wider areas as it deepens, and dropping back 
to narrower and shallower ones as it ebbs, than to the isolated 
pillars with their fixed circumferences, as which we have been 
taught to think of ourselves.'" See Bosanquet, Principle of 
Individuality and Value, p. 372. 
6 See in this dissertation, Chapter III. 
7 CP, 73. 
8 See Brightman, FC, 102, " If the rest of the universe contains 
God, then brain may be the instrument of God." 
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In lieu of the soul, we may seek to provide consciousness 
with a more durable basis in the brain and the xest of the body, 
remembering that "consciousness depends upon the brain. n1 However, this 
is only an incomplete truth. Not only do "no facts about brain consti-
tute evidence against the reality of consciousness,"2 but also no facts 
about brain can adequately explain the nature of mind and the uniqueness 
of consciousness. While the intermittent nature of consciousness is a 
fact we ought not to overlook and would not care to deny, we should 
not stress it overmuch. Rather, we should look more carefully at the 
nature of consciousness, and the self-conscious spirit. 
In consciousness we find not only "simple awareness," 
but we find an abiding center3 which we call the self. As Professor 
G. w. Cunningnam puts it, "the content (of individual experience) always 
has a center of reference, apart from which it is an abstraction."4 
This self is characterized simply by its persistence or self-identity, 
its individuality, or uniqueness, 5 and its time transcendence.G There 
1 Brightman, Personalist, 20 (1939), 133. Cf. Hodgson, Hibbert Journal, 
20 (1921-1922), 772. 
2 Ibid. 
3 See Broad, MPN, 558; cf. Bergson's treatment of the "two aspects", 
in Time and Free Will, trans. by Pogson, pp. 137-140. 
4 Cf. Calkins, American Journal of Psychology, 26 (1915), 496, "The 
characters of the experienced self on which the self-psychologists 
lay their emphasis are, first, its persistance or self-identity; 
second, its individuality or uniqueness; third, the fact that it 
is fundamental or basal to its experiences; and finally, the fact 
that it is related to its environment, social and physical." Cf. 
·also her First Book of Psychology. 
5 Calkins, "Reply to Criticisms," Psychological Review, 25 (1918), 169. 
6 "In personality, or in the self-conscious &pirit, we find the only 
union of change and permanence, or of identity and diversity." 
Bo1(Ile, MET, 97. 
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has been considerable confusion over the terminology of the self. As 
the time-transcendent, or abiding, center, it of 'course, oould not be 
a "perceived fact," "a content," or a "psychological state.'' This 
would be to make it fragmentary and momentary.1 "It is always a unitary 
affair2 in which the past, the present, and even the future are felt to 
3 hang together in an intimate personal way," and as Professor Brightman 
remarks, "If memory were utterly to fail, I should be reduced to a mere 
datum which would be constantly changing, yet having no unity and no 
sense."4 
· The self, however, does not remain upon this level. It 
leads on to the experience of ideal values and becomes a person. 5 Con-
sciousness contributes different factors to the self in order to accom-
p.}.ish this. According to Dr. w. L. Northridge, 
" ••• 
consciousness does 
more than rationalize. It reasons and .feels and wills and can do so 
independently of the influences and motives of the unconscious."6 And 
Hans Driesch also stresses, "••• we must never forget that a perception 
is also a feeling and a thought."7 Above all, it contributes the mind 
1 Calkins, Psychological Review, 25 (1918), 169. 
2 Stratton, refers to it as "the personal system within which any 
particular mental event~ occur. It bears the same relation to 
the particular mental facts of my mind that nature does to the 
events of the physical world." (:Experimental Psychology and . its 
Bearing upon Culture, 300f.) This is clearer if one defines 
"nature" with Hocking as the explanation of everything by one 
series of causal laws. See Moore and Gurnee, FP, 86; and Hocking, 
Types of Philosophy. 
3 Calkins, American Journal of Psychology, 26 (1915), 519. 
4 Brightman, POI, 19. 
5 See_ Brightman, Personalist, 20 ( 1939) , 137. 
6 Ml'U, 179. 
7 CPt 23. 
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which Professor Brightman analyzes as follows: 
Every mind contains principles which drive it beyond 
its present self. Time is one such principle, 
through which one part of the mind sinks into the 
past, and a new part grows into the future. Desire 
and purpose are other such principles which impel 
the mind to explore itself and its world. Logical 
reasoning also is implied by the nature of every 
present moment of mind, and reason drives mind from 
the mere datum to the conception of a whole-mind and 
a whole world. But there is another principle which 
involves time, purpose, and reason, yet aids an im-
portant new function, namely, the memory. 
While, we must remember, therefore, that any human mind has an environ-
ment consisting of (1) biological; (2) physical; (3} social; (4) subcon-
scious; (5) logical and ideal; and (6} metaphysical factors2 conscious-
ness as such is not so fragile and intermittent as it seems. The 
conscious life of the individual is a unity of experience which is 
only added to by itself and retained in itself. Like the individual who 
necessarily operates the evolutionary "omnibus" in which all his ancestors 
ride, so we bear in our present consciousness the sum total of our past 
psychical experience. If we cannot quite say with Hans Driesch, 
•••• In the now I always have implicitly my whole 
former psychical life. There is not a temporal 
continuity in my 'having', ••• but there is a con-
tinuity or penetration §f contents. This is what 
Bergson calls duree ••• 
we can at least, by reasoned inquiry into our memory linkages, recover 
the past in a given present. 4 It is difficult to see how any non-
conscious substance or princip:J.e wuld ever accomplish this. Consequently 
1 Brightman, POI, 19. 
2 Ibid.' 25. 
3 CP, 26. Cf. Broad, l~N, 657. 
4 See Brightman, .rournal of the Philosophical StuHes, 4 ( 1929), 501. 
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even if we were to fail to replace the metaphysic of unconscious purpose 
with a conscious one, we would be unable to deny the fact of conscious 
purpose among men. We could only hold "that the only conscious and 
purposeful beings are finite minds such as our own."1 
Before we stop here, however, in the light of our discussion 
let us consider whether we can extend the concept of conscious purpose, 
selfhood, and personality to the Absolute. 
** ** ** 
The Idea of the Absolute 
The concept of the Absolute 2 is not to be confused with the 
idea of God, for these two often have had widely opposed meanings. 3 
The idea of God centers around the idea of the Good, but the Absolute4 
1 Sorley, MVIG, 355. 
2 c. c. J. Webb suggests that the Absolute would never have been called 
God "had not Philosophy entered from the first into the field al-
ready occupied by Religion." Supplement to the Aristotelian 
Society, 4 (1921-1922}, 237. 
3 Between these, H. P. VanDusen recalls and recommends Hocking's 
4 
principle of alternation: "The God of personal fellowship is also 
the God of the universe of the immensities and the eternities. He 
who is 'closer than breathing, nearer than hands and feet', is also 
the Wholly Other, One whom no human concepts can portray and no 
human reach grasp. It is impossible to hold both ideas in one's 
mind at the same time, and that is not necessary; but both are true. 
In the fullest religious experience, one's thought moves constantly 
between these two poles by a process of alternation." PMSG, 131. 
Cf. Brightman, "The principle of tension and opposition in God serve 
to shed some light on the future of belief in God. One ~neration 
will emphasize unity, another plurality; one transcendence and 
another immanence; one personality and another impersonality. ••• 
the human mind is too small to take in the whole of God at once." 
FC, 94. 
James Ward criticized "Professor Royce in fact, like only too many 
theists, is guilty of that vacillation between God (see next page) 
-----=--------~=l 
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is simply the "ultimate self~contained and all-inclusive system.nl 
For some men like Sirs. Radhakrishnan, 2 the Absolute is a postulate 
from religious experience; but in most western thought it has been 
more of a rational principle, a "concrete Begriff" by which the origin 
of the many and their continuing interaction are made possible, 3 
through an all-inclusive One. 
Although the ter.m itself has only come into common use in 
modern times, it represents the continuing goal of the metaphysical 
quest, which has always been for "the real, the abiding, the absolute, n 4 
and the ter.m has been used in a confusing way as it has been developed 
in a number of differing systems. Dean A. C. Knudson has distinguished 
three characteristic "views or types of thought with reference to the 
Absolute:n5 the agnostic, the logical or pantheistic, and the causal. 
The first interprets the Absolute as the Unknowable, or unrelated. As 
such it has no interpretative value and is indeed a caput mortuum. The 
second interprets the Absolute as "the 'unlimited', 6 and hence regards 
and the Absolute which Mr. Bradley we found quaintly comparing to 
the futile attempts of a dog to follow two masters. The Absolute 
must be in every respect all-inclusive, but God, if his creatures 
are free, is so far not all-inclusive." Ward, ROE, 313. 
1 Cunningham, IARP, 140. 
2 "'In the highest spiritual experience,' writes SirS. Radhakrishnan, 
'we have the sense of rest and fulfilment, of eternity and complete-
ness. These needs provoked, from the beginning of human reflection, 
conceptions of the Absolute as pure and passionless being which 
transcends the restless tur.moil of cosmic life." Q.uoted by Luard, 
from Radhakrishnan's Idealist View of Life, 342. Hibbert Journal, 
36 (1937-1938}, 344. 
3 See Knudson, Philosophy of Personalism, 197ft. 
4 Knudson, Doctrine of God, 242. 
5 Ibid. , 244. 
6 Cf. Mansel's The Philosophy of the Conditioned, dealing with Sir 
William Hamilton's Philosophy and J. S. Mill's criticism of it. 
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it as applicable only to a Being that embraces the entire universe, a 
Being that cannot be identified with personality or any definite mode 
1 
of existence." The third views it as the 'independent' or 'self-
existent', and capable of being the "independent and self-existent cause 
or gxound of a dependent world."2 
** ** ** 
The Argument that the Absolute cannot be a Self 
Those who adopt the second use of the Absolute feel that they 
must deny selfhood to it because the Absolute cannot comply with the 
conditions of consciousness. As H. L. Mansel explains, "All conscious-
ness must in the first instance present itself as a relation between 
constituent parts, the person who is conscious, and the thing, whatever 
it may be, of which he is conscious. This contrast has been indicated 
• • • in the distinction most convenient for philosophy ••• between ••• 
the ego and the non-ego. n 3 Obviously then, since the Absolute is 
absolute, there can be no other, since "the self implies, and has no 
existence apart from, a non-self, and it is only in the contrast with the 
4 
not-self that it is aware of itself as a self." Thus, too, if the 
self "is essentially a thing of development, and as such has its being 
1 Knudson, DG, 245. 
2 Ibid., 245. Cf. ERE, 1:4la. Cf. Spinoza's reference to it as the 
"causa sui, cuius essentia involvit existentiam." Eisler, w8rter-
buch der philosophischen Begriffe, p. 4. 
3 Mansel, ~· cit., 5. 
4 Taylor, EM, 336; cf. Calkins, PPP, 328, who interprets Fichte's 
Impersonal Absolute as simply a "not-self." 
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in the time process"1 the absolute is certainly not a self. 
But while the Absolute could not know itself as we know 
ourselves -- 1·~· seeing ourselves in contrast to our equals and our 
superiors- the Absolute could still have internal awareness of itself, 
or of the world which it creates. Leibniz pictured God as selecting 
this world as best from the "possible worlds." This concept, suggesting 
"Only possible" worlds, implies that even the Absolute works within the 
limitation of possibility. But the idea that He does not have even this 
selection is even a greater limitation and contradiction. The argument 
that the Absolute cannot be a self because it cannot be conscious of 
itself as reflected in an equal, seems of dubious value. 
On the other hand, it may be argued that if the Absolute's 
awareness is likened to our awareness, not in regard to other persons, 
but in regard to things, His consciousness must be other than our 
consciousness; hence, superior and Unknowable. There is, however, no 
necessity in this. My consciousness of a cup, a cat, or a painting is 
the same. I discern no difference in the awareness, but in the value 
placed upon and the meaning ascribed to the events I find in consciousness 
Surely the Absolute has an appreciation of values which we cannot approach 
1 Taylor, EM, 340f. 
* *** * 
* 
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The Argument that the Absolute cannot be a Person1 
If we attribute an appreciation of values, however, to the 
Absolute, He becomes not simply a self but a person, 2 and here 
objections again arise. A person is a more self-contained and self-
controlled individual than a self, and Hartmann conceives personality 
as separating one self from another. In his Religion of the Future, 
he speaks of the problemt 
••• In other words, how to get a Monotheism of 
which the Deity is not separated by his personality 
from Man, and a Pantheism which is not corrupted by 
any Polytheism.3 
1 "'The spirit - the active thing - that which is soul, and God - is 
the Will alone. The ideas are effects~ impotent things.' Thus 
the person is not, indeed a scholastic soul, but also not the 
unitary whole of consciousness; it is the volitional and intel-
lectual aspect of consciousness." Brightman, Personalist, 20, 
( 1939)' 131. 
2 It will be noted that Hume (Human Nature, II, pt. 2, par. 1, p. 331) 
refers to "Person or thinking being." For a good discussion of 
the historical use and meaning of the term "person", see Thorburn, 
"What is a Person?" Mind, 26 ( 1918}, 29lff. 
We use the ter.m here in-rhe spiritual sense, not the corporeal. See 
Knudson, DG, 293f. Cf. PP, 196, "The post-Kantian ideqlists -
F1chte, Schelling, Schopenhauer, and Hegel -marked an advance 
beyond Bpinoza in that they overcame the implicit dualism of his 
system .by rejecting the attribute of extension and also in that 
they sought to prove the reality of an absolute and unitary Being. 
Insofar as they conceived of this Being as constituted by pure 
thought or will they attained to both a qualitative and numerical 
monism. But insofar as they represented the absolute thought or 
will or self as non-mental or non-personal, and as completely 
transcendental in character; they approached the through-going 
pantheism of Spinoza with its barren abstractions and its denial 
of reality to the finite individual." 
3 Hartmann, RM, 148-149. He continues, "For such a vicarious relation 
between a man on one side and God on the other, it is especially 
needful to clothe the divine spirit with human peculiarities of 
disposition which alone create a character-relation between two 
persons, and especially to shape a conception (see next page) 
16? 
In his Religious Metaphysics, he states: 
The religious motive in this is that the theistic 
religious consciousness divides the unitary divine-
human functions of grace and faith into two functions, 
and now strives to build up the destroyed religious 
relation upon the analogy of the relation between two 
human personalities instead of upon a real unity 
between God and man. 
Hartmann indeed point.s out a danger here, but he also overlooks a greater 
value. Consciousness of values brings persons together even as the 
selection of contrary values separates them. And if our values be not 
the Absolute's values, it were better that we should be so separated. 
To speak of the Absolute as a Person has seemed to many 
to limit the infinite. However, as Bowne says, this objection "dis-
appears when we remember that the personality of the infinite means only 
that the infinite has knowledge of itself and its activities and deter-
mines itself accordingly.n2 Or, as Professor Brightman states it, 
"To say that God is personal means that He is a conscious Being, a 
unitary Spirit, who knows and wills and feels forever, with unfailing 
memory, reason, and purpose. n3 
Viewed in this way, all the processes of the universe become 
forms of the conscious purpose; evolution is the striving of God himself; 
and every material thing as well as every person has some place in that 
person. 4 This all seems a consistent and meaningful interpretation; 
of it after the analogy of human personality, whereby then, natur-
ally, the definition of consciousness and self-consciousness are 
supplied." cr. PU, II:253. 
1 Hartmann, RF, 10?. Cf. Lindsay, RATP, 277. 
2 Bowne, MET, 164. 
3 Brightman, PR, 55. Cf. Calkins, PPP, 330. 
4 Brightman, IGP, 15. 
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embodies more reasonably than any other hypothesis "the facts of uncon-
scious purpose and of mechanism; "l and is capable of accounting for 
"(1) the fact of reason; (2) the necessity of eternal being; (3) the 
fact of conscious personality; (4) the· emergence of novelty; (5) the 
existence of values and evils; and (6) religious experience."2 
In response, the advocates of unconscious purpose would 
reply, "It is just because of this nature of the self as conscious 
personality that I hesitate to ascribe it to that Absolute which stands 
supreme over the phenomenal world of our experience. n As Professor 
Taylor says, 
The self, again, is one and individual, just insofar 
as these interests and purposes can be thought of as 
the expression, in the detail of succession, of a 
coherent interest or purpose. Where this central 
interest appears not to exist at all, we have no 
logical right to speak of a succession o~ purposive 
acts as the expression of a single self. 
It is true that the world is teleological, but the world is also dys-
teleological. Its events imply, rather, that God is finite as Hume's 
Cleanthes once proposed, and as JOhn Stuart 1tlll, Professor E. s. 
Brightman, and others have advocated in more recent times. Or else, 
they imply at least two selves behind the causal series, engaged in an 
eternal conflict like a Manichaean dualism. Or, again, they imply an 
unconscious purpose which can create and destroy - like an unconscionable 
devil -without being worried thereby. 
l Brightman, IT!:\ 309. 
2 Bri gb. tman, FC, 100. 
3 Taylor, EM, 335. 
169 
A priori: 
"Is there evil and I did not 
create it? 
Cf. Isa. 45:7 
A posteriori: 
"Shall not the Judge of all the 
earth Himself do right? 
Of. Gen. 18:25 
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Chapter V 
UNCONSCIOUS PURPOSE AND THE PRDBLEM OF EVIL 
**** 
* 
The Contribution of Unconscious 
Purpose to l?hilosophy 
We have no desire -to deny the real contributions the concept 
of unconscious purpose has made to philosophy. John Stuart Mill once 
I 
I 
·I 
I 
jl 
wrote that "'Ihere could be no real belief in one Creator and Governor 
until mankind had begun to see in the apparently confused phenomena which 11 
surrounded them, a system capable of being viewed as the possible working 
1 
out of a single plan." The theory of unconscious purpose has helped 
make this possible. It owes a large share of its popularity in modern 
thought to its frank recognition of, and its persistent quest for, 
te leological elements in the phenomenal order. This same quest and 
recognition also constitute the great contribution the theory has made 
to contemporary philosophy. 
Inasmuch as the idea of unconscious purpose did not imply a 
morally rigorous metaphysic such as theism, and since the problem of the 
nature and origin of purpose was frequently abstracted from completely, 
the theory encouraged many thinkers to amass evidences of purpose 
wherever they cou ld find them. Non-theists joined with theists in 
1 Mill, ~ER , 131. Cf. this dissertation, p. 81, note 4. 
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[' developing the role which purpose plays in the cosmic order, and the 
concept was particularly developed in three fields.l 
4 _- -----= 
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Schopenhauer, Hartmann, and others laid chief 1tress upon the 
rele of purpose in the behavior of organisms. Schopenhauer made the 
form or nature of the organism dependent upon the will, and attempted I, 
t o discover a type of instinctive purpose ranging from the inorganic I 
1 to the spiritual realm. It did not matter particularly if it was the 
I 
j purpose of one organism to destroy another organism that also purposed: 
11 such stri fe simply illustrated the irony of the Vlorld-Ground. Hart1mnn 
11. , in tum, sought to trace purposive behavior throughout being. Going 
beyond Schopenhauer in adding representation to volition, he labored 
voluminously to establish the fact of an unconscious purpose. The pages 
of his Philosophie des Unbevrusste~, as we have shown, 2 are filled with 
illustrations taken from varied sources. 
Other philosophers lai d stress upon the role of purpose in 
the purposive, integrated adaptation of the organism itself in the 
newer teleology. Kant prepared the way for this recognition with his 
theory of internal finality, and Hegel continued the Kantian view, in 
a somewhat varied form, with his doctrine of immanent finality. Professor ~ 
L. J. Henderson, more recently, extended the view of adaptation more 
broadly with his study of the Fitness of the Environment.3 
1 
2 
3 
Still other philosophers stressed, not only purpose 
The fields selected are chosen arbitrarily, and are not to be con-
sidered as being mutually exclusive of one another. 
See this dissertation, p . 78; also 140. 
One might adapt Bowne's phrase and say, "the preparation for the 
fit." 
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and purpose in the structural nature of organisms, the realization of 
organic functions, and the adaptation of the environment to life; but 
also the presence of dynamic purpose1 in the total development of the 
evolutionary process. Henri Bergson, Hans Driesch, and Lloyd Morgan 
were among the first to recognize a dynamic purposiveness in the upward 
drive of creative and emergent evolution.2 Others soon fol lowed their 
lead and supplemented their arguments. 'Ihus, Albert P. Matthews came 
to speak of evolution as psychotropic; and pictured it as a tree of life 
growing out of the world-ground, but dominated by a psychic impulse 
toward consciousness, intelligence, and freedom. ~ In a similar, but 
more complete treatment, 4 Edmund Noble has postulated God and an all-
pervading purpose working through the series and directing the evolution. 
In addition to the evidence from these three fields, the 
increase in scientific knowledge of macrocosm and microcosm; the appre-
ciation of the apparently infinite intricacy of cosmological structure, 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Our three fields suggest roughly the descriptive teleology, static 
teleology, and dynamic teleology of Professor Hans Driesch. Driesch 
uses the term "descriptive teleologY" to designate the simple 
existence of purposiveness . He applies the term "static teleolo~ 
to that which is characterized by an unanalyzable autonomy. 
Professor Brightman calls attention to Bergson ' s famous comparison 
of the eye of the vertebrate with the eye of a common pecten, or 
scallop, to show that evolutionary descent is not sufficient to ex-
plain common development. " The eye of the scallop and the eye of 
man contain the same essential parts with analogous* elements; 
yet this fact cannot be explained by the line of evolutionary 
descent, for eyes of this type were developed, as all biologists 
agree, long after the separation of mollusks and vertebrates from 
their common parent stem. ITP, 282. ( * This really should be 
homologous, not analogous.) 
"The Road of Evolution," Yale Review, January, 1922. 
In his book, Purposive EVolution, N. Y.: Henry Holt and Company, 
1926. I 
-t 
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amid the empirical fact of the most delicate and continuing interaction; 
in short, the mind-like character of being, has made the theories of 
chance and mechanism seem outmoded, and turned men toward some theory 
of reality that can account for both pur pose and intelligibility. 
The theory of unconscious purpose, through the evidence 
collected by its advocates and its friendly associates, and aided more 
incidentally by scientists, was thus a valuable factor in developing a 
non-mechanistic view of the universe. Its evidence, however, was 
"grist -to the mills" of theism and unconscious purpose alike . 
** ** ** 
The Contrasting Fact or Evil 
Vfuile the evidence brought together by the advocates of 
unconscious purpose, by theists, and by scientists, inclined men to view 
the world as having an inte lligent cause and directing power, it did 
not indicate in a comparable degree that the world-ground is also good. 
In f act, the same studies that persuaded man to view his world as 
purposive and intelligible, developed more clearly the fact of the 
presence of evil in the world. Schopenhauer saw clearly that the in-
stinctive purposes in plants and animals often prompt one species to prey 
upon another. The biological sciences showed that internal final i ty 
is encumbered with useless appendages, rudimentary organs, and hurtful 
adaptations. 1 The study of evolution, in turn, revealed a nature 
1 ~anet discusses these at length in his FC, 146-171. 
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riddled with pain and strife. 
Even before John Stuart Mill's famous indictment of nature , 1 
David Hume put the charge into the mouth of his spokesman, Philo: 
Besides, consider Demea ; this very society, by 
which we surmount those wild beasts, out natural 
enemies; what new enemies does it not raise to us? 
What woe and misery does i t not occasion? Man 
is the greatest enemy of man. Oppression, injustice, 
contempt, contumely, violence, sedition, war , calumny, 
treachery, fraud; by these they mutually torment 
each other; and they would soon dissolve that 
society which they had formed, were it not for the 
dread of still greater ills, which must attend 
their separation.2 
In a similar way, a contemporary philosopher has written recently: 
How would history appear if writ ten, not from the 
standpoint of Jews, but of Canaanites ; not of 
Greeks*, but of Carthaginians; not of American 
white men, but of the Indians? Countless noble 
races and worthy movements have been crushed in 
human history -- can we call this teleological? 
And what of earthquakes, pestilences, famines, and 
wars? And think of all the misery and suffering 
we see in the world today among good and innocent 
people! How many a youth or maiden, dear to parents, 
friends, and lover, has died prematurely% How many 
a father lost to his young family when most they 
needed his protection and support !3 
The facts of experience thus reveal a world marked by dystel eology as 
well as by teleology; by evil as well as good. Though it would be 
possible to explain the good in t he world by posi t ing a conscious agent, 
the evil cannot be explained i n the same way. 
1 
2 
3 
* 
See this dissertation, p. 81; note 4. 
Hume, Treatise on Human Nature, and Dialogues Concerning Natural 
Religion. London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1890. lOth part. 
Wright, Student's Phi losophy of Religion, New York: Macmillan, 
(1922) 1937, p. 33lt. 
Professor Wright should replace the Greeks with the Romans in order 
to maintain his parallelism. 
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Why then is there any miser y at all in the world? 
Not by chance, surely. From some cause then. Is 
it from the intenti on o:f the Deity? But he is 
perfectly benevolent. Is it contrary to his inten-
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
II I 
I 
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tion? But he is almighty.l 
** ** ** 
Theistic Solutions to the Problem of Evil 
Ever s ince Abraham asked his historic question, 2 theism has 
had t o struggle with the problem of evil. As Dean A. C. Knudson 
phrases it, "He that :formed the capacity for righteousness, shall he 
not himsel:f be righteous?"3 
"The evils of life. dysteleological facts, are the most 
serious obstacle to faith in God."4 Traditional theism, holding that 
God created the ground as well as the nature of being, 5 ultimately finds 
God responsible for both physical and moral evil despite its attempts 
at theodicy. Hence, it endeavors to show that evil is not really evil. 
It does this by arguing (a} that partial evil is universal good; (b) 
that evil is necessary to distinguish the good; or (c) that evil is 
necessary for the moral development of men. The first argument fails to 
allow for the evilness of evil: 6 evil is not simply the absence of the 
1 Hume, £E.. ill.. , sec. 442. 
2 Genesis 18:25. 
3 DG, 355. 
4 Brightman, ITP, 332. 
5 Thus, "We find Schopenhauer saying: - ' Even if Leibniz's demonstra-
tion, that among the best possible ~orlds this one i s the best, were 
correct; yet, still it would not amount to a theodicy. For in 
t ruth the Creator is the author not merely of the world but of 
possibility too." Ward, ROE, 352. 
6 As John Laird says, "Vlliat is more, Borgia's (see next page) 
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good but that which is antagonistic to the good. The second and third 
arguments claim that evi l has only instrumental value. But in holding 
that an appreciation of the good can only arise through contrast to the · 
evil; also, in holding that God can only create moral personality 
through the struggle with evil, one limits God to necessity on the one 
hand, and dismisses the reality of evil on the other. The real serious-
ness of the problem is compromised: evil is not simply contrast or 
opposition. Under these circumstances one is f orced to treat evil as 
essentially an illusion, or else qualify either the goodness or omni-
potence of God. Consequently, some prefer to take a tentative position 
that might be called "ethical agnosticism." This is the position 
suggested by Dean Knudson, who writes: 
There is, in my opinion , a more excellent way, and 
that is frankly to recognize the limitations of 
human knowledge when it comes to evaluating the 
varied experiences of life, and to hold that if we 
knew all, as God does , the unideal aspects of the 
world would not seem so entirely out of harra.ony with 
an absolute and holy love as they now do. nl 
In criticism of such treatments of the problem of evil, many 
thinkers have frankly faced the contradictory nature of the evidence , 
and argued that God is finite . "The same univer:se brings forth so much 
pure goodness and so much vile evil,"2 because God, who is good, is not 
omnipotent . This theory reaches back i n various forms across many 
wickedness was Borgia's affair, and not the work of the universe. 
The qualities of the whole need not be the qualities of the parts; 
and many of the parts may be very bad indeed even _if the whole is 
good. Realists, therefore, may logically accept the facts which 
they find without referring to the whole which they do not know; •• " 
Laird, SR, 146. 
1 DG, 366 . 
2 Brightman, PG, 97. 
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actively in modern centurie:s. It has been advanced and supported most 
philosophy by David Hume, 1 JOhn Stuart Mill, William James, and Dean 
Hastings Rashdall. It represents the present position of Professors 
E. s. Brightman, w. P. Montague, H. A. OVerstreet, R. A. Tsanoff, and 
others . 
Professor Brightman has developed the view most systematically 
on a monistic basis in his two books, The Problem of God,2 and, The 
Finding of God. 3 According to his view• God i s a person supremely 
conscious, supremely valuable, and supremely creative. He is the sole 
creator of all things and there is nothing external to Him save as He 
wills i ts creation. However, " the eternal nature of God contains a 
principle of delay and suffering vnthin itself. "4 There is within 
Him, in addition to his reason and his active, creative will, a passive 
element which enters into every one of His conscious states, as sensa-
tion, instinct, and impulse enter the conscious experience of men. This 
element, which is c~lled the "Given" has five chief characteristics. It 
is conscious and not a mysterious entity. It is complex as it stands 
for the entire uncreated and external nature of God. It is eternal in 
that it has been co-existensive with God and probably will never be 
wholly eradicated. It is i nternal in the sense that God is the sou rce 
of everything. And it is cont rolled5 in the sense that law and reason 
1 Hume suggested the theory in his Dialogues on Natural Religion, but 
he did not defend the idea. 
2 N. Y.: Abingdon Press, 1930. 
3 N. Y.: Abingdon Press, 1931. 
4 Brightman, PG, 84. 
5 Brightman, FG, 174-175. lj I 
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and purpose are supreme in this universe.l 
Separate from the "Given" is the divine will which is wholly 
good and creative. The will is in a continual struggle with the "Given" 
in the attempt to create and still control. Out of this struggle the 
world is created. 2 The will is the active element i n God, and the 
element in which man is especially interested. Alt hough it is perfectly 
good, its work upon the "Given" is never perfectly done. 3 God's 
goodness, therefore, is not perfection, but infinite perfectibility.4 
Likewise, although the will does not change, its action upon the ''Give n" 
produces change so that time enters into the very being of God,5 and He 
becomes the "dynamic" God of Evolution. 
In a dialectical way6 Professor Brightman projects back into 
God the ' dark aspect ' of Jakob B8hme ' s7 thought, and remains more 
faithful to the spirit of B8hme than some of B8hme ' s successors. He 
interprets the dialectic as subject to the ' control ' of the conscious 
purpose of God, as he derives the teleological and the good from the 
will of God, and attributes the dysteleological, or evil, to the "Given." 
In this way Professor Brightman seeks to provide a satisfactory basis 
for purpose, consciousness, and values without denying any of the 
empirical evidence. II 
The theory of a finite God, particularly as Professor Brightman 1 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
? 
Brightman, FG, 90. 
Brightman, PG, 123. 
Brightman, FG, 1?6. 
Ibid., 182f. 
Brightman, BG, 129. 
Ibid., 137. 
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develops it, preserves the goodness of God without sacrificing the 
dependableness of the universe . Many theists, however, t~ke exception 
to any view of a finite God because they consider it to be fundamentally 
dualistic and inadequate for religious puxposes. They prefer the philo-
sophical absolute that was developed by Christian theologians after the 
initial work of the Christian mission had been accomplished. 
** ** ** 
Unconscious Purpose as a Solution 
The advocates of unconscious purpose , as we have attempted to 
show in our historical study, have been deeply impressed with the 
difficul ties in the problem of evil. Earnestly they have endeavored to 
provide a metaphysical ground tha t would allow for evolutionary develop-
ment; account for the cosmic harmony which underlies extensive inter-
action; explain the mind-like quality of existence; and allow for the 
late emergence of consciousness ; yet, "escape from making the metaphysical 
ground into a conscious agent, intentionally responsible for the cruel 
antagonism in the evolutionary series, and the continual destruction of 
conscious values in death."l 
In contrast to the theists, the advocates of unconscious 
purpose think they escape the difficulties with which theism has to 
wrestle. They would be loyal to the inductive method and simply follow 
the empirical quest. They posit pur~se, but not consciousness; hence, 
1 See this dissertation, p. 93 • 
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their unconscious ground cannot be troubled by the fact of evil. 
Yet, this argument_ is not so simple as it seems. On critical 
reflection, it will be seen that it faces grave difficulties , even if one 
1
1 
does disregard the moral problem. I f metaphysics really gives us "the 
causal ground of the phenomenal world,"1 it should be possible to show 
an intelligible relation between the phenomenal and the noumenal. It 
is difficult to do this in unconscious purpose by either the evolutionary 
or the creation theories. 
Vfuen one considers the pain-v~acked process of evolution, the 
blind alleys where the life principle dies out in prehistoric pterodactyls 
and dinosaurs; the desertion of one forn1 for anQther when adaptation 
fails as in the Bryophyta; the overdevelopment of the human brain size; 
the development of organs which later become vestigial and even endanger 
the health of the bearer, it is easy· to think of the process as uncon-
scious or blind. But when one considers the continuous progress, per-
sistent if not steady; the presence of innovation; not simply duplication; 
the ability for self-maintenance in the newly emergent levels; above all 
the production of consciousness and reflective thought, it is not easy 
to think of so continuous a process arising from the unconscious if that 
unconscious be less than conscious and has not the capacity for the 
time-transcendence we experience in consciousness a1one.2 
1 
2 
Knudson, The Philosophy of Personalism (PP), 1?4. 
Laird comments graphically, ttThe doctrine of evolution has conquered 
biology so thoroughly that biologists can afford to be critical 
of it . Psychologists, on the other hand, write as if they were 
thrilled with the novelty of the notion, and as if they were bound 
to accept it with the faith of a little child. Ar.med with this 
confidence the seize the flail of evolution, (see next page} 
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On the other hand, if we leave the theory of emergence, or 
epigenesis , and take the theory of evolution literally as an "unfolding" 
we confront the difficulty of preformation. This holds that the entire 
J! 
evolutionary series is given in th e beginning, in the metaphysical ground, ' 
If the ground is unconscious and unfolds automatically, this threatens 
to return us to the position of mechanism, which the theory of unconscioul l 
purpose disavows and denounces. 
If , to escape from mechanism, we endow unconscious purpose with 1/ 
an independent, creative impulse, we are at a loss to account for its j 
creation of the present world. 1 It it be truly purposive and creates 1] 
a world in which the dysteleological abides with the teleological , its 
purpose must transcend time both to be realized and to be actualized. 
So far as our experienced is concerned, this is inconceivable outside 
of consciousness, unless we consider the element behind the teleological 
and the element behind the dysteleological factors to be mechanical 
forces. In this case we have returned to mechanism, and increased the 
problem with an inexplicable dualism. 
In this way, the theory of unconscious pur pose encounters 
unexpected difficulties . While it may avoid the moral problem in the 
metaphysical ground, it fails to account satisfactorily for the cont:c~s.-
dictory elements which constitute for theism the problem of evil, 
demolish the cobwebs of theology, stifle philosophy in the filmy 
ruins, and then, with the lust for destruction hot within them, 
turn and belabour consciousness itself. The mind of a man may 
seem very wonderful indeed, but look you, it has t he pedigree of 
the ape . And a man's ancestry i s the stuff of him. " SR, 151. 
1 See this dissertation, p. 80f. 
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But let us turn now and see if the concept of unconscious 
purpose can satisfactorily account for the value aspects of experience. 
1 It will be noted that in this phase of the problem, the origin of 
the moral consciousness of man remains a problem unexplained also . 
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"I know, 0 Arguna! the 
things which have been, 
those which are, and 
those which are to be ." 
Bhagavadgita 
VIII:76 
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Chapter VI 
'!HE .ADEQ.UA.CY OF UNCONSCIOUS PIJRPOSE m THE 
REALIZATION AND THE COR=>ERVATION 
OF VALUES 
**** 
* 
The Meaning of Adequacy 
It seems impossible to separate the concept of the higher 
values from consciousness.l Recognizing that unconscious purpose has 
difficulty in explaining the problem of evil, let us consider whether or 
not it can satisfactorily account for the realization, appreciation, and 
the conservation of values. 
The law of sufficient reason has been much abused in the 
history of philosophy; hence, it was subjected to a much-needed discipline 
by criticism and the secularized use of Occam's Law of Parsimony. Under 
the influence of the idea of development, it was gradually set aside suf-
ficiently to enable one to entertain the idea of deriving the greater 
from the smaller and the more complex from the simple. Accordingly, it 
became quite satisfactory to many people to explain the universe in terms 
arrived at by analysis; and to interpret the higher by analogies drawn 
the lower aspects of existence. 
l Sorley says, "The whole question of the existence of values in sub-
human life must, therefore, be left without exact determination. 
They are on the line of potentiality, or of approximation, rather 
than of actual settlement." MVIG, 126. 
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In this respect, however, thought has been influenced too much 
by the abstracting methods of the specialized sciences. If we are to 
hold to a metaphysic at all, we must hold to one that is adequate to 
explain the whole world of experience, and not simply selective phases 
of it. The causal ground must be sufficient to give a reasonable account 
·I 
'I 
1 .. 
I 
I 
of the development and conservation of the higher valiuteissofforliftehi'sanredason /,II 
the consciousness through which they are realized. 
that many thinkers would approach the study of metaphysics from the 
highest and most concrete aspects of human experience, and not from the 
lower and more abstract forms of the same.1 
The Logic of Unconscious Pur,pose. 
The cause, then, must be adequate to explain the effect. This 
implies the law of sufficient reason which though valuable may all~w 
too great an increase in distribution and must be subjected to Occam's 
Law of Parsimony. The advocates of unconscious purpose attempt to do 
this, but they fall into difficulty. They argue that phenomenal purpose 
I 
I argues for metaphysical purpose because it cannot arise from no-purpose 1 
or mechanism. However, they argue that phenomenal consciousness does not II 
imply metaphysical consciousness because phenomenal purposes are contra-
dictory and antagonistic. This conclusion is a~ sequitur and fails to 
understand the nature of consciousness. The human being is conscious of 
conflicting purposes, of choosing among them, and casting out the 
1 Thus, Dean Knudson says, "True metaphysical reality does not consist 
in any mere substance, material or immaterial, passive or active, 
which somehow persists through time, but in the unifying and self-
identifying activity of consciousness.H PP, 171. 
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rejected ones. The world-ground, if conscious, may be doing the same 
thing. The transient character of evil and the persistence of the good 
imply this; the theory of a finite God demands it, and can satisfactorily 
account for it. Moreover, while the conclusion of unconscious purpose 
is not necessary, the theory of unconscious purpose is embarrassed to 
account for the emergence of consciousness. 
The Emergence of Consciousness. 
Hartmann rightfully differentiates consciousness from sensi-
bility,1 from memory, 2 and also from the idea to which it Umust be an 
aceident."3 However, he then argues that "The essential similarity of 
conscious and unconscious mental action alone causes a fundamentally 
different origin for both to appear unthinkable,"4 and derives the 
conscious from the unconscious in a peculiar way: 
The mind before the rise of consciousness can have no 
other ideas than those ••• called into being by the will 
••• Then organized matter suddenly breaks in upon this 
self-contained peace of the unconscious, and in the 
reaction of sensation occurring according to necessary 
law thrusts upon the astonished individual spirit an 
idea which falls upon it as from the skies, for it finds 
in itself no will to this idea. For the first time, 'the 
matter of intuition is given to it from without.' •• This 
amazement of the will at the rebellion against its pre-
viously acknowledged sway, this sensation which the inter-
loping idea produces in the unconscious, this is con-
sciousness.5 
This account has its difficulties, for it would seem that there must 
1 Hartmann, PU, II:SO. 
2 Ibid., II:SO. 
3 Ibid., II:82. 
4 Ibid., II:Sl. 
5 Ibid., II:83-84. 
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already be consciousness where 'the matter of intuition is given,' and 
amazement is a reaction in consciousness, not unconsciousness itself. The 
explanation really reads back into the Unconscious the conscious, and 
makes the Unconscious a type of universal soul substance; a dark sub-
stratum which produces consciousness, but is itself neither conscious, 
nor material. The criticism that self-psychology brings against the soul 
concept in the human realln would seem to be even more apropos in the 
metaphysical (and purposive) realm. The Unconscious no longer means the 
non-conscious; and the origin of consciousness, if not its troubling, 
remains a mystery. 
The explanation of M. Galey in his De l'inconscient au 
Conscient is hardly any more satisfactory. M. Galey writes: 
In the 11 ving being we have seen the original and 
creative unconscious dynamo-psychism enriched and en-
lightened, so to speak, by conscious acquisitions. We 
have noted the progressive and unlimited tendency to 
unification, to harmonious fusion of unconsciousness 
with consciousness, and have been able to infer that 
the multitude of evolutionary experiences integrally 
retained and transmuted into new capacities, has, as its 
result, the greater and greater realisation of conscious-
ness which absorbs the primitive consciousness. 
In the evolving universe the process is the same. At 
first it represents a very ocean of unconsciousness; 
then, from that ocean, there emerge islets or icebergs 
of consciousness. These are at first very small, very 
few, and isolated; the waves of unconsciousness fre-
quently submerge them. But the evolutionary impulse 
continues; the islets grow, are multiplied, and join. 
They form great continents whose summits shine in full 
consciousness; but their base and foundations lie deep 
in the Unconscious whence they arose and of whose nature 
they partake.l 
1 M. Galey, ~· Cit., 2?5-276. 
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This account is figurative and assertatory, but otherwise valueless. The 
difference between the unconscious and the conscious is assumed, but not 
explained; and the way the latter can arise from the former remains, 
again, a mystery. jl 
Still other investigators, like George Romanes, Lloyd Morgan, 1 
I 
Max Verworn, and Jacques Loeb1 have inquired at what point in the organic ! 
series of evolution we can assume that consciousness arises, and what 
its earliest form is. In comment upon this search, we may note that 
Hartmann observed that "consciousness itself can only be or not be, 
never be more or less."2 When it comes to the development of conscious- l1 
ness, "gradualism" falls into difficulty, and simply confuses the real 
issue.3 Professor w. R. Sorley sees the problem most clearly as he 
writes: 
The entrance into space and time of a new finite center ~~ 
of conscious life remains an event which we are unable I 
to connect with any special feature of the cell from 
which its organism was developed or of the medium which I I supplied it with nouris~ent. And in its life as in I 
it~:r:::i::l:: ::::::unting for tne emergence of oonsciouanesa I 
lies simply in this uniqueness which consists in a four-fold capacity for 
(1) awareness of meaning; (2) time-transcendence; (3) experienced self-
1 
2 
3 
4 
Hocking, TP, 5'7. 
Hartmann, PU, II:l04. 
As Laird says, "The mere fact that the brain is stimulated does not 
explain perception, and the mere fact that the brain endures and 
retains traces of former stimulation does not explain memory. We 
have to trust perception and memory in order to obtain this physio-
logical information, and we have no right to disown these witnesses I 
at a later stage of the argument." Laird, SR, 59. 
1
1 
Sorley, MVIG, 442. 
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\ consciousness; (4) process and conation.1 
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Of these four the second is 
the least private. It is the one Henri Bergson stresses as particularly 
characteristic of consciousness. Through it, consciousness "survives 
the fleeting states of perception and binds the various successions into 
a harmony of experience.n2 
Pure duration is the for.m which the succession of our 
conscious states assumes when our ego lets itself 
live, when it refrains from separating its present 
state from its former states. For this purpose it may 
not be entirely absorbed in the passing sensation or 
idea; for then, on the contrary, it would no longer 
endure. 3 
As the quality of time-transcendence is wholly absent from our uncon-
scious experience and only arises if consciousness gains a phantom 
grasp of the fugitive unconscious, and brings it into the conscious, 
it would seem that under the law of sufficient reason, if we reason 
empirically, consciousness could only be explained satisfactorily by a 
metaphysic that was either conscious or super-conscious. We will return 
to this problem at the close of the chapter. 
The Resulting Position of Unconscious Purpose. 
It will sufrice here to note that as Professors W. R. Sorley4 
and E. s. Brightman5 point out, the theory of unconscious purpose 
occupies an uncertain place between conscious purpose and mechanism. 
This arises from the nature of the terms which the theory attempts to 
1 Brightman, Outline for the Philosophy of Religion, 1932, p. 22. 
2 Flewelling, R. T., Bergson and Personal Realism {BPR}, N. Y.: 
Abingdon Press, 1920. P. 44. 
3 Bergson, Time and Free Will, 100. 
4 MVIG, 408ff. 
5 IT.P, 307f. 
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unite-. If the unconscious purpose is unconscious in the sense of being 
without consciousness, it would appear to be without the element of 
time-transcendence. Any form of continuity which could arise would have 
to issue from a mechanical principle or an element of sheer-dynamic 
force. This leads the theory of unconscious purpose toward mechanism, 
or materialism. 
On the other hand, if the unconscious purpose is truly purpos-
ive, it would seem to demand time~transcendence in order that constancy 
of motivation, consistency of planning would be possible. It is 
impossible to conceive how there can be a cosmic purpose maintained 
behind the intricate interaction revealed in our modern world, and yet 
posit that there is no abiding awareness that the purpose is the same 
now as it was, and is now the same as it will be retained in the 
future, or as it will be consciously varied for intelligible reasons. 
Stress upon this factor, consequently, inclines the theory to an ultimate I 
position of conscious purpose. 
The problem thus develops: to what degree is the quality of 
time-transcendence essential to the realization, appreciation, and 
conservation of values, and does the resulting evidence imply mechanism 
or consciousness? Let us examine this problem. 
** *** ** 
* * * 
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The Instrumental Values1 of Order, Continuity, and Change. 
In considering these values, or qualities, in the order named, 
the implications for time-transcendence become increasingly great. Under Ill 
the influence of the dynamic and energistic conceptions of being, the I 
role of law has become of especial importance in providing the orderliness j 
of the world. If laws are thought of as deliberately contrived by the 
world-ground, the element of time-transcendence would be involved. 
However, if they are thought of as being the result of chance, as 
Platonic forms, or if the whole order is considered as being eternal, 
consciousness would only be necessary for the subjective appreciation 
of orderliness. 
In regard to the continuity of cosmological being, it is 
possible to make an explanation on a similar basis. The difficulty, 
however, is greater. Laws are not generally thought of as executing 
themselves. If they coerce the wild energy of atomic being in order to 
maintain given forms moment to moment, they must be ascribed an active 
being, and the continuity demands a process operating as a mechanism, as 
an instinct, or as controlled by a purpose. The last is preferred 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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II 
today. Yet, it can only be conceived as keeping its identity from impulse ! 
1 We have no desire to 'beg the question.' If the world-ground is an 
unconscious purpose it will not 'desire' order, continuity, and 
change, but will simply effect them. In this case, the term 
'quality' might be substituted for 'value.' 
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to impulse as it transcends the changing moments in the unity of con-
sciousness. 
In confronting change, moreover, one is faced with the emer-
genae of the new and the unique. If these be explained as the product 
of blind chance, the result of preformation, or the consequence of 
subsequent eternal forms, one is led back to pure contingency, to the 
original state of being as inexplicable, or to the problems of inter-
action in a pluralistic universe, respectively. Each has its difficulty 
which purpose would avoid. But free purpose, as we have said, could 
account for the change, only as it transcended all processes of change 
in the enduring unity of consciousness. 1 
The Appreciation and Realization of the Intrinsic Values. 
While the factor of time-transcendence was possible, yet 
problematic, in the nature of order and becoming, it is essential for 
an appreciation of the higher values such as the aesthetic, the moral, 
the religious, and the intellectual. 
The aesthetic values come nearest to being an exception. 
Things of beauty have an immediate appeal. However, the aesthetic moment 
is enhanced by memories, meditation, and comparison. The most complete 
aesthetic experiences are only possible where time-transcendence enables 
the overtones to develop and resound on the immediate moment. 
To the other values, time-transcendence is a ~ qua ~· 
The moral experience is inexplicable except as we posit the unity of 
1 Cf. Flewelling, BPR, 156ff. 
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consciousness.l There could be no moral life if the moment of evaluatio 
the feeling of obligation~ and the final choice could not be merged in 
the transcending identity of an individual person. There could be no 
moral persons if moral autonomy could not reach out in conscious exten-
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sion over the volition of the individual. 
essentiallj In religious experience, religious values arise most 
out of man's relation to God, and the belief that that relation is a 
mutual one. 2 The immediate experience alone is marked for its depth, 
and for its tendency to pervade the entire consciousness. Thus, it 
involves time-transcendence. Moreover, the experience itself has to be 
criticized, its objective reference has to be tested, its subjective 
effect noted, and its imp~ications discovered. Finally, the unity of 
the personality has to be maintained -- and maintained in harmony with 
the values established by God and ratified by the self; otherwise, the 
sincerity of the self is sacrificed to hypocrisy and returns in self-
reproach, an unhappy consciousness. 
Likewise, in the quest for the True, an abiding gift of time-
transcendence is essential in order that the critical and appraising 
reason can be extended indefinitely over the entire gamut of life's 
experiences, and return them, a consistent universe, to the rational 
subject. Possibly if one conceives knowledge to exist in Platonic ideas, 
1 As Laird says, there could be no inference at all "unless one and 
the same mind is aware of the premises and draws the conclusions." 
SR, 153. 
2 In the Christian view of God, at least, Augustine's famous phrase 
might well be reversed, "For He is restless until all have found 
rest in Him." See the Confessions of Augustine. 
I 
I 
.j 
II 
I 
I 
I 11---
II 
l 
I 
I 
I 
~ 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Ji 
II 
195 
==-=-=--. +===---·= 
and posits an abstract will to realize them, one can think with Hartmann 
of intelligence as unconscious. But if one is dealing rather with 
individuals who seek to unify all ideas into a coherent system, it is 
impossible to conceive the process as unconscious, or dismiss the factor 
of time-transcendence. The experience of rational truth demands the 
II 
I 
It II 
.I 
I 
unity of consciousness attaining a synoptic grasp of its total experience, 
1 
explicated in te nns of a coherent and a consistent framework. I 
II 
If it be pointed out that these values are the values of men; 
II that they demand consciousness on the part of man, but do not imply it 
in the world-ground1 the origin of value-questing, value-realizing man 
I 
becomes a mystery. Once again, as happened among the Greeks, man becomes 
greater than the cosmic being which produces him; if not in constancy, 
at least in cogency.2 Instead of escaping from the difficulties of 
anthropomorphism, thought falls back into mechanomorphism, zoomorphism, 
dynamorphism, or geometricomorphism.3 It becomes an ironic result of 
such reasoning that Hartmann conceived the idea that some day the 
accumulating consciousness in the minds of men would bestow freedom on 
the most High, and bring redemption to the world-ground·. Then must the 
Creator, the Unconscious 
Man's forgiveness give-- and take% 4 
I 
In cri ti ci sm of this view it may well be argued: 
I 
1 As Hartmann does who has the Unconscious only coming to consciousness 
in man. 
2 Even more 'immortal' as far as conscious identity is concerned. 
3 If such barbarous phrases may be coined. Janet uses the tem 
nzoomorphism" in his Final Causes. 
4 Omar Khayyam, the Rubai ya t, (Fitzgerald translation} quatrain lxxxi. 
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+:1 =========== Man is organic to nature and owes his capacities to !I the power that lies back of nature. This back-lying 
Power must, as cause, be at least equal to the human 
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spirit which it produces ••• Numerous efforts have been 
made to derive the moral from the nonmoral ••• (Yet) 
Between the "natural" and the "moral" there is a gulf 
which no logic can bridge. If an adequate cause of 
man's moral nature is, therefore, to be found, it must 
be in a world-ground that is itself moral.l 
The same argument might be . applied to man's religious and intellectual 
values. Yet, to a degree, these are dependent upon the above argument 
just as it stands. 
II 
II 
'I Man's confidence in God is in a precarious way unless I, 
I God's moral dependability is valid; his zest in religion redounds in 
illusionism unless God is conscious of him and both can and will treat 
him as a moral agent. In turn, man's love and quest for Truth becomes 
an empty shell if the world-ground can act and change unconsciously; 
hence, non-morally. The world becomes irrational in both senses of the 
word, and no longer only in one. 
** ** ** 
The Conservation of Values 
If an agency capable of time-transcendence is essential for 
II 
I 
II 
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the realization and appreciation of value, it is also necessary for their 11 
I, 
conservation. As Professor Harald H8ffding reminds us, although it is 
"within the realm of personal! ty that the relation of value to real! ty 
II 
1 
I, 
Knudson, 00, 355-356. Cf. Bossuet, "One cannot comprehend, in this l'l 
whole that does not understand, this part that does, for intelli- II 
gence cannot originate from a brute and insensate thing." Connais- ',·,I 
sance et Dieu et soi-meme, chap. IV. Q.uoted by Janet, FC, 185. 
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is experienced, nl "values seem to share the fate of psychical life in 
general, only in a more fragmentary form. n 2 Professor H8ffding has 
made, therefore, a "belief in the conservation of values" the fundamental 
maxim of his philosophy of religion, and he speaks of God as "that which 
supports and comprehends within itself all values;"3 as "that which is 
both the origin and consummation of all values; n4 and as "the power that 
is the bearer of all values in the world of reality.n5 Nevertheless, in 
his desire not to go beyond the data of science, he denies that the con-
servation of values has any relation to the conservation of persons,6 
refers to God a number of times as nothing more than the bare principle 
of the conservation of value, and admits that God himself may be changing 
in accord with primary laws.7 Hgffding's conservative faith was limited 
by the influence of the positivistic position which he once held, and 
which continued later to influence his critical monism. This has held 
him more loyal to a vague, unconscious purpose than it would appear his 
own religious axiom would permit. 
The poet, John Keats, was far from phenomenalism, and out of 
accord with science, when he sang, 
a thing of beauty is a joy forever.s 
Science shows us a world today in which there is hardly a thing permanent 
1 Hoffding, The Philosophy of Religion (PR), 
N. Y.: Macmillan (1906) 1914, p. 274. 
Ibid.' 255. 
Ibid. ' 180-181. 
Ibid., 181. 
trans. by B. E. Meyer. 
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Ibid. , 180-181. 
Ibid., 249ff. 
Ibid., 160-161. 
"Endymion", book 1. 
---1---
198 
"---'--------------===-=-=--~--~----=-==-=~------------__ -===---=---~--
and abiding. According to prevailing scientific opinion, the main 
conditions of our planet as well as its highest achievements in the 
finest aspects of being, are only a transitory phase in the career of 
our physical universe and the general ongoing of things. All is a 
Heraclitean flux. If then there is to be a conservation of fragile 
values, it must be grounded in the ability of fundamental being to 
transcend time, and project the values it appreciates across eternity. 
** ** ** 
Criticism and Reconsideration 
The Limitations of the Finite Consciousness. 
The type of experience sought in the highest values, however, 
the exponents of unconscious puxpose might argue, cannot be attained in 
consciousness on account of the shortcomings of conscious experience. 
Consciousness alternates between the universal and the particular; it 
often takes refuge in concentration and becomes impervious to much of 
one's activity; it awakens in pain, worry, and suffering, and so only 
disturbs harmonies already established. In response, it may be pointed 
out that an alternation between the universal and the particular is 
preferable to no awareness of either. Moreover, such alternation is not 
final in consciousness, but is overcome in the mind by the very ability 
of consciousness to merge the two moments in a single meaning. The 
power of concentration does indeed, on the other hand, destroy the range 
of consciousness. Yet, the finite consciousness lays no claim to omnis-
cience, and as finite, can only be expected to maintain its own identity 
---- ------------ ----
--------------~ 
amid the happy consistency of its own meaning. Finally, the fact that 
"consciousness comes on the scene when our breathing is disturbed: and 
even then it is more of a nuisance than a help, like an old maid weeping 
when someone is hurt, n1 merely emphasizes the difference between the 
psychical and the physiological. Life does not consist in any movement 
that is material alone, no matter how harmonious it may be. No value 
attaches to the perfection with which a robot may be made to propel a 
bicycle. Values come to the bicyclist as he consciously appreciates the 
swift rush of wind, the symmetry of movement, and the delicate adjustment 
of his motion to the laws of gravity and equilibrium. In this way he 
transcends the experience, and he carries the ride away with him as a 
memory in the sum total of his experience. 2 
It is a grievous mistake, therefore, even though it be a common 
one, to endeavor to escape the finiteness of consciousness by dismtssing 
the unity of apperception which makes the wider ranges of our experience 
possible. Consciousness dissolves in the unconscious: it is not 
explained by it. The solution to finiteness is not the unconscious, but 
1 Laird, SR, 155. 
2 Laird defends consciousness as follows: "Many :philosophers, it is 
true, are at pains to point out that consciousness tends to dis-
appear altogether when intense interest fills the sails or utter 
concentration takes the helm. Self-forgetfulness, they say, is 
the law of crisis, of spiritual awakening, of deeds of valour in 
mettlesome emergencies, of love and joy and supreme skill. The 
wrestler is his tottering opponent, the hunter IS the trigger of 
his Winchester. This argument, however, is beside the point; for 
what is absent in these cases is not consciousness but self-
cognition. Archimedes was not unconscious when the soldier killed 
him, but he was so intent on geometry and so inattentive to himself 
that he was aa defenceless as a :penguin." SR, 154. 
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places the former contents of consciousness in a prison without stone 
walls or iron bars, adds a province of new experiences, and establishes 
a contrast provocative of acute pain and poignant regret. Forgiveness 
builds upon the original foundations of innocency, and the later fact 
of wrong-doing; then, out of the resulting contrast between self-approval 
and self-disapproval, which distils the only completely devastating 
suffering, forgiveness brings a .conscious appreciation of the benevolent 
reconstruction of all meanings in the ongoing of an ever-evaluating being, 
and redeems the undying conti'ast with an add.i tional moment which heals 
while it conserves. 
The content of conscious experiences thus grows like the 
annular rings of the California redwood. Yet, amid the flaccid contrasts 
of simple boredom, or amid the most striking contrasts of spiritual 
discovery, the factor of awareness xemains constant. It is difficult 
to see how it could be added to the universal, the world-ground, or the 
Unconscious, without bringing its own intrinsic nature along. Conse-
quently, if we are to reason from experience, it would appear that the 
notion of the super-conscious admits the very factor that would make the 
Unconscious a contradictory and misleading characterization of the world-
ground. 
Despite the valuable part the concept of unconscious purpose has 
played in modern philosophy, criticism shows it to be playing a difricult, 
temporizing rOle~ and suffering from an inescapable instability due to 
the nature of the terms it seeks to combine. As it was developed in a 
large way in modern thought when mechanism was one of the most accepted 
points of view, it was then a most striking critic of the mechanistic 
philosophy. Today, when the popularity of mechanism has disappeared 
from science itself, the view stands more as a critic of, and a 
substitute for theism. Here it has an apparent advantage in the fact 
that it can admit and even declare the contradictory elements in the 
world-order. Nevertheless, it does not and cannot explain them. Con-
sequently, it resembles the empirical frankness of the advocates of a 
finite God. Yet, it lacks their greater cogency, and ultimately it 
leaves the meaning of the universe moored to that which is not aware 
itself of where it goes, what it knows, or why it wills. 
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Ood is not to be treated 
as an exception to all 
metaphysical principles, 
invoked to save their 
collapse. He is their 
chief exemplification. 
Whitehead, PR, 521 
..-"! ·· l J fJL / v ,-... 
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